SecBSD/src
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
0189975fb5
src/lib/libcrypto/x509/x509_vfy.c

2624 lines
63 KiB
C
Raw Blame History

/* $OpenBSD: x509_vfy.c,v 1.142 2024/03/02 10:40:05 tb Exp $ */
/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
* All rights reserved.
*
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
*
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
* must display the following acknowledgement:
* "This product includes cryptographic software written by
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
* 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
* [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include "asn1_local.h"
#include "x509_internal.h"
#include "x509_local.h"
/* CRL score values */
/* No unhandled critical extensions */
#define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100
/* certificate is within CRL scope */
#define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080
/* CRL times valid */
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040
/* Issuer name matches certificate */
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020
/* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */
#define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)
/* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */
#define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018
/* CRL issuer is on certificate path */
#define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008
/* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */
#define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004
/* Have a delta CRL with valid times */
#define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002
static int x509_vfy_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl);
static int x509_vfy_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e);
static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer);
static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x,
int allow_expired);
static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int depth);
static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer,
unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x);
static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x);
static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score,
X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls);
static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
int *pcrl_score);
static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score,
unsigned int *preasons);
static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x);
static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path);
static int X509_cmp_time_internal(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time,
int clamp_notafter);
static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx);
static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert);
static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err);
static int
null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e)
{
return ok;
}
/* Return 1 if a certificate is self signed */
static int
cert_self_signed(X509 *x)
{
X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS)
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
static int
check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode)
{
ctx->error = errcode;
ctx->current_cert = ctx->cert;
ctx->error_depth = 0;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
static int
x509_vfy_check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm)
{
int i, n;
char *name;
n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts);
free(vpm->peername);
vpm->peername = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i);
if (X509_check_host(x, name, strlen(name), vpm->hostflags,
&vpm->peername) > 0)
return 1;
}
return n == 0;
}
int
x509_vfy_check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param;
X509 *x = ctx->cert;
if (vpm->hosts && x509_vfy_check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
if (vpm->email != NULL && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0)
<= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
if (vpm->ip != NULL && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) {
if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* This is the effectively broken legacy OpenSSL chain builder. It
* might find an unvalidated chain and leave it sitting in
* ctx->chain. It does not correctly handle many cases where multiple
* chains could exist.
*
* Oh no.. I know a dirty word...
* Oooooooh..
*/
static int
X509_verify_cert_legacy_build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int *bad, int *out_ok)
{
X509 *x, *xtmp, *xtmp2, *chain_ss = NULL;
int bad_chain = 0;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param = ctx->param;
int ok = 0, ret = 0;
int depth, i;
int num, j, retry, trust;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/*
* First we make sure the chain we are going to build is
* present and that the first entry is in place.
*/
ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
if (ctx->chain == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
goto end;
}
X509_up_ref(ctx->cert);
ctx->num_untrusted = 1;
/* We use a temporary STACK so we can chop and hack at it */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL &&
(sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
goto end;
}
num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
depth = param->depth;
for (;;) {
/* If we have enough, we break */
/* FIXME: If this happens, we should take
* note of it and, if appropriate, use the
* X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code
* later.
*/
if (depth < num)
break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
if (cert_self_signed(x))
break;
/*
* If asked see if we can find issuer in trusted store first
*/
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
/*
* If successful for now free up cert so it
* will be picked up again later.
*/
if (ok > 0) {
X509_free(xtmp);
break;
}
}
/* If we were passed a cert chain, use it first */
if (ctx->untrusted != NULL) {
/*
* If we do not find a non-expired untrusted cert, peek
* ahead and see if we can satisfy this from the trusted
* store. If not, see if we have an expired untrusted cert.
*/
xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x, 0);
if (xtmp == NULL &&
!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)) {
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ok > 0) {
X509_free(xtmp);
break;
}
xtmp = find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x, 1);
}
if (xtmp != NULL) {
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = 0;
goto end;
}
X509_up_ref(xtmp);
(void)sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp);
ctx->num_untrusted++;
x = xtmp;
num++;
/*
* reparse the full chain for the next one
*/
continue;
}
}
break;
}
/* Remember how many untrusted certs we have */
j = num;
/*
* At this point, chain should contain a list of untrusted
* certificates. We now need to add at least one trusted one,
* if possible, otherwise we complain.
*/
do {
/*
* Examine last certificate in chain and see if it is
* self signed.
*/
i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i - 1);
if (cert_self_signed(x)) {
/* we have a self signed certificate */
if (i == 1) {
/*
* We have a single self signed
* certificate: see if we can find it
* in the store. We must have an exact
* match to avoid possible
* impersonation.
*/
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if ((ok <= 0) || X509_cmp(x, xtmp)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error_depth = i - 1;
if (ok == 1)
X509_free(xtmp);
bad_chain = 1;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
} else {
/*
* We have a match: replace
* certificate with store
* version so we get any trust
* settings.
*/
X509_free(x);
x = xtmp;
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, i - 1, x);
ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
}
} else {
/*
* extract and save self signed
* certificate for later use
*/
chain_ss = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
ctx->num_untrusted--;
num--;
j--;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1);
}
}
/* We now lookup certs from the certificate store */
for (;;) {
/* If we have enough, we break */
if (depth < num)
break;
/* If we are self signed, we break */
if (cert_self_signed(x))
break;
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x);
if (ok < 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP;
goto end;
}
if (ok == 0)
break;
x = xtmp;
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x)) {
X509_free(xtmp);
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = 0;
goto end;
}
num++;
}
/* we now have our chain, lets check it... */
trust = x509_vfy_check_trust(ctx);
/* If explicitly rejected error */
if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
ok = 0;
goto end;
}
/*
* If it's not explicitly trusted then check if there
* is an alternative chain that could be used. We only
* do this if we haven't already checked via
* TRUSTED_FIRST and the user hasn't switched off
* alternate chain checking
*/
retry = 0;
if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED &&
!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) &&
!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) {
while (j-- > 1) {
xtmp2 = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j - 1);
ok = ctx->get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, xtmp2);
if (ok < 0)
goto end;
/* Check if we found an alternate chain */
if (ok > 0) {
/*
* Free up the found cert
* we'll add it again later
*/
X509_free(xtmp);
/*
* Dump all the certs above
* this point - we've found an
* alternate chain
*/
while (num > j) {
xtmp = sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain);
X509_free(xtmp);
num--;
}
ctx->num_untrusted = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
retry = 1;
break;
}
}
}
} while (retry);
/*
* If not explicitly trusted then indicate error unless it's a single
* self signed certificate in which case we've indicated an error already
* and set bad_chain == 1
*/
if (trust != X509_TRUST_TRUSTED && !bad_chain) {
if ((chain_ss == NULL) || !ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, chain_ss)) {
if (ctx->num_untrusted >= num)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY;
else
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT;
ctx->current_cert = x;
} else {
if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, chain_ss)) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM;
ok = 0;
goto end;
}
num++;
ctx->num_untrusted = num;
ctx->current_cert = chain_ss;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN;
chain_ss = NULL;
}
ctx->error_depth = num - 1;
bad_chain = 1;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
sk_X509_free(sktmp);
X509_free(chain_ss);
*bad = bad_chain;
*out_ok = ok;
return ret;
}
static int
X509_verify_cert_legacy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int ok = 0, bad_chain;
ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* Initialize to OK */
if (!X509_verify_cert_legacy_build_chain(ctx, &bad_chain, &ok))
goto end;
/* We have the chain complete: now we need to check its purpose */
ok = x509_vfy_check_chain_extensions(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* Check that the chain satisfies the security level. */
ok = x509_vfy_check_security_level(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* Check name constraints */
ok = check_name_constraints(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
#endif
ok = x509_vfy_check_id(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/*
* Check revocation status: we do this after copying parameters because
* they may be needed for CRL signature verification.
*/
ok = x509_vfy_check_revocation(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* At this point, we have a chain and need to verify it */
if (ctx->verify != NULL)
ok = ctx->verify(ctx);
else
ok = internal_verify(ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
/* If we get this far evaluate policies */
if (!bad_chain)
ok = x509_vfy_check_policy(ctx);
end:
/* Safety net, error returns must set ctx->error */
if (ok <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK)
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
return ok;
}
int
X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
struct x509_verify_ctx *vctx = NULL;
int chain_count = 0;
if (ctx->cert == NULL) {
X509error(X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
/*
* This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify
* a cert. We cannot do another one.
*/
X509error(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
if (ctx->param->poisoned) {
/*
* This X509_STORE_CTX had failures setting
* up verify parameters. We can not use it.
*/
X509error(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
if (ctx->error != X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL) {
/*
* This X509_STORE_CTX has not been properly initialized.
*/
X509error(ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
return -1;
}
/*
* If the certificate's public key is too weak, don't bother
* continuing.
*/
if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) &&
!verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
return 0;
/*
* If flags request legacy, use the legacy verifier. If we
* requested "no alt chains" from the age of hammer pants, use
* the legacy verifier because the multi chain verifier really
* does find all the "alt chains".
*
* XXX deprecate the NO_ALT_CHAINS flag?
*/
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_LEGACY_VERIFY) ||
(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS))
return X509_verify_cert_legacy(ctx);
/* Use the modern multi-chain verifier from x509_verify_cert */
if ((vctx = x509_verify_ctx_new_from_xsc(ctx)) != NULL) {
ctx->error = X509_V_OK; /* Initialize to OK */
chain_count = x509_verify(vctx, NULL, NULL);
}
x509_verify_ctx_free(vctx);
/* if we succeed we have a chain in ctx->chain */
return (chain_count > 0 && ctx->chain != NULL);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_verify_cert);
/* Given a STACK_OF(X509) find the issuer of cert (if any)
*/
static X509 *
find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x,
int allow_expired)
{
int i;
X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer)) {
if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, issuer, -1))
return issuer;
if (allow_expired)
rv = issuer;
}
}
return rv;
}
/* Given a possible certificate and issuer check them */
static int
check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *subject, X509 *issuer)
{
/*
* Yes, the arguments of X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn were exposed in
* reverse order compared to the already public X509_check_issued()...
*/
return X509_check_issued(issuer, subject) == X509_V_OK;
}
/* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in ctx->trusted */
static int
x509_vfy_get_trusted_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
*issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->trusted, x, 1);
if (*issuer) {
CRYPTO_add(&(*issuer)->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
return 1;
} else
return 0;
}
/* Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency
* with the supplied purpose
*/
int
x509_vfy_check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
return 1;
#else
int i, ok = 0, must_be_ca, plen = 0;
X509 *x;
int (*cb)(int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
int proxy_path_length = 0;
int purpose;
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/* must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values:
-1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct
use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA).
0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not
used, but the possibility is present for future extensions.
1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for
all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate.
*/
must_be_ca = -1;
/* CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent)
purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN;
else
purpose = ctx->param->purpose;
/* Check all untrusted certificates */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->num_untrusted; i++) {
int ret;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
ret = X509_check_ca(x);
if (must_be_ca == -1) {
if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
(ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
} else {
if ((ret == 0) ||
((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
(ret != 1))) {
ret = 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA;
} else
ret = 1;
}
if (ret == 0) {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
if (ctx->param->purpose > 0) {
ret = X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0);
if ((ret == 0) ||
((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) &&
(ret != 1))) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
}
/* Check pathlen if not self issued */
if ((i > 1) && !(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) &&
(x->ex_pathlen != -1) &&
(plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length + 1))) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED;
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto end;
}
/* Increment path length if not self issued */
if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
plen++;
must_be_ca = 1;
}
ok = 1;
end:
return ok;
#endif
}
static int
check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!x509_constraints_chain(ctx->chain, &ctx->error,
&ctx->error_depth)) {
ctx->current_cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, ctx->error_depth);
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */
static X509 *
lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
X509 *xtmp = NULL;
size_t i;
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
if (certs == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Look for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
break;
}
if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
X509_up_ref(xtmp);
else
xtmp = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
return xtmp;
}
X509 *
x509_vfy_lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
if (ctx->store == NULL || ctx->store->objs == NULL)
return NULL;
return lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
}
int
x509_vfy_check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
size_t i;
int ok;
X509 *x = NULL;
int (*cb) (int xok, X509_STORE_CTX *xctx);
cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/* Check all trusted certificates in chain */
for (i = ctx->num_untrusted; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0);
/* If explicitly trusted return trusted */
if (ok == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED)
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
/*
* If explicitly rejected notify callback and reject if not
* overridden.
*/
if (ok == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) {
ctx->error_depth = i;
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED;
ok = cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
}
}
/*
* If we accept partial chains and have at least one trusted certificate
* return success.
*/
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
X509 *mx;
if (ctx->num_untrusted < (int)sk_X509_num(ctx->chain))
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, 0);
mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x);
if (mx) {
(void)sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx);
X509_free(x);
ctx->num_untrusted = 0;
return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED;
}
}
/*
* If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow
* standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated.
*/
return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED;
}
int
x509_vfy_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, last, ok;
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK))
return 1;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL)
last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
else {
/* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */
if (ctx->parent)
return 1;
last = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) {
ok = check_cert(ctx, ctx->chain, i);
if (!ok)
return ok;
}
return 1;
}
static int
check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int depth)
{
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
X509 *x;
int ok = 0, cnum;
unsigned int last_reasons;
cnum = ctx->error_depth = depth;
x = sk_X509_value(chain, cnum);
ctx->current_cert = x;
ctx->current_issuer = NULL;
ctx->current_crl_score = 0;
ctx->current_reasons = 0;
while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) {
last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
/* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */
ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x);
if (!ok) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
ctx->current_crl = crl;
ok = x509_vfy_check_crl(ctx, crl);
if (!ok)
goto err;
if (dcrl) {
ok = x509_vfy_check_crl(ctx, dcrl);
if (!ok)
goto err;
ok = x509_vfy_cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x);
if (!ok)
goto err;
} else
ok = 1;
/* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */
if (ok != 2) {
ok = x509_vfy_cert_crl(ctx, crl, x);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
X509_CRL_free(crl);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
crl = NULL;
dcrl = NULL;
/* If reasons not updated we wont get anywhere by
* another iteration, so exit loop.
*/
if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
goto err;
}
}
err:
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
X509_CRL_free(crl);
X509_CRL_free(dcrl);
return ok;
}
/* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */
static int
check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify)
{
time_t *ptime;
int i;
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = crl;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = &ctx->param->check_time;
else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
return (1);
else
ptime = NULL;
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl), ptime);
if (i == 0) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (i > 0) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
if (X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)) {
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl), ptime);
if (i == 0) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
/* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */
if ((i < 0) &&
!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) {
if (!notify)
return 0;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx))
return 0;
}
}
if (notify)
ctx->current_crl = NULL;
return 1;
}
static int
get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl,
X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore;
unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0;
X509 *x = ctx->current_cert;
X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL;
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
reasons = *preasons;
crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x);
if (crl_score > best_score) {
best_crl = crl;
best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer;
best_score = crl_score;
best_reasons = reasons;
}
}
if (best_crl) {
if (*pcrl)
X509_CRL_free(*pcrl);
*pcrl = best_crl;
*pissuer = best_crl_issuer;
*pscore = best_score;
*preasons = best_reasons;
CRYPTO_add(&best_crl->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
if (*pdcrl) {
X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl);
*pdcrl = NULL;
}
get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls);
}
if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be
* both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical.
*/
static int
crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb;
int i;
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
/* Can't have multiple occurrences */
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i));
} else
exta = NULL;
i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1);
if (i >= 0) {
if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1)
return 0;
extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i));
} else
extb = NULL;
if (!exta && !extb)
return 1;
if (!exta || !extb)
return 0;
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb))
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* See if a base and delta are compatible */
static int
check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base)
{
/* Delta CRL must be a delta */
if (!delta->base_crl_number)
return 0;
/* Base must have a CRL number */
if (!base->crl_number)
return 0;
/* Issuer names must match */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base),
X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta)))
return 0;
/* AKID and IDP must match */
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier))
return 0;
if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point))
return 0;
/* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
return 0;
/* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */
if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring
* or retrieve a chain of deltas...
*/
static void
get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base,
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls)
{
X509_CRL *delta;
int i;
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS))
return;
if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST))
return;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) {
delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i);
if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) {
if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0))
*pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA;
CRYPTO_add(&delta->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509_CRL);
*dcrl = delta;
return;
}
}
*dcrl = NULL;
}
/* For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate 'x'.
* The return value is a mask of several criteria.
* If the issuer is not the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer.
* The reasons mask is also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if
* no new reasons the CRL is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated.
*/
static int
get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons,
X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons;
/* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */
/* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID)
return 0;
/* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) {
if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS))
return 0;
} else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
}
/* Don't process deltas at this stage */
else if (crl->base_crl_number)
return 0;
/* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) {
if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT))
return 0;
} else
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME;
if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL;
/* Check expiry */
if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0))
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME;
/* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */
crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score);
/* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */
if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID))
return 0;
/* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */
if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) {
/* If no new reasons reject */
if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons))
return 0;
tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons;
crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE;
}
*preasons = tmp_reasons;
return crl_score;
}
static void
crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer,
int *pcrl_score)
{
X509 *crl_issuer = NULL;
X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
int cidx = ctx->error_depth;
int i;
if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1)
cidx++;
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) {
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT;
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
return;
}
}
for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) {
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
continue;
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID|CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH;
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
return;
}
}
/* Anything else needs extended CRL support */
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT))
return;
/* Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the
* set of untrusted certificates.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) {
crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm))
continue;
if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) {
*pissuer = crl_issuer;
*pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID;
return;
}
}
}
/* Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new
* X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the
* parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking
* will be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in
* practice.
*/
static int
check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx;
int ret;
/* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */
if (ctx->parent)
return 0;
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->store, x, ctx->untrusted)) {
ret = -1;
goto err;
}
crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls;
/* Copy verify params across */
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param);
crl_ctx.parent = ctx;
crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb;
/* Verify CRL issuer */
ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx);
if (ret <= 0)
goto err;
/* Check chain is acceptable */
ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain);
err:
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx);
return ret;
}
/* RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path
* and certificate path, which could lead to situations where a
* certificate could be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised
* to do so. RFC5280 is more strict and states that the two paths must
* end in the same trust anchor, though some discussions remain...
* until this is resolved we use the RFC5280 version
*/
static int
check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path,
STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path)
{
X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta;
cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1);
crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1);
if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases.
* 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types.
* 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES.
* 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES.
* 4. One is NULL: automatic match.
*/
static int
idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b)
{
X509_NAME *nm = NULL;
GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL;
GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb;
int i, j;
if (!a || !b)
return 1;
if (a->type == 1) {
if (!a->dpname)
return 0;
/* Case 1: two X509_NAME */
if (b->type == 1) {
if (!b->dpname)
return 0;
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname))
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
nm = a->dpname;
gens = b->name.fullname;
} else if (b->type == 1) {
if (!b->dpname)
return 0;
/* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */
gens = a->name.fullname;
nm = b->dpname;
}
/* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */
if (nm) {
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) {
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i);
if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) {
gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i);
for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) {
genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j);
if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb))
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
static int
crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score)
{
int i;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
/* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */
if (!dp->CRLissuer)
return !!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME);
for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) {
GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i);
if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME)
continue;
if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm))
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check CRLDP and IDP */
static int
crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons)
{
int i;
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR)
return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) {
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER)
return 0;
} else {
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA)
return 0;
}
*preasons = crl->idp_reasons;
for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) {
DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i);
if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) {
if (!crl->idp ||
idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) {
*preasons &= dp->dp_reasons;
return 1;
}
}
}
if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) &&
(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate.
* If deltas enabled try to find a delta CRL too
*/
static int
get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509 *issuer = NULL;
int crl_score = 0;
unsigned int reasons;
X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl;
X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
reasons = ctx->current_reasons;
ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons,
ctx->crls);
if (ok)
goto done;
/* Lookup CRLs from store */
skcrl = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, nm);
/* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */
if (!skcrl && crl)
goto done;
get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl);
sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free);
done:
/* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */
if (crl) {
ctx->current_issuer = issuer;
ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score;
ctx->current_reasons = reasons;
*pcrl = crl;
*pdcrl = dcrl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Check CRL validity */
static int
x509_vfy_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl)
{
X509 *issuer = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL;
int ok = 0, chnum, cnum;
cnum = ctx->error_depth;
chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
/* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */
if (ctx->current_issuer) {
issuer = ctx->current_issuer;
} else if (cnum < chnum) {
/*
* Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer
* is next certificate in chain.
*/
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1);
} else {
issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum);
/* If not self signed, can't check signature */
if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
if (issuer) {
/* Skip most tests for deltas because they have already
* been done
*/
if (!crl->base_crl_number) {
/* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */
if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) &&
!(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH)) {
if (check_crl_path(ctx,
ctx->current_issuer) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME)) {
ok = check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
/* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */
ikey = X509_get_pubkey(issuer);
if (!ikey) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
} else {
/* Verify CRL signature */
if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
goto err;
}
}
}
ok = 1;
err:
EVP_PKEY_free(ikey);
return ok;
}
/* Check certificate against CRL */
static int
x509_vfy_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x)
{
int ok;
X509_REVOKED *rev;
/* The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained
* unhandled critical extensions it could still be used to indicate
* a certificate was revoked. This has since been changed since
* critical extension can change the meaning of CRL entries.
*/
if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) &&
(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) {
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return 0;
}
/* Look for serial number of certificate in CRL
* If found make sure reason is not removeFromCRL.
*/
if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) {
if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL)
return 2;
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED;
ok = ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
if (!ok)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
int
x509_vfy_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *current_cert = NULL;
int ret;
if (ctx->parent != NULL)
return 1;
ret = X509_policy_check(ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies,
ctx->param->flags, &current_cert);
if (ret != X509_V_OK) {
ctx->current_cert = current_cert;
ctx->error = ret;
if (ret == X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM)
return 0;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) {
ctx->current_cert = NULL;
/*
* Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have
* allowed an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and
* we must then remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST
* NOT clear earlier verification errors by setting the error
* to X509_V_OK.
*/
if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Inform the verify callback of an error.
*
* If x is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert
* at depth.
*
* If err is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave
* unchanged (presumably set by the caller).
*
* Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue.
*/
static int
verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err)
{
ctx->error_depth = depth;
ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth);
if (err != X509_V_OK)
ctx->error = err;
return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx);
}
/* Mimic OpenSSL '0 for failure' ick */
static int
time_t_bogocmp(time_t a, time_t b)
{
if (a == -1 || b == -1)
return 0;
if (a <= b)
return -1;
return 1;
}
/*
* Check certificate validity times.
*
* If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return
* the validation status.
*
* Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
int
x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth)
{
time_t ptime;
int i;
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME)
ptime = ctx->param->check_time;
else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME)
return 1;
else
ptime = time(NULL);
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
i = time_t_bogocmp(x->not_before, ptime);
else
i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get_notBefore(x), &ptime);
if (i >= 0 && depth < 0)
return 0;
if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD))
return 0;
if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID))
return 0;
if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SET)
i = time_t_bogocmp(x->not_after, ptime);
else
i = X509_cmp_time_internal(X509_get_notAfter(x), &ptime, 1);
if (i <= 0 && depth < 0)
return 0;
if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD))
return 0;
if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth,
X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
x509_vfy_internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int chain_verified)
{
int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1;
X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
X509 *xs;
if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi))
xs = xi;
else {
if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) {
xs = xi;
goto check_cert;
}
if (n <= 0)
return verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0,
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE);
n--;
ctx->error_depth = n;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
/*
* Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the
* user's callback is allowed to reset errors (at its own
* peril).
*/
while (n >= 0) {
/*
* Skip signature check for self signed certificates
* unless explicitly asked for. It doesn't add any
* security and just wastes time. If the issuer's
* public key is unusable, report the issuer
* certificate and its depth (rather than the depth of
* the subject).
*/
if (!chain_verified && ( xs != xi ||
(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE))) {
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
if ((pkey = X509_get_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) {
if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, xi != xs ? n+1 : n,
X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY))
return 0;
} else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) {
if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n,
X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
return 0;
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
check_cert:
/* Calls verify callback as needed */
if (!chain_verified && !x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n))
return 0;
/*
* Signal success at this depth. However, the
* previous error (if any) is retained.
*/
ctx->current_issuer = xi;
ctx->current_cert = xs;
ctx->error_depth = n;
if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx))
return 0;
if (--n >= 0) {
xi = xs;
xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n);
}
}
return 1;
}
static int
internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return x509_vfy_internal_verify(ctx, 0);
}
/*
* Internal verify, but with a chain where the verification
* math has already been performed.
*/
int
x509_vfy_callback_indicate_completion(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return x509_vfy_internal_verify(ctx, 1);
}
int
X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
{
return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_cmp_current_time);
/*
* Compare a possibly unvalidated ASN1_TIME string against a time_t
* using RFC 5280 rules for the time string. If *cmp_time is NULL
* the current system time is used.
*
* XXX NOTE that unlike what you expect a "cmp" function to do in C,
* XXX this one is "special", and returns 0 for error.
*
* Returns:
* -1 if the ASN1_time is earlier than OR the same as *cmp_time.
* 1 if the ASN1_time is later than *cmp_time.
* 0 on error.
*/
static int
X509_cmp_time_internal(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time, int is_notafter)
{
time_t compare, cert_time;
if (cmp_time == NULL)
compare = time(NULL);
else
compare = *cmp_time;
if (!x509_verify_asn1_time_to_time_t(ctm, is_notafter, &cert_time))
return 0; /* invalid time */
if (cert_time <= compare)
return -1; /* 0 is used for error, so map same to less than */
return 1;
}
int
X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
{
return X509_cmp_time_internal(ctm, cmp_time, 0);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_cmp_time);
ASN1_TIME *
X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
{
return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_gmtime_adj);
ASN1_TIME *
X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_time)
{
return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_time);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_time_adj);
ASN1_TIME *
X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_time)
{
time_t t;
if (in_time == NULL)
t = time(NULL);
else
t = *in_time;
return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_time_adj_ex);
int
X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
{
EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2;
int i, j;
if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i));
if (ktmp == NULL) {
X509error(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp))
break;
else
ktmp = NULL;
}
if (ktmp == NULL) {
X509error(X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN);
return 0;
}
/* first, populate the other certs */
for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) {
if ((ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j))) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp))
return 0;
}
if (pkey != NULL)
if (!EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp))
return 0;
return 1;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_get_pubkey_parameters);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func,
CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func)
{
/* This function is (usually) called only once, by
* SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx (ssl/ssl_cert.c). */
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX,
argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data)
{
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data);
void *
X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx)
{
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->error;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err)
{
ctx->error = err;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_error);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->error_depth;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
ctx->error_depth = depth;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth);
X509 *
X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_cert;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
ctx->current_cert = x;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert);
STACK_OF(X509) *
X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->chain;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain);
STACK_OF(X509) *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *xs)
{
return xs->chain;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain);
STACK_OF(X509) *
X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int i;
X509 *x;
STACK_OF(X509) *chain;
if (!ctx->chain || !(chain = sk_X509_dup(ctx->chain)))
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return chain;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain);
X509 *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_issuer;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer);
X509_CRL *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->current_crl;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl);
X509_STORE_CTX *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->parent;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx);
X509_STORE *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store(X509_STORE_CTX *xs)
{
return xs->store;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_store);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
ctx->cert = x;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted = sk;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk)
{
ctx->crls = sk;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls);
/*
* This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust
* values. This is intended to be used when another structure has its
* own trust and purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by
* the ctx. If they aren't set then we will usually have a default
* purpose in mind which should then be used to set the trust value.
* An example of this is SSL use: an SSL structure will have its own
* purpose and trust settings which the application can set: if they
* aren't set then we use the default of SSL client/server.
*/
int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose_id)
{
const X509_PURPOSE *purpose;
int idx;
/* XXX - Match wacky/documented behavior. Do we need to keep this? */
if (purpose_id == 0)
return 1;
if (purpose_id < X509_PURPOSE_MIN || purpose_id > X509_PURPOSE_MAX) {
X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
idx = purpose_id - X509_PURPOSE_MIN;
if ((purpose = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx)) == NULL) {
X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID);
return 0;
}
/* XXX - Succeeding while ignoring purpose_id and trust is awful. */
if (ctx->param->purpose == 0)
ctx->param->purpose = purpose_id;
if (ctx->param->trust == 0)
ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(purpose);
return 1;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust_id)
{
/* XXX - Match wacky/documented behavior. Do we need to keep this? */
if (trust_id == 0)
return 1;
if (trust_id < X509_TRUST_MIN || trust_id > X509_TRUST_MAX) {
X509error(X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID);
return 0;
}
/* XXX - Succeeding while ignoring the trust_id is awful. */
if (ctx->param->trust == 0)
ctx->param->trust = trust_id;
return 1;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust);
X509_STORE_CTX *
X509_STORE_CTX_new(void)
{
X509_STORE_CTX *ctx;
ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(X509_STORE_CTX));
if (!ctx) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
return ctx;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_new);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
free(ctx);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_free);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *leaf,
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted)
{
int param_ret = 1;
/*
* Make sure everything is initialized properly even in case of an
* early return due to an error.
*
* While this 'ctx' can be reused, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() will have
* freed everything and memset ex_data anyway. This also allows us
* to safely use X509_STORE_CTX variables from the stack which will
* have uninitialized data.
*/
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
/*
* Start with this set to not valid - it will be set to valid
* in X509_verify_cert.
*/
ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL;
/*
* Set values other than 0. Keep this in the same order as
* X509_STORE_CTX except for values that may fail. All fields that
* may fail should go last to make sure 'ctx' is as consistent as
* possible even on early exits.
*/
ctx->store = store;
ctx->cert = leaf;
ctx->untrusted = untrusted;
if (store && store->verify)
ctx->verify = store->verify;
else
ctx->verify = internal_verify;
if (store && store->verify_cb)
ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb;
else
ctx->verify_cb = null_callback;
ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer;
ctx->check_issued = check_issued;
ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new();
if (!ctx->param) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/* Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set
* use defaults.
*/
if (store)
param_ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param);
else
ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT|X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE;
if (param_ret)
param_ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param,
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default"));
if (param_ret == 0) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx,
&(ctx->ex_data)) == 0) {
X509error(ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_init);
/* Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates.
* This avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed.
*/
void
X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *trusted)
{
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(ctx, trusted);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *trusted)
{
ctx->trusted = trusted;
ctx->get_issuer = x509_vfy_get_trusted_issuer;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx->param != NULL) {
if (ctx->parent == NULL)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param = NULL;
}
if (ctx->chain != NULL) {
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
ctx->chain = NULL;
}
CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX,
ctx, &(ctx->ex_data));
memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(CRYPTO_EX_DATA));
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t)
{
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_time);
int
(*X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)
{
return ctx->verify_cb;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
int (*verify_cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb);
int
(*X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx))(X509_STORE_CTX *)
{
return ctx->verify;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *))
{
ctx->verify = verify;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify);
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
X509_STORE_get_check_issued(X509_STORE *store)
{
return store->check_issued;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_get_check_issued);
void
X509_STORE_set_check_issued(X509_STORE *store,
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn check_issued)
{
store->check_issued = check_issued;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_set_check_issued);
X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn
X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->check_issued;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued);
X509 *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->cert;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert);
STACK_OF(X509) *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->untrusted;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
ctx->untrusted = sk;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
{
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free);
ctx->chain = sk;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->num_untrusted;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted);
int
X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name)
{
const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name);
if (!param)
return 0;
return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param);
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set_default);
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *
X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
return ctx->param;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param);
void
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
if (ctx->param)
X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param);
ctx->param = param;
}
LCRYPTO_ALIAS(X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param);
/*
* Check if |bits| are adequate for |security level|.
* Returns 1 if ok, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
enough_bits_for_security_level(int bits, int level)
{
/*
* Sigh. OpenSSL does this silly squashing, so we will
* too. Derp for Derp compatibility being important.
*/
if (level < 0)
level = 0;
if (level > 5)
level = 5;
switch (level) {
case 0:
return 1;
case 1:
return bits >= 80;
case 2:
return bits >= 112;
case 3:
return bits >= 128;
case 4:
return bits >= 192;
case 5:
return bits >= 256;
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Check whether the public key of |cert| meets the security level of |ctx|.
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int bits;
/* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */
if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert)) == NULL)
return 0;
if ((bits = EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey)) <= 0)
return 0;
return enough_bits_for_security_level(bits, ctx->param->security_level);
}
/*
* Check whether the signature digest algorithm of |cert| meets the security
* level of |ctx|. Do not check trust anchors (self-signed or not).
*
* Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
int bits, nid, md_nid;
if ((nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert)) == NID_undef)
return 0;
/*
* Look up signature algorithm digest.
*/
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &md_nid, NULL))
return 0;
if (md_nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
if ((md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet. */
bits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
return enough_bits_for_security_level(bits, ctx->param->security_level);
}
int
x509_vfy_check_security_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
int i;
if (ctx->param->security_level <= 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i);
/*
* We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here
* we only check the security of issuer keys.
*/
if (i > 0) {
if (!check_key_level(ctx, cert) &&
!verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i,
X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL))
return 0;
}
/*
* We also check the signature algorithm security of all certs
* except those of the trust anchor at index num - 1.
*/
if (i == num - 1)
break;
if (!check_sig_level(ctx, cert) &&
!verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink