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src/lib/libssl/ssl_clnt.c

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/* $OpenBSD: ssl_clnt.c,v 1.165 2024/02/03 18:03:49 tb Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* openssl-core@openssl.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license provided above.
*
* ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by
* Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories.
*
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
*
* The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by
* Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
* license.
*
* The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of
* Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites
* support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL.
*
* No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in
* the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received
* expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise.
*
* No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not
* infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third
* party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights
* to make use of the Contribution.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN
* ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA
* SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY
* OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR
* OTHERWISE.
*/
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/md5.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include "bytestring.h"
#include "dtls_local.h"
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include "ssl_sigalgs.h"
#include "ssl_tlsext.h"
static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b);
static int ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_dtls_hello_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s);
static int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey);
static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_client_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_send_client_finished(SSL *s);
static int ssl3_get_server_finished(SSL *s);
int
ssl3_connect(SSL *s)
{
int new_state, state, skip = 0;
int ret = -1;
ERR_clear_error();
errno = 0;
s->in_handshake++;
if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s))
SSL_clear(s);
for (;;) {
state = s->s3->hs.state;
switch (s->s3->hs.state) {
case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE:
s->renegotiate = 1;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_CONNECT;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++;
/* break */
case SSL_ST_BEFORE:
case SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT:
s->server = 0;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1);
if (!ssl_legacy_stack_version(s, s->version)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl_supported_tls_version_range(s,
&s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version,
&s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl_security_version(s,
s->s3->hs.our_min_tls_version)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_init_buffer(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 0)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
/* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */
if (!tls1_transcript_init(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++;
s->init_num = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/* mark client_random uninitialized */
memset(s->s3->client_random, 0,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random));
s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
s->hit = 0;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B:
s->shutdown = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/* every DTLS ClientHello resets Finished MAC */
tls1_transcript_reset(s);
dtls1_start_timer(s);
}
ret = ssl3_send_client_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s) && s->d1->send_cookie) {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
} else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */
if (s->bbio != s->wbio)
s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio);
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_hello(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->hit) {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
if (!SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) {
/* receive renewed session ticket */
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
}
/* No client certificate verification. */
tls1_transcript_free(s);
}
} else if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
s->s3->hs.state = DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A;
} else {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A:
case DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B:
ret = ssl3_get_dtls_hello_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->d1->send_cookie) /* start again, with a cookie */
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B:
ret = ssl3_check_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (ret == 2) {
s->hit = 1;
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
}
/* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH. */
if (!(s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth &
SSL_aNULL)) {
ret = ssl3_get_server_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (s->tlsext_status_expected)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
} else {
skip = 1;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A;
s->init_num = 0;
/*
* At this point we check that we have the
* required stuff from the server.
*/
if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B:
ret = ssl3_get_certificate_request(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B:
ret = ssl3_get_server_done(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_certificate(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
/*
* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert
* sent back
*/
/*
* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain
* of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent
*/
/*
* XXX: For now, we do not support client
* authentication in ECDH cipher suites with
* ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates.
* We need to skip the certificate verify
* message when client's ECDH public key is sent
* inside the client certificate.
*/
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request == 1) {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A;
} else {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_verify(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
s->init_num = 0;
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s) && !s->hit)
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_change_cipher_spec(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
s->session->cipher = s->s3->hs.cipher;
if (!tls1_setup_key_block(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!tls1_change_write_cipher_state(s)) {
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s) && !s->hit)
dtls1_start_timer(s);
ret = ssl3_send_client_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (!SSL_is_dtls(s))
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH;
/* clear flags */
if (s->hit) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state = SSL_ST_OK;
} else {
/* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */
if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected)
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state =
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A;
else
s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state =
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
}
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B:
ret = ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B:
ret = ssl3_get_cert_status(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A:
case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B:
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1;
else
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
ret = ssl3_get_server_finished(s);
if (ret <= 0)
goto end;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s))
dtls1_stop_timer(s);
if (s->hit)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL_ST_OK;
s->init_num = 0;
break;
case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH:
s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING;
if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) {
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/* If the write error was fatal, stop trying */
if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) {
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state;
}
}
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
s->s3->hs.state = s->s3->hs.tls12.next_state;
break;
case SSL_ST_OK:
/* clean a few things up */
tls1_cleanup_key_block(s);
if (s->s3->handshake_transcript != NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
ret = -1;
goto end;
}
if (!SSL_is_dtls(s))
ssl3_release_init_buffer(s);
ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s);
s->init_num = 0;
s->renegotiate = 0;
s->new_session = 0;
ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT);
if (s->hit)
s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++;
ret = 1;
/* s->server=0; */
s->handshake_func = ssl3_connect;
s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1);
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
/* done with handshaking */
s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0;
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0;
}
goto end;
/* break; */
default:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE);
ret = -1;
goto end;
/* break; */
}
/* did we do anything */
if (!s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message && !skip) {
if (s->s3->hs.state != state) {
new_state = s->s3->hs.state;
s->s3->hs.state = state;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP, 1);
s->s3->hs.state = new_state;
}
}
skip = 0;
}
end:
s->in_handshake--;
ssl_info_callback(s, SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT, ret);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_hello(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, client_hello, session_id, cookie, cipher_suites;
CBB compression_methods;
uint16_t max_version;
size_t sl;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) {
SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session;
if (!ssl_max_supported_version(s, &max_version)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE);
return (-1);
}
s->version = max_version;
if (sess == NULL || sess->ssl_version != s->version ||
(sess->session_id_length == 0 && sess->tlsext_tick == NULL) ||
sess->not_resumable) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0))
goto err;
}
/* else use the pre-loaded session */
/*
* If a DTLS ClientHello message is being resent after a
* HelloVerifyRequest, we must retain the original client
* random value.
*/
if (!SSL_is_dtls(s) || s->d1->send_cookie == 0)
arc4random_buf(s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_hello,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16(&client_hello, s->version))
goto err;
/* Random stuff */
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&client_hello, s->s3->client_random,
sizeof(s->s3->client_random)))
goto err;
/* Session ID */
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &session_id))
goto err;
if (!s->new_session &&
s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
sl = s->session->session_id_length;
if (sl > sizeof(s->session->session_id)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&session_id,
s->session->session_id, sl))
goto err;
}
/* DTLS Cookie. */
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
if (s->d1->cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->cookie)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cookie))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
s->d1->cookie_len))
goto err;
}
/* Ciphers supported */
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(&client_hello, &cipher_suites))
return 0;
if (!ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s, SSL_get_ciphers(s),
&cipher_suites)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE);
goto err;
}
/* Add in compression methods (null) */
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(&client_hello,
&compression_methods))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8(&compression_methods, 0))
goto err;
/* TLS extensions */
if (!tlsext_client_build(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_CH, &client_hello)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_dtls_hello_verify(SSL *s)
{
CBS hello_verify_request, cookie;
size_t cookie_len;
uint16_t ssl_version;
int al, ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A,
DTLS1_ST_CR_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0)
return ret;
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
s->d1->send_cookie = 0;
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->init_num < 0)
goto decode_err;
CBS_init(&hello_verify_request, s->init_msg,
s->init_num);
if (!CBS_get_u16(&hello_verify_request, &ssl_version))
goto decode_err;
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&hello_verify_request, &cookie))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(&hello_verify_request) != 0)
goto decode_err;
/*
* Per RFC 6347 section 4.2.1, the HelloVerifyRequest should always
* contain DTLSv1.0 the version that is going to be negotiated.
* Tolerate DTLSv1.2 just in case.
*/
if (ssl_version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl_version != DTLS1_2_VERSION) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (ssl_version & 0xff);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&cookie, s->d1->cookie,
sizeof(s->d1->cookie), &cookie_len)) {
s->d1->cookie_len = 0;
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->d1->cookie_len = cookie_len;
s->d1->send_cookie = 1;
return 1;
decode_err:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return -1;
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, server_random, session_id;
uint16_t server_version, cipher_suite;
uint8_t compression_method;
const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
int al, ret;
s->first_packet = 1;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000 /* ?? */)) <= 0)
return ret;
s->first_packet = 0;
if (s->init_num < 0)
goto decode_err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) {
if (s->d1->send_cookie == 0) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
} else {
/* Already sent a cookie. */
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
}
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &server_version))
goto decode_err;
if (!ssl_check_version_from_server(s, server_version)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION);
s->version = (s->version & 0xff00) | (server_version & 0xff);
al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.peer_legacy_version = server_version;
s->version = server_version;
s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version = ssl_tls_version(server_version);
if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((method = ssl_get_method(server_version)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->method = method;
/* Server random. */
if (!CBS_get_bytes(&cbs, &server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto decode_err;
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&server_random, s->s3->server_random,
sizeof(s->s3->server_random), NULL))
goto err;
if (s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION &&
s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version < s->s3->hs.our_max_tls_version) {
/*
* RFC 8446 section 4.1.3. We must not downgrade if the server
* random value contains the TLS 1.2 or TLS 1.1 magical value.
*/
if (!CBS_skip(&server_random,
CBS_len(&server_random) - sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12)))
goto err;
if (s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version == TLS1_2_VERSION &&
CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_12,
sizeof(tls13_downgrade_12))) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (CBS_mem_equal(&server_random, tls13_downgrade_11,
sizeof(tls13_downgrade_11))) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
/* Session ID. */
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_id))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(&session_id) > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG);
goto fatal_err;
}
/* Cipher suite. */
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &cipher_suite))
goto decode_err;
/*
* Check if we want to resume the session based on external
* pre-shared secret.
*/
if (s->tls_session_secret_cb != NULL) {
SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL;
int master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key);
if (!s->tls_session_secret_cb(s,
s->session->master_key, &master_key_length, NULL,
&pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (master_key_length <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->session->master_key_length = master_key_length;
if ((s->session->cipher = pref_cipher) == NULL)
s->session->cipher =
ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite);
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
}
if (s->session->session_id_length != 0 &&
CBS_mem_equal(&session_id, s->session->session_id,
s->session->session_id_length)) {
if (s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length ||
timingsafe_memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,
s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length) != 0) {
/* actually a client application bug */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK;
s->hit = 1;
} else {
/* a miss or crap from the other end */
/* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new
* SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */
s->hit = 0;
if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) {
if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 0)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
}
/*
* XXX - improve the handling for the case where there is a
* zero length session identifier.
*/
if (!CBS_write_bytes(&session_id, s->session->session_id,
sizeof(s->session->session_id),
&s->session->session_id_length))
goto err;
s->session->ssl_version = s->version;
}
if ((cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_value(cipher_suite)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto fatal_err;
}
/* TLS v1.2 only ciphersuites require v1.2 or later. */
if ((cipher->algorithm_ssl & SSL_TLSV1_2) &&
s->s3->hs.negotiated_tls_version < TLS1_2_VERSION) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!ssl_cipher_in_list(SSL_get_ciphers(s), cipher)) {
/* we did not say we would use this cipher */
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED);
goto fatal_err;
}
/*
* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher
* and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that
* cipher_id is set and use it for comparison.
*/
if (s->session->cipher)
s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id;
if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != cipher->id)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.cipher = cipher;
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_init(s))
goto err;
/*
* Don't digest cached records if no sigalgs: we may need them for
* client authentication.
*/
if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
tls1_transcript_free(s);
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cbs, &compression_method))
goto decode_err;
if (compression_method != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!tlsext_client_parse(s, SSL_TLSEXT_MSG_SH, &cbs, &al)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
goto decode_err;
/*
* Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to
* avoid an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server
* hello because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an
* attack. However this would mean we could not connect to any server
* which doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI
* absence on initial connect only.
*/
if (!s->s3->renegotiate_seen &&
!(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT)) {
al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT);
goto err;
}
return (1);
decode_err:
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
{
CBS cbs, cert_list, cert_data;
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = NULL;
X509 *cert = NULL;
const uint8_t *p;
int al, ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0)
return ret;
ret = -1;
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (s->init_num < 0)
goto decode_err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cbs, &cert_list))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0)
goto decode_err;
while (CBS_len(&cert_list) > 0) {
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_list, &cert_data))
goto decode_err;
p = CBS_data(&cert_data);
if ((cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, CBS_len(&cert_data))) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (p != CBS_data(&cert_data) + CBS_len(&cert_data))
goto decode_err;
if (!sk_X509_push(certs, cert)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
cert = NULL;
}
/* A server must always provide a non-empty certificate list. */
if (sk_X509_num(certs) < 1) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE);
goto decode_err;
}
if (ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, certs) <= 0 &&
s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) {
al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result;
ERR_clear_error();
if (!tls_process_peer_certs(s, certs))
goto err;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
decode_err:
/* wrong packet length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
}
err:
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
X509_free(cert);
return (ret);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
{
int decode_error, invalid_params, invalid_key;
int nid = NID_dhKeyAgreement;
tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share);
if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new_nid(nid)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_peer_params(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbs,
&decode_error, &invalid_params)) {
if (decode_error) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
}
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbs,
&decode_error, &invalid_key)) {
if (decode_error) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
}
goto err;
}
if (invalid_params) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
if (invalid_key) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_peer_security(s, s->s3->hs.key_share)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
return 0;
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBS *cbs)
{
uint8_t curve_type;
uint16_t group_id;
int decode_error;
CBS public;
if (!CBS_get_u8(cbs, &curve_type))
goto decode_err;
if (!CBS_get_u16(cbs, &group_id))
goto decode_err;
/* Only named curves are supported. */
if (curve_type != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(cbs, &public))
goto decode_err;
/*
* Check that the group is one of our preferences - if it is not,
* the server has sent us an invalid group.
*/
if (!tls1_check_group(s, group_id)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_CURVE);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER);
goto err;
}
tls_key_share_free(s->s3->hs.key_share);
if ((s->s3->hs.key_share = tls_key_share_new(group_id)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_peer_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public,
&decode_error, NULL)) {
if (decode_error)
goto decode_err;
goto err;
}
return 1;
decode_err:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
err:
return 0;
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb;
CBS cbs, params, signature;
EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
unsigned char *signed_params = NULL;
size_t signed_params_len;
size_t params_len;
long alg_k, alg_a;
int al, ret;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth;
/*
* Use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request()
* as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped.
*/
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0)
return ret;
if ((md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (s->init_num < 0)
goto err;
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Do not skip server key exchange if this cipher suite uses
* ephemeral keys.
*/
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return (1);
}
if (!CBB_init(&cbb, 0))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE))
goto err;
CBS_dup(&cbs, &params);
if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (!ssl3_get_server_kex_dhe(s, &cbs))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
if (!ssl3_get_server_kex_ecdhe(s, &cbs))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((params_len = CBS_offset(&cbs)) > CBS_len(&params))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb, CBS_data(&params), params_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, &signed_params, &signed_params_len))
goto err;
/* if it was signed, check the signature */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aNULL) == 0) {
uint16_t sigalg_value = SIGALG_NONE;
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) != 0 &&
s->session->peer_cert_type == SSL_PKEY_RSA) {
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert);
} else if ((alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) != 0 &&
s->session->peer_cert_type == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert);
}
if (pkey == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!CBS_get_u16(&cbs, &sigalg_value))
goto decode_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &signature))
goto decode_err;
if (CBS_len(&signature) > EVP_PKEY_size(pkey)) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_for_peer(s, pkey,
sigalg_value)) == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->hs.peer_sigalg = sigalg;
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(md_ctx, &pctx, sigalg->md(),
NULL, pkey))
goto err;
if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx,
RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1)))
goto err;
if (EVP_DigestVerify(md_ctx, CBS_data(&signature),
CBS_len(&signature), signed_params, signed_params_len) <= 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
if (CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE);
goto fatal_err;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
free(signed_params);
return (1);
decode_err:
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
free(signed_params);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s)
{
CBS cert_request, cert_types, rdn_list;
X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
const unsigned char *q;
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;
int ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0)
return ret;
ret = 0;
s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 0;
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
/*
* If we get here we don't need any cached handshake records
* as we wont be doing client auth.
*/
tls1_transcript_free(s);
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto err;
}
/* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */
if (s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER);
goto err;
}
if (s->init_num < 0)
goto decode_err;
CBS_init(&cert_request, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if ((ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u8_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &cert_types))
goto decode_err;
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
CBS sigalgs;
if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &sigalgs)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (CBS_len(&sigalgs) % 2 != 0 || CBS_len(&sigalgs) > 64) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&sigalgs, &s->s3->hs.sigalgs,
&s->s3->hs.sigalgs_len))
goto err;
}
/* get the CA RDNs */
if (CBS_len(&cert_request) < 2) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cert_request, &rdn_list) ||
CBS_len(&cert_request) != 0) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
while (CBS_len(&rdn_list) > 0) {
CBS rdn;
if (CBS_len(&rdn_list) < 2) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&rdn_list, &rdn)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG);
goto err;
}
q = CBS_data(&rdn);
if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &q, CBS_len(&rdn))) == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (q != CBS_data(&rdn) + CBS_len(&rdn)) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto err;
}
if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
xn = NULL; /* avoid free in err block */
}
/* we should setup a certificate to return.... */
s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 1;
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->hs.tls12.ca_names, X509_NAME_free);
s->s3->hs.tls12.ca_names = ca_sk;
ca_sk = NULL;
ret = 1;
if (0) {
decode_err:
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH);
}
err:
X509_NAME_free(xn);
sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free);
return (ret);
}
static int
ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b)
{
return (X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b));
}
static int
ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s)
{
uint32_t lifetime_hint;
CBS cbs, session_ticket;
unsigned int session_id_length = 0;
int al, ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384)) <= 0)
return ret;
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (s->init_num < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if (!CBS_get_u32(&cbs, &lifetime_hint) ||
!CBS_get_u16_length_prefixed(&cbs, &session_ticket) ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = lifetime_hint;
if (!CBS_stow(&session_ticket, &s->session->tlsext_tick,
&s->session->tlsext_ticklen)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket session.
* One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server
* must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal
* client session ID matching to work and we know much
* earlier that the ticket has been accepted.
*
* The other way is to set zero length session ID when the
* ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine
* session resumption.
*
* We choose the former approach because this fits in with
* assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set
* to the SHA256 hash of the ticket.
*/
/* XXX - ensure this doesn't overflow session_id if hash is changed. */
if (!EVP_Digest(CBS_data(&session_ticket), CBS_len(&session_ticket),
s->session->session_id, &session_id_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->session->session_id_length = session_id_length;
return (1);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
err:
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s)
{
CBS cert_status, response;
uint8_t status_type;
int al, ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, -1, 16384)) <= 0)
return ret;
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) {
/*
* Tell the callback the server did not send us an OSCP
* response, and has decided to head directly to key exchange.
*/
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp);
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL;
s->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len = 0;
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s,
s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
return (1);
}
if (s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE &&
s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (s->init_num < 0) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
CBS_init(&cert_status, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if (!CBS_get_u8(&cert_status, &status_type) ||
CBS_len(&cert_status) < 3) {
/* need at least status type + length */
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!CBS_get_u24_length_prefixed(&cert_status, &response) ||
CBS_len(&cert_status) != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!CBS_stow(&response, &s->tlsext_ocsp_resp,
&s->tlsext_ocsp_resp_len)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) {
ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s,
s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg);
if (ret == 0) {
al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (ret < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto fatal_err;
}
}
return (1);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE,
30 /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */)) <= 0)
return ret;
if (s->init_num != 0) {
/* should contain no data */
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
{
unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
unsigned char *enc_pms = NULL;
uint16_t max_legacy_version;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
RSA *rsa;
int ret = 0;
int enc_len;
CBB epms;
/*
* RSA-Encrypted Premaster Secret Message - RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1.
*/
pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer_cert);
if (pkey == NULL || (rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* Our maximum legacy protocol version - while RFC 5246 section 7.4.7.1
* says "The latest (newest) version supported by the client", if we're
* doing RSA key exchange then we have to presume that we're talking to
* a server that does not understand the supported versions extension
* and therefore our maximum version is that sent in the ClientHello.
*/
if (!ssl_max_legacy_version(s, &max_legacy_version))
goto err;
pms[0] = max_legacy_version >> 8;
pms[1] = max_legacy_version & 0xff;
arc4random_buf(&pms[2], sizeof(pms) - 2);
if ((enc_pms = malloc(RSA_size(rsa))) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
enc_len = RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof(pms), pms, enc_pms, rsa,
RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (enc_len <= 0) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cbb, &epms))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&epms, enc_pms, enc_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, pms, sizeof(pms)))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
explicit_bzero(pms, sizeof(pms));
free(enc_pms);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = 0;
int ret = 0;
/* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key from the server for DHE. */
if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, cbb))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_peer_security(s, s->s3->hs.key_share)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL);
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
freezero(key, key_len);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(SSL *s, CBB *cbb)
{
uint8_t *key = NULL;
size_t key_len = 0;
CBB public;
int ret = 0;
/* Ensure that we have an ephemeral key for ECDHE. */
if (s->s3->hs.key_share == NULL) {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!tls_key_share_generate(s->s3->hs.key_share))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8_length_prefixed(cbb, &public))
return 0;
if (!tls_key_share_public(s->s3->hs.key_share, &public))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cbb))
goto err;
if (!tls_key_share_derive(s->s3->hs.key_share, &key, &key_len))
goto err;
if (!tls12_derive_master_secret(s, key, key_len))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
freezero(key, key_len);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
CBB cbb, kex;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) {
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &kex,
SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE))
goto err;
if (alg_k & SSL_kRSA) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_kex_rsa(s, &kex))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kDHE) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_kex_dhe(s, &kex))
goto err;
} else if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_kex_ecdhe(s, &kex))
goto err;
} else {
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL,
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg, CBB *cert_verify)
{
CBB cbb_signature;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL;
const unsigned char *hdata;
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
size_t signature_len, hdata_len;
int ret = 0;
if ((mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!tls1_transcript_data(s, &hdata, &hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, sigalg->md(), NULL, pkey)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((sigalg->flags & SIGALG_FLAG_RSA_PSS) &&
(!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) ||
!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, -1))) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &signature_len, hdata, hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if ((signature = calloc(1, signature_len)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSign(mctx, signature, &signature_len, hdata, hdata_len)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16(cert_verify, sigalg->value))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
free(signature);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey, CBB *cert_verify)
{
CBB cbb_signature;
RSA *rsa;
unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
unsigned int signature_len;
size_t data_len;
int ret = 0;
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), &data_len))
goto err;
if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, data_len, signature, &signature_len,
rsa) <= 0 ) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
free(signature);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey, CBB *cert_verify)
{
CBB cbb_signature;
EC_KEY *eckey;
unsigned char data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *signature = NULL;
unsigned int signature_len;
int ret = 0;
if (!tls1_transcript_hash_value(s, data, sizeof(data), NULL))
goto err;
if ((signature = calloc(1, EVP_PKEY_size(pkey))) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ECDSA_sign(0, &data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
signature, &signature_len, eckey)) {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB);
goto err;
}
if (!CBB_add_u16_length_prefixed(cert_verify, &cbb_signature))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&cbb_signature, signature, signature_len))
goto err;
if (!CBB_flush(cert_verify))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
free(signature);
return ret;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s)
{
const struct ssl_sigalg *sigalg;
CBB cbb, cert_verify;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &cert_verify,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY))
goto err;
pkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
if ((sigalg = ssl_sigalg_select(s, pkey)) == NULL) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHMS_ERROR);
goto err;
}
s->s3->hs.our_sigalg = sigalg;
/*
* For TLS v1.2 send signature algorithm and signature using
* agreed digest and cached handshake records.
*/
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_sigalgs(s, pkey, sigalg,
&cert_verify))
goto err;
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_rsa(s, pkey, &cert_verify))
goto err;
} else if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (!ssl3_send_client_verify_ec(s, pkey, &cert_verify))
goto err;
} else {
SSLerror(s, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
tls1_transcript_free(s);
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B;
}
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
CBB cbb, client_cert;
int i;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) {
if (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL ||
s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
else
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
/* We need to get a client cert */
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) {
/*
* If we get an error, we need to
* ssl->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1);
* We then get retried later.
*/
i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey);
if (i < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return (-1);
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) {
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B;
if (!SSL_use_certificate(s, x509) ||
!SSL_use_PrivateKey(s, pkey))
i = 0;
} else if (i == 1) {
i = 0;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK);
}
X509_free(x509);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
if (i == 0) {
s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request = 2;
/* There is no client certificate to verify. */
tls1_transcript_free(s);
}
/* Ok, we have a cert */
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C;
}
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) {
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &client_cert,
SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, &client_cert,
(s->s3->hs.tls12.cert_request == 2) ? NULL : s->cert->key))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (0);
}
#define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m))
static int
ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s)
{
long alg_k, alg_a;
int nid = NID_undef;
int i;
alg_k = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_mkey;
alg_a = s->s3->hs.cipher->algorithm_auth;
/* We don't have a certificate. */
if (alg_a & SSL_aNULL)
return (1);
if (s->s3->hs.key_share != NULL)
nid = tls_key_share_nid(s->s3->hs.key_share);
/* This is the passed certificate. */
if (s->session->peer_cert_type == SSL_PKEY_ECC) {
if (!ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(s, s->session->peer_cert)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT);
goto fatal_err;
}
return (1);
}
i = X509_certificate_type(s->session->peer_cert, NULL);
/* Check that we have a certificate if we require one. */
if ((alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT);
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) && !has_bits(i, EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC)) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT);
goto fatal_err;
}
if ((alg_k & SSL_kDHE) &&
!(has_bits(i, EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (nid == NID_dhKeyAgreement))) {
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY);
goto fatal_err;
}
return (1);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
return (0);
}
/*
* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a
* case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of
* session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure.
*/
static int
ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s)
{
int ret;
/* If we have no ticket it cannot be a resumed session. */
if (!s->session->tlsext_tick)
return (1);
/* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate
* message, so permit appropriate message length */
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list)) <= 0)
return ret;
s->s3->hs.tls12.reuse_message = 1;
if ((s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) ||
(s->s3->hs.tls12.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET))
return (2);
return (1);
}
static int
ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey)
{
if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb == NULL)
return 0;
return s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s, px509, ppkey);
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s)
{
size_t outlen;
CBB cbb;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A) {
if (!CBB_init_fixed(&cbb, s->init_buf->data,
s->init_buf->length))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_u8(&cbb, SSL3_MT_CCS))
goto err;
if (!CBB_finish(&cbb, NULL, &outlen))
goto err;
if (outlen > INT_MAX)
goto err;
s->init_num = (int)outlen;
s->init_off = 0;
if (SSL_is_dtls(s)) {
s->d1->handshake_write_seq =
s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq;
dtls1_set_message_header_int(s, SSL3_MT_CCS, 0,
s->d1->handshake_write_seq, 0, 0);
dtls1_buffer_message(s, 1);
}
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B;
}
/* SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B */
return ssl3_record_write(s, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return -1;
}
static int
ssl3_send_client_finished(SSL *s)
{
CBB cbb, finished;
memset(&cbb, 0, sizeof(cbb));
if (s->s3->hs.state == SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A) {
if (!tls12_derive_finished(s))
goto err;
/* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished,
s->s3->hs.finished, s->s3->hs.finished_len);
s->s3->previous_client_finished_len =
s->s3->hs.finished_len;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_start(s, &cbb, &finished,
SSL3_MT_FINISHED))
goto err;
if (!CBB_add_bytes(&finished, s->s3->hs.finished,
s->s3->hs.finished_len))
goto err;
if (!ssl3_handshake_msg_finish(s, &cbb))
goto err;
s->s3->hs.state = SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B;
}
return (ssl3_handshake_write(s));
err:
CBB_cleanup(&cbb);
return (-1);
}
static int
ssl3_get_server_finished(SSL *s)
{
int al, md_len, ret;
CBS cbs;
/* should actually be 36+4 :-) */
if ((ret = ssl3_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A,
SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B, SSL3_MT_FINISHED, 64)) <= 0)
return ret;
/* If this occurs, we have missed a message */
if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS);
goto fatal_err;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0;
md_len = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH;
if (s->init_num < 0) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto fatal_err;
}
CBS_init(&cbs, s->init_msg, s->init_num);
if (s->s3->hs.peer_finished_len != md_len ||
CBS_len(&cbs) != md_len) {
al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
goto fatal_err;
}
if (!CBS_mem_equal(&cbs, s->s3->hs.peer_finished, CBS_len(&cbs))) {
al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR;
SSLerror(s, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED);
goto fatal_err;
}
/* Copy finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks. */
OPENSSL_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished,
s->s3->hs.peer_finished, md_len);
s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len;
return (1);
fatal_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
return (0);
}
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