3379 lines
112 KiB
C
3379 lines
112 KiB
C
/*
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* validator/validator.c - secure validator DNS query response module
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*
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* Copyright (c) 2007, NLnet Labs. All rights reserved.
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*
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* This software is open source.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
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* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
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* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
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* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* Neither the name of the NLNET LABS nor the names of its contributors may
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* be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
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* specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
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* "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
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* LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
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* A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
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* HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
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* TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR
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* PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
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* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING
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* NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS
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* SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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/**
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* \file
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*
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* This file contains a module that performs validation of DNS queries.
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* According to RFC 4034.
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*/
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#include "config.h"
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include "validator/validator.h"
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#include "validator/val_anchor.h"
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#include "validator/val_kcache.h"
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#include "validator/val_kentry.h"
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#include "validator/val_utils.h"
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#include "validator/val_nsec.h"
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#include "validator/val_nsec3.h"
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#include "validator/val_neg.h"
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#include "validator/val_sigcrypt.h"
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#include "validator/autotrust.h"
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#include "services/cache/dns.h"
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#include "services/cache/rrset.h"
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#include "util/data/dname.h"
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#include "util/module.h"
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#include "util/log.h"
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#include "util/net_help.h"
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#include "util/regional.h"
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#include "util/config_file.h"
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#include "util/fptr_wlist.h"
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#include "sldns/rrdef.h"
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#include "sldns/wire2str.h"
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#include "sldns/str2wire.h"
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/** Max number of RRSIGs to validate at once, suspend query for later. */
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#define MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE 8
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/** Max number of validation suspends allowed, error out otherwise. */
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#define MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS 16
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/* forward decl for cache response and normal super inform calls of a DS */
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static void process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate,
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struct val_qstate* vq, int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg,
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struct query_info* qinfo, struct sock_list* origin, int* suspend);
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/* Updates the suplied EDE (RFC8914) code selectively so we don't lose
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* a more specific code */
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static void
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update_reason_bogus(struct reply_info* rep, sldns_ede_code reason_bogus)
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{
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if(reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_NONE) return;
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if(reason_bogus == LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS
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&& rep->reason_bogus != LDNS_EDE_NONE
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&& rep->reason_bogus != LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS) return;
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rep->reason_bogus = reason_bogus;
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}
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/** fill up nsec3 key iterations config entry */
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static int
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fill_nsec3_iter(struct val_env* ve, char* s, int c)
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{
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char* e;
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int i;
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free(ve->nsec3_keysize);
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free(ve->nsec3_maxiter);
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ve->nsec3_keysize = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c);
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ve->nsec3_maxiter = (size_t*)calloc(sizeof(size_t), (size_t)c);
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if(!ve->nsec3_keysize || !ve->nsec3_maxiter) {
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log_err("out of memory");
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return 0;
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}
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for(i=0; i<c; i++) {
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ve->nsec3_keysize[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10);
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if(s == e) {
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log_err("cannot parse: %s", s);
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return 0;
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}
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s = e;
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ve->nsec3_maxiter[i] = (size_t)strtol(s, &e, 10);
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if(s == e) {
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log_err("cannot parse: %s", s);
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return 0;
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}
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s = e;
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if(i>0 && ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1] >= ve->nsec3_keysize[i]) {
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log_err("nsec3 key iterations not ascending: %d %d",
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(int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i-1],
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(int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i]);
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return 0;
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}
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator nsec3cfg keysz %d mxiter %d",
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(int)ve->nsec3_keysize[i], (int)ve->nsec3_maxiter[i]);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/** apply config settings to validator */
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static int
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val_apply_cfg(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* val_env,
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struct config_file* cfg)
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{
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int c;
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val_env->bogus_ttl = (uint32_t)cfg->bogus_ttl;
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if(!env->anchors)
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env->anchors = anchors_create();
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if(!env->anchors) {
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log_err("out of memory");
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return 0;
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}
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if (env->key_cache)
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val_env->kcache = env->key_cache;
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if(!val_env->kcache)
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val_env->kcache = key_cache_create(cfg);
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if(!val_env->kcache) {
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log_err("out of memory");
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return 0;
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}
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env->key_cache = val_env->kcache;
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if(!anchors_apply_cfg(env->anchors, cfg)) {
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log_err("validator: error in trustanchors config");
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return 0;
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}
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val_env->date_override = cfg->val_date_override;
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val_env->skew_min = cfg->val_sig_skew_min;
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val_env->skew_max = cfg->val_sig_skew_max;
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val_env->max_restart = cfg->val_max_restart;
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c = cfg_count_numbers(cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations);
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if(c < 1 || (c&1)) {
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log_err("validator: unparsable or odd nsec3 key "
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"iterations: %s", cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations);
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return 0;
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}
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val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count = c/2;
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if(!fill_nsec3_iter(val_env, cfg->val_nsec3_key_iterations, c/2)) {
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log_err("validator: cannot apply nsec3 key iterations");
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return 0;
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}
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if (env->neg_cache)
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val_env->neg_cache = env->neg_cache;
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if(!val_env->neg_cache)
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val_env->neg_cache = val_neg_create(cfg,
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val_env->nsec3_maxiter[val_env->nsec3_keyiter_count-1]);
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if(!val_env->neg_cache) {
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log_err("out of memory");
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return 0;
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}
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env->neg_cache = val_env->neg_cache;
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return 1;
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}
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#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND
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void ecdsa_evp_workaround_init(void);
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#endif
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int
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val_init(struct module_env* env, int id)
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{
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struct val_env* val_env = (struct val_env*)calloc(1,
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sizeof(struct val_env));
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if(!val_env) {
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log_err("malloc failure");
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return 0;
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}
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env->modinfo[id] = (void*)val_env;
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env->need_to_validate = 1;
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lock_basic_init(&val_env->bogus_lock);
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lock_protect(&val_env->bogus_lock, &val_env->num_rrset_bogus,
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sizeof(val_env->num_rrset_bogus));
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#ifdef USE_ECDSA_EVP_WORKAROUND
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ecdsa_evp_workaround_init();
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#endif
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if(!val_apply_cfg(env, val_env, env->cfg)) {
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log_err("validator: could not apply configuration settings.");
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return 0;
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}
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if(env->cfg->disable_edns_do) {
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struct trust_anchor* anchor = anchors_find_any_noninsecure(
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env->anchors);
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if(anchor) {
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char b[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+2];
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dname_str(anchor->name, b);
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log_warn("validator: disable-edns-do is enabled, but there is a trust anchor for '%s'. Since DNSSEC could not work, the disable-edns-do setting is turned off. Continuing without it.", b);
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lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
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env->cfg->disable_edns_do = 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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void
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val_deinit(struct module_env* env, int id)
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{
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struct val_env* val_env;
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if(!env || !env->modinfo[id])
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return;
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val_env = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id];
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lock_basic_destroy(&val_env->bogus_lock);
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anchors_delete(env->anchors);
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env->anchors = NULL;
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key_cache_delete(val_env->kcache);
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env->key_cache = NULL;
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neg_cache_delete(val_env->neg_cache);
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env->neg_cache = NULL;
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free(val_env->nsec3_keysize);
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free(val_env->nsec3_maxiter);
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free(val_env);
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env->modinfo[id] = NULL;
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}
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/** fill in message structure */
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static struct val_qstate*
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val_new_getmsg(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq)
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{
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if(!qstate->return_msg || qstate->return_rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
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/* create a message to verify */
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "constructing reply for validation");
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vq->orig_msg = (struct dns_msg*)regional_alloc(qstate->region,
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sizeof(struct dns_msg));
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if(!vq->orig_msg)
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return NULL;
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vq->orig_msg->qinfo = qstate->qinfo;
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vq->orig_msg->rep = (struct reply_info*)regional_alloc(
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qstate->region, sizeof(struct reply_info));
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if(!vq->orig_msg->rep)
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return NULL;
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memset(vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, sizeof(struct reply_info));
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vq->orig_msg->rep->flags = (uint16_t)(qstate->return_rcode&0xf)
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|BIT_QR|BIT_RA|(qstate->query_flags|(BIT_CD|BIT_RD));
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vq->orig_msg->rep->qdcount = 1;
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vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NONE;
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} else {
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vq->orig_msg = qstate->return_msg;
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}
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vq->qchase = qstate->qinfo;
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/* chase reply will be an edited (sub)set of the orig msg rrset ptrs */
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vq->chase_reply = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
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vq->orig_msg->rep,
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sizeof(struct reply_info) - sizeof(struct rrset_ref));
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if(!vq->chase_reply)
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return NULL;
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if(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > RR_COUNT_MAX)
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return NULL; /* protect against integer overflow */
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vq->chase_reply->rrsets = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
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vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets, sizeof(struct ub_packed_rrset_key*)
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* vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count);
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if(!vq->chase_reply->rrsets)
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return NULL;
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vq->rrset_skip = 0;
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return vq;
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}
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/** allocate new validator query state */
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static struct val_qstate*
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val_new(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
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{
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struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)regional_alloc(
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qstate->region, sizeof(*vq));
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log_assert(!qstate->minfo[id]);
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if(!vq)
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return NULL;
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memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
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qstate->minfo[id] = vq;
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vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
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return val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq);
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}
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/** reset validator query state for query restart */
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static void
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val_restart(struct val_qstate* vq)
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{
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struct comm_timer* temp_timer;
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int restart_count;
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if(!vq) return;
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temp_timer = vq->suspend_timer;
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restart_count = vq->restart_count+1;
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memset(vq, 0, sizeof(*vq));
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vq->suspend_timer = temp_timer;
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vq->restart_count = restart_count;
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vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
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}
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/**
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* Exit validation with an error status
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*
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* @param qstate: query state
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* @param id: validator id.
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* @return false, for use by caller to return to stop processing.
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*/
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static int
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val_error(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
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{
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qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
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qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_SERVFAIL;
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Check to see if a given response needs to go through the validation
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* process. Typical reasons for this routine to return false are: CD bit was
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* on in the original request, or the response is a kind of message that
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* is unvalidatable (i.e., SERVFAIL, REFUSED, etc.)
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*
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* @param qstate: query state.
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* @param ret_rc: rcode for this message (if noerror - examine ret_msg).
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* @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL; look at rcode instead.
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* @return true if the response could use validation (although this does not
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* mean we can actually validate this response).
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*/
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static int
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needs_validation(struct module_qstate* qstate, int ret_rc,
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struct dns_msg* ret_msg)
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{
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int rcode;
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/* If the CD bit is on in the original request, then you could think
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* that we don't bother to validate anything.
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* But this is signalled internally with the valrec flag.
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* User queries are validated with BIT_CD to make our cache clean
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* so that bogus messages get retried by the upstream also for
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* downstream validators that set BIT_CD.
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* For DNS64 bit_cd signals no dns64 processing, but we want to
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* provide validation there too */
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/*
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if(qstate->query_flags & BIT_CD) {
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response due to CD bit");
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return 0;
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}
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*/
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if(qstate->is_valrec) {
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "not validating response, is valrec"
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"(validation recursion lookup)");
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return 0;
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}
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if(ret_rc != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR || !ret_msg)
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rcode = ret_rc;
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else rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(ret_msg->rep->flags);
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if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NXDOMAIN) {
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if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO) {
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char rc[16];
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rc[0]=0;
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(void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc));
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate non-answer, rcode %s", rc);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/* cannot validate positive RRSIG response. (negatives can) */
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if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG &&
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rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR && ret_msg &&
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ret_msg->rep->an_numrrsets > 0) {
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate RRSIG, no sigs on sigs.");
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/**
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* Check to see if the response has already been validated.
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* @param ret_msg: return msg, can be NULL
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* @return true if the response has already been validated
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*/
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static int
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already_validated(struct dns_msg* ret_msg)
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{
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/* validate unchecked, and re-validate bogus messages */
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if (ret_msg && ret_msg->rep->security > sec_status_bogus)
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{
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "response has already been validated: %s",
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sec_status_to_string(ret_msg->rep->security));
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return 1;
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}
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return 0;
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}
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/**
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* Generate a request for DNS data.
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*
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* @param qstate: query state that is the parent.
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* @param id: module id.
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* @param name: what name to query for.
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* @param namelen: length of name.
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* @param qtype: query type.
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* @param qclass: query class.
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* @param flags: additional flags, such as the CD bit (BIT_CD), or 0.
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|
* @param newq: If the subquery is newly created, it is returned,
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* otherwise NULL is returned
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* @param detached: true if this qstate should not attach to the subquery
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* @return false on alloc failure.
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*/
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static int
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generate_request(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id, uint8_t* name,
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size_t namelen, uint16_t qtype, uint16_t qclass, uint16_t flags,
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struct module_qstate** newq, int detached)
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{
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struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
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struct query_info ask;
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int valrec;
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ask.qname = name;
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ask.qname_len = namelen;
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ask.qtype = qtype;
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ask.qclass = qclass;
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ask.local_alias = NULL;
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log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "generate request", &ask);
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/* enable valrec flag to avoid recursion to the same validation
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|
* routine, this lookup is simply a lookup. */
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valrec = 1;
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fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_detect_cycle(qstate->env->detect_cycle));
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if((*qstate->env->detect_cycle)(qstate, &ask,
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(uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec)) {
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not generate request: cycle detected");
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return 0;
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}
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if(detached) {
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struct mesh_state* sub = NULL;
|
|
fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_add_sub(
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qstate->env->add_sub));
|
|
if(!(*qstate->env->add_sub)(qstate, &ask,
|
|
(uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq, &sub)){
|
|
log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
fptr_ok(fptr_whitelist_modenv_attach_sub(
|
|
qstate->env->attach_sub));
|
|
if(!(*qstate->env->attach_sub)(qstate, &ask,
|
|
(uint16_t)(BIT_RD|flags), 0, valrec, newq)){
|
|
log_err("Could not generate request: out of memory");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* newq; validator does not need state created for that
|
|
* query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */
|
|
if(*newq) {
|
|
/* add our blacklist to the query blacklist */
|
|
sock_list_merge(&(*newq)->blacklist, (*newq)->region,
|
|
vq->chain_blacklist);
|
|
}
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_subquery;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Generate, send and detach key tag signaling query.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param ta: trust anchor, locked.
|
|
* @return false on a processing error.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
generate_keytag_query(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
|
|
struct trust_anchor* ta)
|
|
{
|
|
/* 3 bytes for "_ta", 5 bytes per tag (4 bytes + "-") */
|
|
#define MAX_LABEL_TAGS (LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN-3)/5
|
|
size_t i, numtag;
|
|
uint16_t tags[MAX_LABEL_TAGS];
|
|
char tagstr[LDNS_MAX_LABELLEN+1] = "_ta"; /* +1 for NULL byte */
|
|
size_t tagstr_left = sizeof(tagstr) - strlen(tagstr);
|
|
char* tagstr_pos = tagstr + strlen(tagstr);
|
|
uint8_t dnamebuf[LDNS_MAX_DOMAINLEN+1]; /* +1 for label length byte */
|
|
size_t dnamebuf_len = sizeof(dnamebuf);
|
|
uint8_t* keytagdname;
|
|
struct module_qstate* newq = NULL;
|
|
enum module_ext_state ext_state = qstate->ext_state[id];
|
|
|
|
numtag = anchor_list_keytags(ta, tags, MAX_LABEL_TAGS);
|
|
if(numtag == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
for(i=0; i<numtag; i++) {
|
|
/* Buffer can't overflow; numtag is limited to tags that fit in
|
|
* the buffer. */
|
|
snprintf(tagstr_pos, tagstr_left, "-%04x", (unsigned)tags[i]);
|
|
tagstr_left -= strlen(tagstr_pos);
|
|
tagstr_pos += strlen(tagstr_pos);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sldns_str2wire_dname_buf_origin(tagstr, dnamebuf, &dnamebuf_len,
|
|
ta->name, ta->namelen);
|
|
if(!(keytagdname = (uint8_t*)regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
|
|
dnamebuf, dnamebuf_len))) {
|
|
log_err("could not generate key tag query: out of memory");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "generate keytag query", keytagdname,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass);
|
|
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, keytagdname, dnamebuf_len,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_NULL, ta->dclass, 0, &newq, 1)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "failed to generate key tag signaling request");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Not interested in subquery response. Restore the ext_state,
|
|
* that might be changed by generate_request() */
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = ext_state;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Get keytag as uint16_t from string
|
|
*
|
|
* @param start: start of string containing keytag
|
|
* @param keytag: pointer where to store the extracted keytag
|
|
* @return: 1 if keytag was extracted, else 0.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
sentinel_get_keytag(char* start, uint16_t* keytag) {
|
|
char* keytag_str;
|
|
char* e = NULL;
|
|
keytag_str = calloc(1, SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN + 1 /* null byte */);
|
|
if(!keytag_str)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
memmove(keytag_str, start, SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN);
|
|
keytag_str[SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN] = '\0';
|
|
*keytag = (uint16_t)strtol(keytag_str, &e, 10);
|
|
if(!e || *e != '\0') {
|
|
free(keytag_str);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
free(keytag_str);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Prime trust anchor for use.
|
|
* Generate and dispatch a priming query for the given trust anchor.
|
|
* The trust anchor can be DNSKEY or DS and does not have to be signed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param toprime: what to prime.
|
|
* @return false on a processing error.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
prime_trust_anchor(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
int id, struct trust_anchor* toprime)
|
|
{
|
|
struct module_qstate* newq = NULL;
|
|
int ret = generate_request(qstate, id, toprime->name, toprime->namelen,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, toprime->dclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0);
|
|
|
|
if(newq && qstate->env->cfg->trust_anchor_signaling &&
|
|
!generate_keytag_query(qstate, id, toprime)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "keytag signaling query failed");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!ret) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Could not prime trust anchor");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* ignore newq; validator does not need state created for that
|
|
* query, and its a 'normal' for iterator as well */
|
|
vq->wait_prime_ta = 1; /* to elicit PRIME_RESP_STATE processing
|
|
from the validator inform_super() routine */
|
|
/* store trust anchor name for later lookup when prime returns */
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
|
|
toprime->name, toprime->namelen);
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_len = toprime->namelen;
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_labs = toprime->namelabs;
|
|
if(!vq->trust_anchor_name) {
|
|
log_err("Could not prime trust anchor: out of memory");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate if the ANSWER and AUTHORITY sections contain valid rrsets.
|
|
* They must be validly signed with the given key.
|
|
* Tries to validate ADDITIONAL rrsets as well, but only to check them.
|
|
* Allows unsigned CNAME after a DNAME that expands the DNAME.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
|
|
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
|
|
* completed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to validate.
|
|
* @param key_entry: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
* @return false if any of the rrsets in the an or ns sections of the message
|
|
* fail to verify. The message is then set to bogus.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
validate_msg_signatures(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve, struct query_info* qchase,
|
|
struct reply_info* chase_reply, struct key_entry_key* key_entry,
|
|
int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t* sname;
|
|
size_t i, slen;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
enum sec_status sec;
|
|
int dname_seen = 0, num_verifies = 0, verified, have_state = 0;
|
|
char* reason = NULL;
|
|
sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
if(vq->msg_signatures_state) {
|
|
/* Pick up the state, and reset it, may not be needed now. */
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_state = 0;
|
|
have_state = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* validate the ANSWER section */
|
|
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
|
|
continue;
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
/* Skip the CNAME following a (validated) DNAME.
|
|
* Because of the normalization routines in the iterator,
|
|
* there will always be an unsigned CNAME following a DNAME
|
|
* (unless qtype=DNAME). */
|
|
if(dname_seen && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
|
|
dname_seen = 0;
|
|
/* CNAME was synthesized by our own iterator */
|
|
/* since the DNAME verified, mark the CNAME as secure */
|
|
((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->security =
|
|
sec_status_secure;
|
|
((struct packed_rrset_data*)s->entry.data)->trust =
|
|
rrset_trust_validated;
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Verify the answer rrset */
|
|
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
|
|
&reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified);
|
|
/* If the (answer) rrset failed to validate, then this
|
|
* message is BAD. */
|
|
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response "
|
|
"has failed ANSWER rrset:", s->rk.dname,
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME)
|
|
errinf(qstate, "for CNAME");
|
|
else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME)
|
|
errinf(qstate, "for DNAME");
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Notice a DNAME that should be followed by an unsigned
|
|
* CNAME. */
|
|
if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME &&
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
|
|
dname_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
num_verifies += verified;
|
|
if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
|
|
i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional?
|
|
chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets:
|
|
chase_reply->rrset_count)) {
|
|
/* If the number of RRSIGs exceeds the maximum in
|
|
* one go, suspend. Only suspend if there is a next
|
|
* rrset to verify, i+1<loopmax. Store where to
|
|
* continue later. */
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
|
|
"suspended");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* validate the AUTHORITY section */
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
|
|
continue;
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry, &reason,
|
|
&reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_AUTHORITY, qstate,
|
|
&verified);
|
|
/* If anything in the authority section fails to be secure,
|
|
* we have a bad message. */
|
|
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "validator: response "
|
|
"has failed AUTHORITY rrset:", s->rk.dname,
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
errinf_rrset(qstate, s);
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, reason_bogus);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
num_verifies += verified;
|
|
if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
|
|
i+1 < (env->cfg->val_clean_additional?
|
|
chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets:
|
|
chase_reply->rrset_count)) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
|
|
"suspended");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If set, the validator should clean the additional section of
|
|
* secure messages. */
|
|
if(!env->cfg->val_clean_additional)
|
|
return 1;
|
|
/* attempt to validate the ADDITIONAL section rrsets */
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets;
|
|
i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) {
|
|
if(have_state && i <= vq->msg_signatures_index)
|
|
continue;
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
/* only validate rrs that have signatures with the key */
|
|
/* leave others unchecked, those get removed later on too */
|
|
val_find_rrset_signer(s, &sname, &slen);
|
|
|
|
verified = 0;
|
|
if(sname && query_dname_compare(sname, key_entry->name)==0)
|
|
(void)val_verify_rrset_entry(env, ve, s, key_entry,
|
|
&reason, NULL, LDNS_SECTION_ADDITIONAL, qstate,
|
|
&verified);
|
|
/* the additional section can fail to be secure,
|
|
* it is optional, check signature in case we need
|
|
* to clean the additional section later. */
|
|
num_verifies += verified;
|
|
if(num_verifies > MAX_VALIDATE_AT_ONCE &&
|
|
i+1 < chase_reply->rrset_count) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_state = 1;
|
|
vq->msg_signatures_index = i;
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "msg signature validation "
|
|
"suspended");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
validate_suspend_timer_cb(void* arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct module_qstate* qstate = (struct module_qstate*)arg;
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer, continue");
|
|
mesh_run(qstate->env->mesh, qstate->mesh_info, module_event_pass,
|
|
NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/** Setup timer to continue validation of msg signatures later */
|
|
static int
|
|
validate_suspend_setup_timer(struct module_qstate* qstate,
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq, int id, enum val_state resume_state)
|
|
{
|
|
struct timeval tv;
|
|
int usec, slack, base;
|
|
if(vq->suspend_count >= MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer: "
|
|
"reached MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS (%d); error out",
|
|
MAX_VALIDATION_SUSPENDS);
|
|
errinf(qstate, "max validation suspends reached, "
|
|
"too many RRSIG validations");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate_suspend timer, set for suspend");
|
|
vq->state = resume_state;
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_reply;
|
|
if(!vq->suspend_timer) {
|
|
vq->suspend_timer = comm_timer_create(
|
|
qstate->env->worker_base,
|
|
validate_suspend_timer_cb, qstate);
|
|
if(!vq->suspend_timer) {
|
|
log_err("validate_suspend_setup_timer: "
|
|
"out of memory for comm_timer_create");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* The timer is activated later, after other events in the event
|
|
* loop have been processed. The query state can also be deleted,
|
|
* when the list is full and query states are dropped. */
|
|
/* Extend wait time if there are a lot of queries or if this one
|
|
* is taking long, to keep around cpu time for ordinary queries. */
|
|
usec = 50000; /* 50 msec */
|
|
slack = 0;
|
|
if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states)
|
|
slack += 3;
|
|
else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/2)
|
|
slack += 2;
|
|
else if(qstate->env->mesh->all.count >= qstate->env->mesh->max_reply_states/4)
|
|
slack += 1;
|
|
if(vq->suspend_count > 3)
|
|
slack += 3;
|
|
else if(vq->suspend_count > 0)
|
|
slack += vq->suspend_count;
|
|
if(slack != 0 && slack <= 12 /* No numeric overflow. */) {
|
|
usec = usec << slack;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Spread such timeouts within 90%-100% of the original timer. */
|
|
base = usec * 9/10;
|
|
usec = base + ub_random_max(qstate->env->rnd, usec-base);
|
|
tv.tv_usec = (usec % 1000000);
|
|
tv.tv_sec = (usec / 1000000);
|
|
vq->suspend_count ++;
|
|
comm_timer_set(vq->suspend_timer, &tv);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Detect wrong truncated response (say from BIND 9.6.1 that is forwarding
|
|
* and saw the NS record without signatures from a referral).
|
|
* The positive response has a mangled authority section.
|
|
* Remove that authority section and the additional section.
|
|
* @param rep: reply
|
|
* @return true if a wrongly truncated response.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
/* only NS in authority, and it is bogus */
|
|
if(rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 || rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]
|
|
->entry.data)->security == sec_status_secure)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
/* answer section is present and secure */
|
|
for(i=0; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ]
|
|
->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "truncating to minimal response");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* For messages that are not referrals, if the chase reply contains an
|
|
* unsigned NS record in the authority section it could have been
|
|
* inserted by a (BIND) forwarder that thinks the zone is insecure, and
|
|
* that has an NS record without signatures in cache. Remove the NS
|
|
* record since the reply does not hinge on that record (in the authority
|
|
* section), but do not remove it if it removes the last record from the
|
|
* answer+authority sections.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: the chased reply, we have a key for this contents,
|
|
* so we should have signatures for these rrsets and not having
|
|
* signatures means it will be bogus.
|
|
* @param orig_reply: original reply, remove NS from there as well because
|
|
* we cannot mark the NS record as DNSSEC valid because it is not
|
|
* validated by signatures.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
remove_spurious_authority(struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct reply_info* orig_reply)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i, found = 0;
|
|
int remove = 0;
|
|
/* if no answer and only 1 auth RRset, do not remove that one */
|
|
if(chase_reply->an_numrrsets == 0 && chase_reply->ns_numrrsets == 1)
|
|
return;
|
|
/* search authority section for unsigned NS records */
|
|
for(i = chase_reply->an_numrrsets;
|
|
i < chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
struct packed_rrset_data* d = (struct packed_rrset_data*)
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets[i]->entry.data;
|
|
if(ntohs(chase_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS
|
|
&& d->rrsig_count == 0) {
|
|
found = i;
|
|
remove = 1;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* see if we found the entry */
|
|
if(!remove) return;
|
|
log_rrset_key(VERB_ALGO, "Removing spurious unsigned NS record "
|
|
"(likely inserted by forwarder)", chase_reply->rrsets[found]);
|
|
|
|
/* find rrset in orig_reply */
|
|
for(i = orig_reply->an_numrrsets;
|
|
i < orig_reply->an_numrrsets+orig_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
if(ntohs(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS
|
|
&& query_dname_compare(orig_reply->rrsets[i]->rk.dname,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets[found]->rk.dname) == 0) {
|
|
/* remove from orig_msg */
|
|
val_reply_remove_auth(orig_reply, i);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* remove rrset from chase_reply */
|
|
val_reply_remove_auth(chase_reply, found);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
|
|
* question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response.
|
|
*
|
|
* The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
|
|
* @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param qstate: query state for the region.
|
|
* @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
|
|
* @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_positive_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
|
|
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t* wc = NULL;
|
|
size_t wl;
|
|
int wc_cached = 0;
|
|
int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
|
|
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */
|
|
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard
|
|
* expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be
|
|
* made in the authority section. */
|
|
if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive response has "
|
|
"inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname,
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(wc && !wc_cached && env->cfg->aggressive_nsec) {
|
|
rrset_cache_update_wildcard(env->rrset_cache, s, wc, wl,
|
|
env->alloc, *env->now);
|
|
wc_cached = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* validate the AUTHORITY section as well - this will generally be
|
|
* the NS rrset (which could be missing, no problem) */
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a
|
|
* (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove
|
|
* that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard
|
|
* was used. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
|
|
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* if not, continue looking for proof */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and
|
|
* we have NSEC3 records */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
|
|
nsec3s_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
|
|
* proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
|
|
* records. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen &&
|
|
nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc,
|
|
&vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
|
|
if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive wildcard response is "
|
|
"insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
|
|
* response, fail. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive response was wildcard "
|
|
"expansion and did not prove original data "
|
|
"did not exist");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive response");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate a NOERROR/NODATA signed response -- a response that has a
|
|
* NOERROR Rcode but no ANSWER section RRsets. This consists of making
|
|
* certain that the authority section NSEC/NSEC3s proves that the qname
|
|
* does exist and the qtype doesn't.
|
|
*
|
|
* The answer and authority RRsets must already be verified as secure.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
|
|
* @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param qstate: query state for the region.
|
|
* @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
|
|
* @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_nodata_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
|
|
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Since we are here, there must be nothing in the ANSWER section to
|
|
* validate. */
|
|
/* (Note: CNAME/DNAME responses will not directly get here --
|
|
* instead, they are chased down into individual CNAME validations,
|
|
* and at the end of the cname chain a POSITIVE, or CNAME_NOANSWER
|
|
* validation.) */
|
|
|
|
/* validate the AUTHORITY section */
|
|
int has_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then the NODATA has been proven.*/
|
|
uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the
|
|
proven closest encloser. */
|
|
uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */
|
|
int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
/* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove
|
|
* NODATA.
|
|
* This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case. */
|
|
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
|
|
if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) {
|
|
has_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
/* sets wc-encloser if wildcard applicable */
|
|
}
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) {
|
|
ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
|
|
}
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
|
|
nsec3s_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */
|
|
|
|
/* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exist
|
|
* (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC
|
|
* showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */
|
|
if(wc && !ce)
|
|
has_valid_nsec = 0;
|
|
else if(wc && ce) {
|
|
if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) {
|
|
has_valid_nsec = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!has_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen &&
|
|
nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nodata(env, ve,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey,
|
|
&vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
|
|
if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "NODATA response is insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
has_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
|
|
/* check is incomplete; suspend */
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!has_valid_nsec) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NODATA response failed to prove NODATA "
|
|
"status with NSEC/NSEC3");
|
|
if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
|
|
log_dns_msg("Failed NODATA", qchase, chase_reply);
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NODATA response.");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate a NAMEERROR signed response -- a response that has a NXDOMAIN
|
|
* Rcode.
|
|
* This consists of making certain that the authority section NSEC proves
|
|
* that the qname doesn't exist and the covering wildcard also doesn't exist..
|
|
*
|
|
* The answer and authority RRsets must have already been verified as secure.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
|
|
* @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param rcode: adjusted RCODE, in case of RCODE/proof mismatch leniency.
|
|
* @param qstate: query state for the region.
|
|
* @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
|
|
* @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_nameerror_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
|
|
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey, int* rcode,
|
|
struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
int has_valid_nsec = 0;
|
|
int has_valid_wnsec = 0;
|
|
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
uint8_t* ce;
|
|
int ce_labs = 0;
|
|
int prev_ce_labs = 0;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname))
|
|
has_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
|
|
ce_labs = dname_count_labels(ce);
|
|
/* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */
|
|
if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs ||
|
|
(ce_labs == prev_ce_labs &&
|
|
has_valid_wnsec == 0)) {
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname,
|
|
qchase->qname_len))
|
|
has_valid_wnsec = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
has_valid_wnsec = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
prev_ce_labs = ce_labs;
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3)
|
|
nsec3s_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if((!has_valid_nsec || !has_valid_wnsec) && nsec3s_seen &&
|
|
nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
/* use NSEC3 proof, both answer and auth rrsets, in case
|
|
* NSEC3s end up in the answer (due to qtype=NSEC3 or so) */
|
|
chase_reply->security = nsec3_prove_nameerror(env, ve,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets, chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey,
|
|
&vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
|
|
if(chase_reply->security == sec_status_unchecked) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(chase_reply->security != sec_status_secure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response failed nsec, "
|
|
"nsec3 proof was %s", sec_status_to_string(
|
|
chase_reply->security));
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
has_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
has_valid_wnsec = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the message fails to prove either condition, it is bogus. */
|
|
if(!has_valid_nsec) {
|
|
validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey,
|
|
qstate, vq, nsec3_calculations, suspend);
|
|
if(*suspend) return;
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: "
|
|
"qname does not exist");
|
|
/* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */
|
|
if(chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
*rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR;
|
|
} else {
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!has_valid_wnsec) {
|
|
validate_nodata_response(env, ve, qchase, chase_reply, kkey,
|
|
qstate, vq, nsec3_calculations, suspend);
|
|
if(*suspend) return;
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "NameError response has failed to prove: "
|
|
"covering wildcard does not exist");
|
|
/* Be lenient with RCODE in NSEC NameError responses */
|
|
if (chase_reply->security == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
*rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR;
|
|
} else {
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, we consider the message secure. */
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated NAME ERROR response.");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Given a referral response, validate rrsets and take least trusted rrset
|
|
* as the current validation status.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
|
|
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
|
|
* completed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to validate.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_referral_response(struct reply_info* chase_reply)
|
|
{
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
enum sec_status s;
|
|
/* message security equals lowest rrset security */
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->rrset_count; i++) {
|
|
s = ((struct packed_rrset_data*)chase_reply->rrsets[i]
|
|
->entry.data)->security;
|
|
if(s < chase_reply->security)
|
|
chase_reply->security = s;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validated part of referral response as %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(chase_reply->security));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Given an "ANY" response -- a response that contains an answer to a
|
|
* qtype==ANY question, with answers. This does no checking that all
|
|
* types are present.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: it may be possible to get parent-side delegation point records
|
|
* here, which won't all be signed. Right now, this routine relies on the
|
|
* upstream iterative resolver to not return these responses -- instead
|
|
* treating them as referrals.
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE: RFC 4035 is silent on this issue, so this may change upon
|
|
* clarification. Clarification draft -05 says to not check all types are
|
|
* present.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note that by the time this method is called, the process of finding the
|
|
* trusted DNSKEY rrset that signs this response must already have been
|
|
* completed.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
|
|
* @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param qstate: query state for the region.
|
|
* @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
|
|
* @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_any_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
|
|
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
/* all answer and auth rrsets already verified */
|
|
/* but check if a wildcard response is given, then check NSEC/NSEC3
|
|
* for qname denial to see if wildcard is applicable */
|
|
uint8_t* wc = NULL;
|
|
size_t wl;
|
|
int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
|
|
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
|
|
if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_ANY) {
|
|
log_err("internal error: ANY validation called for non-ANY");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the answer itself */
|
|
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard
|
|
* expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be
|
|
* made in the authority section. */
|
|
if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Positive ANY response"
|
|
" has inconsistent wildcard sigs:",
|
|
s->rk.dname, ntohs(s->rk.type),
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if it was a wildcard, check for NSEC/NSEC3s in both answer
|
|
* and authority sections (NSEC may be moved to the ANSWER section) */
|
|
if(wc != NULL)
|
|
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets;
|
|
i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a
|
|
* (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove
|
|
* that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard
|
|
* was used. */
|
|
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
|
|
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* if not, continue looking for proof */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and
|
|
* we have NSEC3 records */
|
|
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
|
|
nsec3s_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
|
|
* proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
|
|
* records. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen &&
|
|
nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
/* look both in answer and auth section for NSEC3s */
|
|
enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets,
|
|
chase_reply->an_numrrsets+chase_reply->ns_numrrsets,
|
|
qchase, kkey, wc, &vq->nsec3_cache_table,
|
|
nsec3_calculations);
|
|
if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Positive ANY wildcard response is "
|
|
"insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
|
|
* response, fail. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "positive ANY response was wildcard "
|
|
"expansion and did not prove original data "
|
|
"did not exist");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated positive ANY response");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate CNAME response, or DNAME+CNAME.
|
|
* This is just like a positive proof, except that this is about a
|
|
* DNAME+CNAME. Possible wildcard proof.
|
|
* Difference with positive proof is that this routine refuses
|
|
* wildcarded DNAMEs.
|
|
*
|
|
* The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
|
|
* @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param qstate: query state for the region.
|
|
* @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
|
|
* @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_cname_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
|
|
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t* wc = NULL;
|
|
size_t wl;
|
|
int wc_NSEC_ok = 0;
|
|
int nsec3s_seen = 0;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* validate the ANSWER section - this will be the CNAME (+DNAME) */
|
|
for(i=0; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* Check to see if the rrset is the result of a wildcard
|
|
* expansion. If so, an additional check will need to be
|
|
* made in the authority section. */
|
|
if(!val_rrset_wildcard(s, &wc, &wl)) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "Cname response has "
|
|
"inconsistent wildcard sigs:", s->rk.dname,
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Refuse wildcarded DNAMEs rfc 4597.
|
|
* Do not follow a wildcarded DNAME because
|
|
* its synthesized CNAME expansion is underdefined */
|
|
if(qchase->qtype != LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME &&
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME && wc) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_QUERY, "cannot validate a "
|
|
"wildcarded DNAME:", s->rk.dname,
|
|
ntohs(s->rk.type), ntohs(s->rk.rrset_class));
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If we have found a CNAME, stop looking for one.
|
|
* The iterator has placed the CNAME chain in correct
|
|
* order. */
|
|
if (ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME) {
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* AUTHORITY section */
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* If this is a positive wildcard response, and we have a
|
|
* (just verified) NSEC record, try to use it to 1) prove
|
|
* that qname doesn't exist and 2) that the correct wildcard
|
|
* was used. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_positive_wildcard(s, qchase, wc)) {
|
|
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* if not, continue looking for proof */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, if this is a positive wildcard response and
|
|
* we have NSEC3 records */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
|
|
nsec3s_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If this was a positive wildcard response that we haven't already
|
|
* proven, and we have NSEC3 records, try to prove it using the NSEC3
|
|
* records. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok && nsec3s_seen &&
|
|
nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_wildcard(env, ve,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, wc,
|
|
&vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
|
|
if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "wildcard CNAME response is "
|
|
"insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
wc_NSEC_ok = 1;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If after all this, we still haven't proven the positive wildcard
|
|
* response, fail. */
|
|
if(wc != NULL && !wc_NSEC_ok) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAME response was wildcard "
|
|
"expansion and did not prove original data "
|
|
"did not exist");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Successfully validated CNAME response");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Validate CNAME NOANSWER response, no more data after a CNAME chain.
|
|
* This can be a NODATA or a NAME ERROR case, but not both at the same time.
|
|
* We don't know because the rcode has been set to NOERROR by the CNAME.
|
|
*
|
|
* The answer and authority rrsets must already be verified as secure.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param env: module env for verify.
|
|
* @param ve: validator env for verify.
|
|
* @param qchase: query that was made.
|
|
* @param chase_reply: answer to that query to validate.
|
|
* @param kkey: the key entry, which is trusted, and which matches
|
|
* the signer of the answer. The key entry isgood().
|
|
* @param qstate: query state for the region.
|
|
* @param vq: validator state for the nsec3 cache table.
|
|
* @param nsec3_calculations: current nsec3 hash calculations.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
validate_cname_noanswer_response(struct module_env* env, struct val_env* ve,
|
|
struct query_info* qchase, struct reply_info* chase_reply,
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey, struct module_qstate* qstate,
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq, int* nsec3_calculations, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
int nodata_valid_nsec = 0; /* If true, then NODATA has been proven.*/
|
|
uint8_t* ce = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. This is the
|
|
proven closest encloser. */
|
|
uint8_t* wc = NULL; /* for wildcard nodata responses. wildcard nsec */
|
|
int nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0; /* if true, nameerror has been proven */
|
|
int nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0;
|
|
int nsec3s_seen = 0; /* nsec3s seen */
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* s;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
uint8_t* nsec_ce; /* Used to find the NSEC with the longest ce */
|
|
int ce_labs = 0;
|
|
int prev_ce_labs = 0;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* the AUTHORITY section */
|
|
for(i=chase_reply->an_numrrsets; i<chase_reply->an_numrrsets+
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets; i++) {
|
|
s = chase_reply->rrsets[i];
|
|
|
|
/* If we encounter an NSEC record, try to use it to prove
|
|
* NODATA. This needs to handle the ENT NODATA case.
|
|
* Also try to prove NAMEERROR, and absence of a wildcard */
|
|
if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC) {
|
|
if(nsec_proves_nodata(s, qchase, &wc)) {
|
|
nodata_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
/* set wc encloser if wildcard applicable */
|
|
}
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_name_error(s, qchase->qname)) {
|
|
ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
|
|
nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
nsec_ce = nsec_closest_encloser(qchase->qname, s);
|
|
ce_labs = dname_count_labels(nsec_ce);
|
|
/* Use longest closest encloser to prove wildcard. */
|
|
if(ce_labs > prev_ce_labs ||
|
|
(ce_labs == prev_ce_labs &&
|
|
nxdomain_valid_wnsec == 0)) {
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_no_wc(s, qchase->qname,
|
|
qchase->qname_len))
|
|
nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 1;
|
|
else
|
|
nxdomain_valid_wnsec = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
prev_ce_labs = ce_labs;
|
|
if(val_nsec_proves_insecuredelegation(s, qchase)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "delegation is insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if(ntohs(s->rk.type) == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC3) {
|
|
nsec3s_seen = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if we have a wildcard NODATA proof. */
|
|
|
|
/* The wildcard NODATA is 1 NSEC proving that qname does not exists
|
|
* (and also proving what the closest encloser is), and 1 NSEC
|
|
* showing the matching wildcard, which must be *.closest_encloser. */
|
|
if(wc && !ce)
|
|
nodata_valid_nsec = 0;
|
|
else if(wc && ce) {
|
|
if(query_dname_compare(wc, ce) != 0) {
|
|
nodata_valid_nsec = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if(nxdomain_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_wnsec) {
|
|
/* name error is missing wildcard denial proof */
|
|
nxdomain_valid_nsec = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(nodata_valid_nsec && nxdomain_valid_nsec) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer proves that name "
|
|
"exists and not exists, bogus");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec && nsec3s_seen &&
|
|
nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
int nodata;
|
|
enum sec_status sec = nsec3_prove_nxornodata(env, ve,
|
|
chase_reply->rrsets+chase_reply->an_numrrsets,
|
|
chase_reply->ns_numrrsets, qchase, kkey, &nodata,
|
|
&vq->nsec3_cache_table, nsec3_calculations);
|
|
if(sec == sec_status_insecure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response "
|
|
"is insecure");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
if(nodata)
|
|
nodata_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
else nxdomain_valid_nsec = 1;
|
|
} else if(sec == sec_status_unchecked) {
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!nodata_valid_nsec && !nxdomain_valid_nsec) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "CNAMEchain to noanswer response failed "
|
|
"to prove status with NSEC/NSEC3");
|
|
if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
|
|
log_dns_msg("Failed CNAMEnoanswer", qchase, chase_reply);
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(nodata_valid_nsec)
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a "
|
|
"NODATA response.");
|
|
else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "successfully validated CNAME chain to a "
|
|
"NAMEERROR response.");
|
|
chase_reply->security = sec_status_secure;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Process init state for validator.
|
|
* Process the INIT state. First tier responses start in the INIT state.
|
|
* This is where they are vetted for validation suitability, and the initial
|
|
* key search is done.
|
|
*
|
|
* Currently, events the come through this routine will be either promoted
|
|
* to FINISHED/CNAME_RESP (no validation needed), FINDKEY (next step to
|
|
* validation), or will be (temporarily) retired and a new priming request
|
|
* event will be generated.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
|
|
* not.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
processInit(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
struct val_env* ve, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t* lookup_name;
|
|
size_t lookup_len;
|
|
struct trust_anchor* anchor;
|
|
enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response(
|
|
qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase,
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
|
|
if(vq->restart_count > ve->max_restart) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "restart count exceeded");
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* correctly initialize reason_bogus */
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator classification %s",
|
|
val_classification_to_string(subtype));
|
|
if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL &&
|
|
vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) {
|
|
/* referral uses the rrset name as qchase, to find keys for
|
|
* that rrset */
|
|
vq->qchase.qname = vq->orig_msg->rep->
|
|
rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname;
|
|
vq->qchase.qname_len = vq->orig_msg->rep->
|
|
rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.dname_len;
|
|
vq->qchase.qtype = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->
|
|
rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type);
|
|
vq->qchase.qclass = ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->
|
|
rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.rrset_class);
|
|
}
|
|
lookup_name = vq->qchase.qname;
|
|
lookup_len = vq->qchase.qname_len;
|
|
/* for type DS look at the parent side for keys/trustanchor */
|
|
/* also for NSEC not at apex */
|
|
if(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS ||
|
|
(vq->qchase.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count > vq->rrset_skip &&
|
|
ntohs(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->rk.type) ==
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_NSEC &&
|
|
!(vq->orig_msg->rep->rrsets[vq->rrset_skip]->
|
|
rk.flags&PACKED_RRSET_NSEC_AT_APEX))) {
|
|
dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
val_mark_indeterminate(vq->chase_reply, qstate->env->anchors,
|
|
qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL;
|
|
vq->empty_DS_name = NULL;
|
|
vq->ds_rrset = 0;
|
|
anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors,
|
|
lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass);
|
|
|
|
/* Determine the signer/lookup name */
|
|
val_find_signer(subtype, &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep,
|
|
vq->rrset_skip, &vq->signer_name, &vq->signer_len);
|
|
if(vq->signer_name != NULL &&
|
|
!dname_subdomain_c(lookup_name, vq->signer_name)) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "this signer name is not a parent "
|
|
"of lookupname, omitted", vq->signer_name, 0, 0);
|
|
vq->signer_name = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if(vq->signer_name == NULL) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "no signer, using", lookup_name,
|
|
0, 0);
|
|
} else {
|
|
lookup_name = vq->signer_name;
|
|
lookup_len = vq->signer_len;
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "signer is", lookup_name, 0, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* for NXDOMAIN it could be signed by a parent of the trust anchor */
|
|
if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR && vq->signer_name &&
|
|
anchor && dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, lookup_name)){
|
|
lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
|
|
anchor = anchors_lookup(qstate->env->anchors,
|
|
lookup_name, lookup_len, vq->qchase.qclass);
|
|
if(!anchor) { /* unsigned parent denies anchor*/
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "unsigned parent zone denies"
|
|
" trust anchor, indeterminate");
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE);
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "trust anchor NXDOMAIN by signed parent");
|
|
} else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE &&
|
|
qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY &&
|
|
query_dname_compare(lookup_name, qstate->qinfo.qname) == 0) {
|
|
/* is a DNSKEY so lookup a bit higher since we want to
|
|
* get it from a parent or from trustanchor */
|
|
dname_remove_label(&lookup_name, &lookup_len);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(vq->rrset_skip > 0 || subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME ||
|
|
subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
|
|
/* extract this part of orig_msg into chase_reply for
|
|
* the eventual VALIDATE stage */
|
|
val_fill_reply(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep,
|
|
vq->rrset_skip, lookup_name, lookup_len,
|
|
vq->signer_name);
|
|
if(verbosity >= VERB_ALGO)
|
|
log_dns_msg("chased extract", &vq->qchase,
|
|
vq->chase_reply);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vq->key_entry = key_cache_obtain(ve->kcache, lookup_name, lookup_len,
|
|
vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region, *qstate->env->now);
|
|
|
|
/* there is no key and no trust anchor */
|
|
if(vq->key_entry == NULL && anchor == NULL) {
|
|
/*response isn't under a trust anchor, so we cannot validate.*/
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_INDETERMINATE);
|
|
/* go to finished state to cache this result */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* if not key, or if keyentry is *above* the trustanchor, i.e.
|
|
* the keyentry is based on another (higher) trustanchor */
|
|
else if(vq->key_entry == NULL || (anchor &&
|
|
dname_strict_subdomain_c(anchor->name, vq->key_entry->name))) {
|
|
/* trust anchor is an 'unsigned' trust anchor */
|
|
if(anchor && anchor->numDS == 0 && anchor->numDNSKEY == 0) {
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, anchor->name,
|
|
qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
|
|
lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
|
|
/* go to finished state to cache this result */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* fire off a trust anchor priming query. */
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "prime trust anchor");
|
|
if(!prime_trust_anchor(qstate, vq, id, anchor)) {
|
|
lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
|
|
/* and otherwise, don't continue processing this event.
|
|
* (it will be reactivated when the priming query returns). */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if(anchor) {
|
|
lock_basic_unlock(&anchor->lock);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
/* response is under a null key, so we cannot validate
|
|
* However, we do set the status to INSECURE, since it is
|
|
* essentially proven insecure. */
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name,
|
|
qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
|
|
/* go to finished state to cache this result */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
} else if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
/* Bad keys should have the relevant EDE code and text */
|
|
sldns_ede_code ede = key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry);
|
|
/* key is bad, chain is bad, reply is bogus */
|
|
errinf_dname(qstate, "key for validation", vq->key_entry->name);
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, "is marked as invalid", ede);
|
|
errinf(qstate, "because of a previous");
|
|
errinf(qstate, key_entry_get_reason(vq->key_entry));
|
|
|
|
/* no retries, stop bothering the authority until timeout */
|
|
vq->restart_count = ve->max_restart;
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, ede);
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* otherwise, we have our "closest" cached key -- continue
|
|
* processing in the next state. */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINDKEY_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Process the FINDKEY state. Generally this just calculates the next name
|
|
* to query and either issues a DS or a DNSKEY query. It will check to see
|
|
* if the correct key has already been reached, in which case it will
|
|
* advance the event to the next state.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
|
|
* not.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
processFindKey(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
uint8_t* target_key_name, *current_key_name;
|
|
size_t target_key_len;
|
|
int strip_lab;
|
|
struct module_qstate* newq = NULL;
|
|
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: FindKey", &vq->qchase);
|
|
/* We know that state.key_entry is not 0 or bad key -- if it were,
|
|
* then previous processing should have directed this event to
|
|
* a different state.
|
|
* It could be an isnull key, which signals the DNSKEY failed
|
|
* with retry and has to be looked up again. */
|
|
log_assert(vq->key_entry && !key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry));
|
|
if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
|
|
vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
|
|
vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request");
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
target_key_name = vq->signer_name;
|
|
target_key_len = vq->signer_len;
|
|
if(!target_key_name) {
|
|
target_key_name = vq->qchase.qname;
|
|
target_key_len = vq->qchase.qname_len;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
current_key_name = vq->key_entry->name;
|
|
|
|
/* If our current key entry matches our target, then we are done. */
|
|
if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name, current_key_name) == 0) {
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(vq->empty_DS_name) {
|
|
/* if the last empty nonterminal/emptyDS name we detected is
|
|
* below the current key, use that name to make progress
|
|
* along the chain of trust */
|
|
if(query_dname_compare(target_key_name,
|
|
vq->empty_DS_name) == 0) {
|
|
/* do not query for empty_DS_name again */
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Cannot retrieve DS for signature");
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, "no signatures", LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
current_key_name = vq->empty_DS_name;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "current keyname", current_key_name,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "target keyname", target_key_name,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
|
|
/* assert we are walking down the DNS tree */
|
|
if(!dname_subdomain_c(target_key_name, current_key_name)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "bad signer name");
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* so this value is >= -1 */
|
|
strip_lab = dname_count_labels(target_key_name) -
|
|
dname_count_labels(current_key_name) - 1;
|
|
log_assert(strip_lab >= -1);
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "striplab %d", strip_lab);
|
|
if(strip_lab > 0) {
|
|
dname_remove_labels(&target_key_name, &target_key_len,
|
|
strip_lab);
|
|
}
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "next keyname", target_key_name,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
|
|
|
|
/* The next step is either to query for the next DS, or to query
|
|
* for the next DNSKEY. */
|
|
if(vq->ds_rrset)
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_ALGO, "DS RRset", vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, LDNS_RR_CLASS_IN);
|
|
else verbose(VERB_ALGO, "No DS RRset");
|
|
|
|
if(vq->ds_rrset && query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
|
|
vq->key_entry->name) != 0) {
|
|
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
|
|
vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
|
|
vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request");
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!vq->ds_rrset || query_dname_compare(vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
|
|
target_key_name) != 0) {
|
|
/* check if there is a cache entry : pick up an NSEC if
|
|
* there is no DS, check if that NSEC has DS-bit unset, and
|
|
* thus can disprove the secure delegation we seek.
|
|
* We can then use that NSEC even in the absence of a SOA
|
|
* record that would be required by the iterator to supply
|
|
* a completely protocol-correct response.
|
|
* Uses negative cache for NSEC3 lookup of DS responses. */
|
|
/* only if cache not blacklisted, of course */
|
|
struct dns_msg* msg;
|
|
int suspend;
|
|
if(vq->sub_ds_msg) {
|
|
/* We have a suspended DS reply from a sub-query;
|
|
* process it. */
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process suspended sub DS response");
|
|
msg = vq->sub_ds_msg;
|
|
process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR,
|
|
msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
/* we'll come back here later to continue */
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
|
|
id, VAL_FINDKEY_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
vq->sub_ds_msg = NULL;
|
|
return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */
|
|
} else if(!qstate->blacklist && !vq->chain_blacklist &&
|
|
(msg=val_find_DS(qstate->env, target_key_name,
|
|
target_key_len, vq->qchase.qclass, qstate->region,
|
|
vq->key_entry->name)) ) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Process cached DS response");
|
|
process_ds_response(qstate, vq, id, LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR,
|
|
msg, &msg->qinfo, NULL, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
/* we'll come back here later to continue */
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
|
|
id, VAL_FINDKEY_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
return 1; /* continue processing ds-response results */
|
|
}
|
|
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, target_key_name,
|
|
target_key_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS, vq->qchase.qclass,
|
|
BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DS request");
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, it is time to query for the DNSKEY */
|
|
if(!generate_request(qstate, id, vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname,
|
|
vq->ds_rrset->rk.dname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
|
|
vq->qchase.qclass, BIT_CD, &newq, 0)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "error generating DNSKEY request");
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Process the VALIDATE stage, the init and findkey stages are finished,
|
|
* and the right keys are available to validate the response.
|
|
* Or, there are no keys available, in order to invalidate the response.
|
|
*
|
|
* After validation, the status is recorded in the message and rrsets,
|
|
* and finished state is started.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
|
|
* not.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
processValidate(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
struct val_env* ve, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
enum val_classification subtype;
|
|
int rcode, suspend, nsec3_calculations = 0;
|
|
|
|
if(!vq->key_entry) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validate: no key entry, failed");
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* This is the default next state. */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_FINISHED_STATE;
|
|
|
|
/* Unsigned responses must be underneath a "null" key entry.*/
|
|
if(key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Verified that %sresponse is INSECURE",
|
|
vq->signer_name?"":"unsigned ");
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_insecure;
|
|
val_mark_insecure(vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry->name,
|
|
qstate->env->rrset_cache, qstate->env);
|
|
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish a chain "
|
|
"of trust to keys for", vq->key_entry->name,
|
|
LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, vq->key_entry->key_class);
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply,
|
|
key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry));
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, "while building chain of trust",
|
|
key_entry_get_reason_bogus(vq->key_entry));
|
|
if(vq->restart_count >= ve->max_restart)
|
|
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* signerName being null is the indicator that this response was
|
|
* unsigned */
|
|
if(vq->signer_name == NULL) {
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "processValidate: state has no "
|
|
"signer name", &vq->qchase);
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Could not establish validation of "
|
|
"INSECURE status of unsigned response.");
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, "no signatures", LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->chase_reply, LDNS_EDE_RRSIGS_MISSING);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo,
|
|
&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
|
|
if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL)
|
|
remove_spurious_authority(vq->chase_reply, vq->orig_msg->rep);
|
|
|
|
/* check signatures in the message;
|
|
* answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */
|
|
if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate, vq, qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase,
|
|
vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &suspend)) {
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate, vq,
|
|
id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
/* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even
|
|
* with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section
|
|
* for positive replies*/
|
|
if((subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE || subtype == VAL_CLASS_ANY
|
|
|| subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) &&
|
|
detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) {
|
|
/* truncate the message some more */
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->ar_numrrsets = 0;
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count =
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets;
|
|
vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0;
|
|
vq->chase_reply->ar_numrrsets = 0;
|
|
vq->chase_reply->rrset_count =
|
|
vq->chase_reply->an_numrrsets;
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains "
|
|
"bad rrsets");
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch(subtype) {
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response");
|
|
validate_positive_response(qstate->env, ve,
|
|
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
|
|
vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_NODATA:
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nodata response");
|
|
validate_nodata_response(qstate->env, ve,
|
|
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
|
|
vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nodata): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR:
|
|
rcode = (int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags);
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a nxdomain response");
|
|
validate_nameerror_response(qstate->env, ve,
|
|
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, &rcode,
|
|
qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
|
|
vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(nxdomain): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->orig_msg->rep->flags, rcode);
|
|
FLAGS_SET_RCODE(vq->chase_reply->flags, rcode);
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_CNAME:
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname response");
|
|
validate_cname_response(qstate->env, ve,
|
|
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
|
|
vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER:
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a cname noanswer "
|
|
"response");
|
|
validate_cname_noanswer_response(qstate->env, ve,
|
|
&vq->qchase, vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate, vq, &nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
|
|
vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(cname_noanswer): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL:
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a referral response");
|
|
validate_referral_response(vq->chase_reply);
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(referral): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case VAL_CLASS_ANY:
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive ANY "
|
|
"response");
|
|
validate_any_response(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase,
|
|
vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry, qstate, vq,
|
|
&nsec3_calculations, &suspend);
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
if(!validate_suspend_setup_timer(qstate,
|
|
vq, id, VAL_VALIDATE_STATE))
|
|
return val_error(qstate, id);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate(positive_any): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security));
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
log_err("validate: unhandled response subtype: %d",
|
|
subtype);
|
|
}
|
|
if(vq->chase_reply->security == sec_status_bogus) {
|
|
if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE)
|
|
errinf(qstate, "wildcard");
|
|
else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype));
|
|
errinf(qstate, "proof failed");
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The Finished state. The validation status (good or bad) has been determined.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @return true if the event should be processed further on return, false if
|
|
* not.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
processFinished(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
struct val_env* ve, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
enum val_classification subtype = val_classify_response(
|
|
qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo, &vq->qchase,
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
|
|
|
|
/* store overall validation result in orig_msg */
|
|
if(vq->rrset_skip == 0) {
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->security = vq->chase_reply->security;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->chase_reply->reason_bogus);
|
|
} else if(subtype != VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL ||
|
|
vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->an_numrrsets +
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets) {
|
|
/* ignore sec status of additional section if a referral
|
|
* type message skips there and
|
|
* use the lowest security status as end result. */
|
|
if(vq->chase_reply->security < vq->orig_msg->rep->security) {
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->security =
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->chase_reply->reason_bogus);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_REFERRAL) {
|
|
/* for a referral, move to next unchecked rrset and check it*/
|
|
vq->rrset_skip = val_next_unchecked(vq->orig_msg->rep,
|
|
vq->rrset_skip);
|
|
if(vq->rrset_skip < vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count) {
|
|
/* and restart for this rrset */
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: go to next rrset");
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked;
|
|
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* referral chase is done */
|
|
}
|
|
if(vq->chase_reply->security != sec_status_bogus &&
|
|
subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME) {
|
|
/* chase the CNAME; process next part of the message */
|
|
if(!val_chase_cname(&vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep,
|
|
&vq->rrset_skip)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: failed to chase CNAME");
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* restart process for new qchase at rrset_skip */
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: chased to",
|
|
&vq->qchase);
|
|
vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_unchecked;
|
|
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
/* If the message is secure, check that all rrsets are
|
|
* secure (i.e. some inserted RRset for CNAME chain with
|
|
* a different signer name). And drop additional rrsets
|
|
* that are not secure (if clean-additional option is set) */
|
|
/* this may cause the msg to be marked bogus */
|
|
val_check_nonsecure(qstate->env, vq->orig_msg->rep);
|
|
if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validation success",
|
|
&qstate->qinfo);
|
|
if(!qstate->no_cache_store) {
|
|
val_neg_addreply(qstate->env->neg_cache,
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if the result is bogus - set message ttl to bogus ttl to avoid
|
|
* endless bogus revalidation */
|
|
if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_bogus) {
|
|
/* see if we can try again to fetch data */
|
|
if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validation failed, "
|
|
"blacklist and retry to fetch data");
|
|
val_blacklist(&qstate->blacklist, qstate->region,
|
|
qstate->reply_origin, 0);
|
|
qstate->reply_origin = NULL;
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
val_restart(vq);
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "pass back to next module");
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_restart_next;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl = ve->bogus_ttl;
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->prefetch_ttl =
|
|
PREFETCH_TTL_CALC(vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl);
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->serve_expired_ttl =
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->ttl + qstate->env->cfg->serve_expired_ttl;
|
|
if((qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 1 ||
|
|
qstate->env->cfg->log_servfail) &&
|
|
!qstate->env->cfg->val_log_squelch) {
|
|
if(qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level < 2 &&
|
|
!qstate->env->cfg->log_servfail)
|
|
log_query_info(NO_VERBOSE, "validation failure",
|
|
&qstate->qinfo);
|
|
else {
|
|
char* err_str = errinf_to_str_bogus(qstate);
|
|
if(err_str) {
|
|
size_t err_str_len = strlen(err_str);
|
|
log_info("%s", err_str);
|
|
/* allocate space and store the error
|
|
* string */
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus_str = regional_alloc(
|
|
qstate->region,
|
|
sizeof(char) * (err_str_len+1));
|
|
memcpy(vq->orig_msg->rep->reason_bogus_str,
|
|
err_str, err_str_len+1);
|
|
}
|
|
free(err_str);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/*
|
|
* If set, the validator will not make messages bogus, instead
|
|
* indeterminate is issued, so that no clients receive SERVFAIL.
|
|
* This allows an operator to run validation 'shadow' without
|
|
* hurting responses to clients.
|
|
*/
|
|
/* If we are in permissive mode, bogus gets indeterminate */
|
|
if(qstate->env->cfg->val_permissive_mode)
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->security = sec_status_indeterminate;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(vq->orig_msg->rep->security == sec_status_secure &&
|
|
qstate->env->cfg->root_key_sentinel &&
|
|
(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_A ||
|
|
qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_AAAA)) {
|
|
char* keytag_start;
|
|
uint16_t keytag;
|
|
if(*qstate->qinfo.qname == strlen(SENTINEL_IS) +
|
|
SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN &&
|
|
dname_lab_startswith(qstate->qinfo.qname, SENTINEL_IS,
|
|
&keytag_start)) {
|
|
if(sentinel_get_keytag(keytag_start, &keytag) &&
|
|
!anchor_has_keytag(qstate->env->anchors,
|
|
(uint8_t*)"", 1, 0, vq->qchase.qclass, keytag)) {
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->security =
|
|
sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if(*qstate->qinfo.qname == strlen(SENTINEL_NOT) +
|
|
SENTINEL_KEYTAG_LEN &&
|
|
dname_lab_startswith(qstate->qinfo.qname, SENTINEL_NOT,
|
|
&keytag_start)) {
|
|
if(sentinel_get_keytag(keytag_start, &keytag) &&
|
|
anchor_has_keytag(qstate->env->anchors,
|
|
(uint8_t*)"", 1, 0, vq->qchase.qclass, keytag)) {
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep->security =
|
|
sec_status_secure_sentinel_fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Update rep->reason_bogus as it is the one being cached */
|
|
update_reason_bogus(vq->orig_msg->rep, errinf_to_reason_bogus(qstate));
|
|
/* store results in cache */
|
|
if(qstate->query_flags&BIT_RD) {
|
|
/* if secure, this will override cache anyway, no need
|
|
* to check if from parentNS */
|
|
if(!qstate->no_cache_store) {
|
|
if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo,
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep, 0, qstate->prefetch_leeway, 0, NULL,
|
|
qstate->query_flags, qstate->qstarttime)) {
|
|
log_err("out of memory caching validator results");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
/* for a referral, store the verified RRsets */
|
|
/* and this does not get prefetched, so no leeway */
|
|
if(!dns_cache_store(qstate->env, &vq->orig_msg->qinfo,
|
|
vq->orig_msg->rep, 1, 0, 0, NULL,
|
|
qstate->query_flags, qstate->qstarttime)) {
|
|
log_err("out of memory caching validator results");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
qstate->return_rcode = LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR;
|
|
qstate->return_msg = vq->orig_msg;
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Handle validator state.
|
|
* If a method returns true, the next state is started. If false, then
|
|
* processing will stop.
|
|
* @param qstate: query state.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state.
|
|
* @param ve: validator shared global environment.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
val_handle(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
struct val_env* ve, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
int cont = 1;
|
|
while(cont) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "val handle processing q with state %s",
|
|
val_state_to_string(vq->state));
|
|
switch(vq->state) {
|
|
case VAL_INIT_STATE:
|
|
cont = processInit(qstate, vq, ve, id);
|
|
break;
|
|
case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE:
|
|
cont = processFindKey(qstate, vq, id);
|
|
break;
|
|
case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE:
|
|
cont = processValidate(qstate, vq, ve, id);
|
|
break;
|
|
case VAL_FINISHED_STATE:
|
|
cont = processFinished(qstate, vq, ve, id);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
log_warn("validator: invalid state %d",
|
|
vq->state);
|
|
cont = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
val_operate(struct module_qstate* qstate, enum module_ev event, int id,
|
|
struct outbound_entry* outbound)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "validator[module %d] operate: extstate:%s "
|
|
"event:%s", id, strextstate(qstate->ext_state[id]),
|
|
strmodulevent(event));
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: query",
|
|
&qstate->qinfo);
|
|
if(vq && qstate->qinfo.qname != vq->qchase.qname)
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_QUERY, "validator operate: chased to",
|
|
&vq->qchase);
|
|
(void)outbound;
|
|
if(event == module_event_new ||
|
|
(event == module_event_pass && vq == NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
/* pass request to next module, to get it */
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: pass to next module");
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_wait_module;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(event == module_event_moddone) {
|
|
/* check if validation is needed */
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "validator: nextmodule returned");
|
|
|
|
if(!needs_validation(qstate, qstate->return_rcode,
|
|
qstate->return_msg)) {
|
|
/* no need to validate this */
|
|
if(qstate->return_msg)
|
|
qstate->return_msg->rep->security =
|
|
sec_status_indeterminate;
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(already_validated(qstate->return_msg)) {
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* qclass ANY should have validation result from spawned
|
|
* queries. If we get here, it is bogus or an internal error */
|
|
if(qstate->qinfo.qclass == LDNS_RR_CLASS_ANY) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "cannot validate classANY: bogus");
|
|
if(qstate->return_msg) {
|
|
qstate->return_msg->rep->security =
|
|
sec_status_bogus;
|
|
update_reason_bogus(qstate->return_msg->rep, LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS);
|
|
}
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_finished;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* create state to start validation */
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */
|
|
if(!vq) {
|
|
vq = val_new(qstate, id);
|
|
if(!vq) {
|
|
log_err("validator: malloc failure");
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
} else if(!vq->orig_msg) {
|
|
if(!val_new_getmsg(qstate, vq)) {
|
|
log_err("validator: malloc failure");
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(event == module_event_pass) {
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error; /* override this */
|
|
/* continue processing, since val_env exists */
|
|
val_handle(qstate, vq, ve, id);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
log_err("validator: bad event %s", strmodulevent(event));
|
|
qstate->ext_state[id] = module_error;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Evaluate the response to a priming request.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param dnskey_rrset: DNSKEY rrset (can be NULL if none) in prime reply.
|
|
* (this rrset is allocated in the wrong region, not the qstate).
|
|
* @param ta: trust anchor.
|
|
* @param qstate: qstate that needs key.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @return new key entry or NULL on allocation failure.
|
|
* The key entry will either contain a validated DNSKEY rrset, or
|
|
* represent a Null key (query failed, but validation did not), or a
|
|
* Bad key (validation failed).
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct key_entry_key*
|
|
primeResponseToKE(struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset,
|
|
struct trust_anchor* ta, struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
|
|
struct key_entry_key* kkey = NULL;
|
|
enum sec_status sec = sec_status_unchecked;
|
|
char* reason = NULL;
|
|
sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
|
|
int downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade;
|
|
|
|
if(!dnskey_rrset) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- "
|
|
"could not fetch DNSKEY rrset",
|
|
ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass);
|
|
reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISSING;
|
|
reason = "no DNSKEY rrset";
|
|
if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) {
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name,
|
|
ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL,
|
|
reason_bogus, reason,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
} else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name,
|
|
ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL,
|
|
reason_bogus, reason,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
if(!kkey) {
|
|
log_err("out of memory: allocate fail prime key");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return kkey;
|
|
}
|
|
/* attempt to verify with trust anchor DS and DNSKEY */
|
|
kkey = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs_with_ta(qstate->region, qstate->env, ve,
|
|
dnskey_rrset, ta->ds_rrset, ta->dnskey_rrset, downprot,
|
|
&reason, &reason_bogus, qstate);
|
|
if(!kkey) {
|
|
log_err("out of memory: verifying prime TA");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if(key_entry_isgood(kkey))
|
|
sec = sec_status_secure;
|
|
else
|
|
sec = sec_status_bogus;
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "validate keys with anchor(DS): %s",
|
|
sec_status_to_string(sec));
|
|
|
|
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_OPS, "failed to prime trust anchor -- "
|
|
"DNSKEY rrset is not secure",
|
|
ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass);
|
|
/* NOTE: in this case, we should probably reject the trust
|
|
* anchor for longer, perhaps forever. */
|
|
if(qstate->env->cfg->harden_dnssec_stripped) {
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
kkey = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, ta->name,
|
|
ta->namelen, ta->dclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL,
|
|
reason_bogus, reason,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
} else kkey = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region, ta->name,
|
|
ta->namelen, ta->dclass, NULL_KEY_TTL,
|
|
reason_bogus, reason,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
if(!kkey) {
|
|
log_err("out of memory: allocate null prime key");
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return kkey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
log_nametypeclass(VERB_DETAIL, "Successfully primed trust anchor",
|
|
ta->name, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY, ta->dclass);
|
|
return kkey;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* In inform supers, with the resulting message and rcode and the current
|
|
* keyset in the super state, validate the DS response, returning a KeyEntry.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
|
|
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
|
|
* @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
|
|
* @param ke: the key entry to return. It returns
|
|
* is_bad if the DS response fails to validate, is_null if the
|
|
* DS response indicated an end to secure space, is_good if the DS
|
|
* validated. It returns ke=NULL if the DS response indicated that the
|
|
* request wasn't a delegation point.
|
|
* @return
|
|
* 0 on success,
|
|
* 1 on servfail error (malloc failure),
|
|
* 2 on NSEC3 suspend.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int
|
|
ds_response_to_ke(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
|
|
struct key_entry_key** ke)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
|
|
char* reason = NULL;
|
|
sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
|
|
enum val_classification subtype;
|
|
int verified;
|
|
if(rcode != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
|
|
char rc[16];
|
|
rc[0]=0;
|
|
(void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf(rcode, rc, sizeof(rc));
|
|
/* errors here pretty much break validation */
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS response was error, thus bogus");
|
|
errinf(qstate, rc);
|
|
reason = "no DS";
|
|
reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NETWORK_ERROR;
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
subtype = val_classify_response(BIT_RD, qinfo, qinfo, msg->rep, 0);
|
|
if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE) {
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* ds;
|
|
enum sec_status sec;
|
|
ds = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep);
|
|
/* If there was no DS rrset, then we have mis-classified
|
|
* this message. */
|
|
if(!ds) {
|
|
log_warn("internal error: POSITIVE DS response was "
|
|
"missing DS.");
|
|
reason = "no DS record";
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Verify only returns BOGUS or SECURE. If the rrset is
|
|
* bogus, then we are done. */
|
|
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, ds,
|
|
vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified);
|
|
if(sec != sec_status_secure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS rrset in DS response did "
|
|
"not verify");
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the DS rrset validates, we still have to make sure
|
|
* that they are usable. */
|
|
if(!val_dsset_isusable(ds)) {
|
|
/* If they aren't usable, then we treat it like
|
|
* there was no DS. */
|
|
*ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region,
|
|
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass,
|
|
ub_packed_rrset_ttl(ds),
|
|
LDNS_EDE_UNSUPPORTED_DS_DIGEST, NULL,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
return (*ke) == NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Otherwise, we return the positive response. */
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DS", qinfo);
|
|
*ke = key_entry_create_rrset(qstate->region,
|
|
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, ds,
|
|
NULL, LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL, *qstate->env->now);
|
|
return (*ke) == NULL;
|
|
} else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_NODATA ||
|
|
subtype == VAL_CLASS_NAMEERROR) {
|
|
/* NODATA means that the qname exists, but that there was
|
|
* no DS. This is a pretty normal case. */
|
|
time_t proof_ttl = 0;
|
|
enum sec_status sec;
|
|
|
|
/* make sure there are NSECs or NSEC3s with signatures */
|
|
if(!val_has_signed_nsecs(msg->rep, &reason)) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "no NSECs: %s", reason);
|
|
reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_NSEC_MISSING;
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* For subtype Name Error.
|
|
* attempt ANS 2.8.1.0 compatibility where it sets rcode
|
|
* to nxdomain, but really this is an Nodata/Noerror response.
|
|
* Find and prove the empty nonterminal in that case */
|
|
|
|
/* Try to prove absence of the DS with NSEC */
|
|
sec = val_nsec_prove_nodata_dsreply(
|
|
qstate->env, ve, qinfo, msg->rep, vq->key_entry,
|
|
&proof_ttl, &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate);
|
|
switch(sec) {
|
|
case sec_status_secure:
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
|
|
"referral proved no DS.");
|
|
*ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region,
|
|
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
|
|
qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl,
|
|
LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
return (*ke) == NULL;
|
|
case sec_status_insecure:
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
|
|
"referral proved not a delegation point");
|
|
*ke = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case sec_status_bogus:
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC RRset for the "
|
|
"referral did not prove no DS.");
|
|
errinf(qstate, reason);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
case sec_status_unchecked:
|
|
default:
|
|
/* NSEC proof did not work, try next */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!nsec3_cache_table_init(&vq->nsec3_cache_table, qstate->region)) {
|
|
log_err("malloc failure in ds_response_to_ke for "
|
|
"NSEC3 cache");
|
|
reason = "malloc failure";
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, 0);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
sec = nsec3_prove_nods(qstate->env, ve,
|
|
msg->rep->rrsets + msg->rep->an_numrrsets,
|
|
msg->rep->ns_numrrsets, qinfo, vq->key_entry, &reason,
|
|
&reason_bogus, qstate, &vq->nsec3_cache_table);
|
|
switch(sec) {
|
|
case sec_status_insecure:
|
|
/* case insecure also continues to unsigned
|
|
* space. If nsec3-iter-count too high or
|
|
* optout, then treat below as unsigned */
|
|
case sec_status_secure:
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the "
|
|
"referral proved no DS.");
|
|
*ke = key_entry_create_null(qstate->region,
|
|
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len,
|
|
qinfo->qclass, proof_ttl,
|
|
LDNS_EDE_NONE, NULL,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
return (*ke) == NULL;
|
|
case sec_status_indeterminate:
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the "
|
|
"referral proved no delegation");
|
|
*ke = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
case sec_status_bogus:
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "NSEC3s for the "
|
|
"referral did not prove no DS.");
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
case sec_status_unchecked:
|
|
return 2;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* NSEC3 proof did not work */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Apparently, no available NSEC/NSEC3 proved NODATA, so
|
|
* this is BOGUS. */
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "DS %s ran out of options, so return "
|
|
"bogus", val_classification_to_string(subtype));
|
|
reason = "no DS but also no proof of that";
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
} else if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAME ||
|
|
subtype == VAL_CLASS_CNAMENOANSWER) {
|
|
/* if the CNAME matches the exact name we want and is signed
|
|
* properly, then also, we are sure that no DS exists there,
|
|
* much like a NODATA proof */
|
|
enum sec_status sec;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* cname;
|
|
cname = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep, qinfo->qname,
|
|
qinfo->qname_len, LDNS_RR_TYPE_CNAME, qinfo->qclass);
|
|
if(!cname) {
|
|
reason = "validator classified CNAME but no "
|
|
"CNAME of the queried name for DS";
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)cname->entry.data)->rrsig_count
|
|
== 0) {
|
|
if(msg->rep->an_numrrsets != 0 && ntohs(msg->rep->
|
|
rrsets[0]->rk.type)==LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNAME) {
|
|
reason = "DS got DNAME answer";
|
|
} else {
|
|
reason = "DS got unsigned CNAME answer";
|
|
}
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
sec = val_verify_rrset_entry(qstate->env, ve, cname,
|
|
vq->key_entry, &reason, &reason_bogus,
|
|
LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER, qstate, &verified);
|
|
if(sec == sec_status_secure) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "CNAME validated, "
|
|
"proof that DS does not exist");
|
|
/* and that it is not a referral point */
|
|
*ke = NULL;
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
errinf(qstate, "CNAME in DS response was not secure.");
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
} else {
|
|
verbose(VERB_QUERY, "Encountered an unhandled type of "
|
|
"DS response, thus bogus.");
|
|
errinf(qstate, "no DS and");
|
|
reason = "no DS";
|
|
if(FLAGS_GET_RCODE(msg->rep->flags) != LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
|
|
char rc[16];
|
|
rc[0]=0;
|
|
(void)sldns_wire2str_rcode_buf((int)FLAGS_GET_RCODE(
|
|
msg->rep->flags), rc, sizeof(rc));
|
|
errinf(qstate, rc);
|
|
} else errinf(qstate, val_classification_to_string(subtype));
|
|
errinf(qstate, "message fails to prove that");
|
|
goto return_bogus;
|
|
}
|
|
return_bogus:
|
|
*ke = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region, qinfo->qname,
|
|
qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass, BOGUS_KEY_TTL,
|
|
reason_bogus, reason, *qstate->env->now);
|
|
return (*ke) == NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Process DS response. Called from inform_supers.
|
|
* Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks
|
|
* for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead
|
|
* set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon.
|
|
* Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DS.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
|
|
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
|
|
* @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
|
|
* @param origin: the origin of msg.
|
|
* @param suspend: returned true if the task takes too long and needs to
|
|
* suspend to continue the effort later.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
process_ds_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
|
|
struct sock_list* origin, int* suspend)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
|
|
struct key_entry_key* dske = NULL;
|
|
uint8_t* olds = vq->empty_DS_name;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
*suspend = 0;
|
|
vq->empty_DS_name = NULL;
|
|
ret = ds_response_to_ke(qstate, vq, id, rcode, msg, qinfo, &dske);
|
|
if(ret != 0) {
|
|
switch(ret) {
|
|
case 1:
|
|
log_err("malloc failure in process_ds_response");
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
case 2:
|
|
*suspend = 1;
|
|
return;
|
|
default:
|
|
log_err("unhandled error value for ds_response_to_ke");
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if(dske == NULL) {
|
|
vq->empty_DS_name = regional_alloc_init(qstate->region,
|
|
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len);
|
|
if(!vq->empty_DS_name) {
|
|
log_err("malloc failure in empty_DS_name");
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
vq->empty_DS_len = qinfo->qname_len;
|
|
vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
|
|
/* ds response indicated that we aren't on a delegation point.
|
|
* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */
|
|
} else if(key_entry_isgood(dske)) {
|
|
vq->ds_rrset = key_entry_get_rrset(dske, qstate->region);
|
|
if(!vq->ds_rrset) {
|
|
log_err("malloc failure in process DS");
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL; /* make it error */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
vq->chain_blacklist = NULL; /* fresh blacklist for next part*/
|
|
/* Keep the forState.state on FINDKEY. */
|
|
} else if(key_entry_isbad(dske)
|
|
&& vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
|
|
vq->empty_DS_name = olds;
|
|
val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region, origin, 1);
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
vq->restart_count++;
|
|
} else {
|
|
if(key_entry_isbad(dske)) {
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
|
|
errinf_dname(qstate, "for DS", qinfo->qname);
|
|
}
|
|
/* NOTE: the reason for the DS to be not good (that is,
|
|
* either bad or null) should have been logged by
|
|
* dsResponseToKE. */
|
|
vq->key_entry = dske;
|
|
/* The FINDKEY phase has ended, so move on. */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Process DNSKEY response. Called from inform_supers.
|
|
* Sets the key entry in the state.
|
|
* Because it is in inform_supers, the mesh itself is busy doing callbacks
|
|
* for a state that is to be deleted soon; don't touch the mesh; instead
|
|
* set a state in the super, as the super will be reactivated soon.
|
|
* Perform processing to determine what state to set in the super.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and asked for a DNSKEY.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
|
|
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
|
|
* @param qinfo: from the sub query state, query info.
|
|
* @param origin: the origin of msg.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
process_dnskey_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct query_info* qinfo,
|
|
struct sock_list* origin)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
|
|
struct key_entry_key* old = vq->key_entry;
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey = NULL;
|
|
int downprot;
|
|
char* reason = NULL;
|
|
sldns_ede_code reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSSEC_BOGUS;
|
|
|
|
if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR)
|
|
dnskey = reply_find_answer_rrset(qinfo, msg->rep);
|
|
|
|
if(dnskey == NULL) {
|
|
/* bad response */
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Missing DNSKEY RRset in response to "
|
|
"DNSKEY query.");
|
|
|
|
if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
|
|
val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region,
|
|
origin, 1);
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
vq->restart_count++;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
reason = "No DNSKEY record";
|
|
reason_bogus = LDNS_EDE_DNSKEY_MISSING;
|
|
vq->key_entry = key_entry_create_bad(qstate->region,
|
|
qinfo->qname, qinfo->qname_len, qinfo->qclass,
|
|
BOGUS_KEY_TTL, reason_bogus, reason,
|
|
*qstate->env->now);
|
|
if(!vq->key_entry) {
|
|
log_err("alloc failure in missing dnskey response");
|
|
/* key_entry is NULL for failure in Validate */
|
|
}
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
|
|
errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname);
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!vq->ds_rrset) {
|
|
log_err("internal error: no DS rrset for new DNSKEY response");
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL;
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
downprot = qstate->env->cfg->harden_algo_downgrade;
|
|
vq->key_entry = val_verify_new_DNSKEYs(qstate->region, qstate->env,
|
|
ve, dnskey, vq->ds_rrset, downprot, &reason, &reason_bogus, qstate);
|
|
|
|
if(!vq->key_entry) {
|
|
log_err("out of memory in verify new DNSKEYs");
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* If the key entry isBad or isNull, then we can move on to the next
|
|
* state. */
|
|
if(!key_entry_isgood(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
if(vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
|
|
val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist,
|
|
qstate->region, origin, 1);
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
vq->restart_count++;
|
|
vq->key_entry = old;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Did not match a DS to a DNSKEY, "
|
|
"thus bogus.");
|
|
errinf_ede(qstate, reason, reason_bogus);
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
|
|
errinf_dname(qstate, "for key", qinfo->qname);
|
|
}
|
|
vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* The DNSKEY validated, so cache it as a trusted key rrset. */
|
|
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
|
|
|
|
/* If good, we stay in the FINDKEY state. */
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_DETAIL, "validated DNSKEY", qinfo);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Process prime response
|
|
* Sets the key entry in the state.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state that is validating and primed a trust anchor.
|
|
* @param vq: validator query state
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param rcode: rcode result value.
|
|
* @param msg: result message (if rcode is OK).
|
|
* @param origin: the origin of msg.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
process_prime_response(struct module_qstate* qstate, struct val_qstate* vq,
|
|
int id, int rcode, struct dns_msg* msg, struct sock_list* origin)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)qstate->env->modinfo[id];
|
|
struct ub_packed_rrset_key* dnskey_rrset = NULL;
|
|
struct trust_anchor* ta = anchor_find(qstate->env->anchors,
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_name, vq->trust_anchor_labs,
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_len, vq->qchase.qclass);
|
|
if(!ta) {
|
|
/* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
|
|
if(!vq->trust_anchor_name)
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE; /* break a loop */
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Fetch and validate the keyEntry that corresponds to the
|
|
* current trust anchor. */
|
|
if(rcode == LDNS_RCODE_NOERROR) {
|
|
dnskey_rrset = reply_find_rrset_section_an(msg->rep,
|
|
ta->name, ta->namelen, LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY,
|
|
ta->dclass);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(ta->autr) {
|
|
if(!autr_process_prime(qstate->env, ve, ta, dnskey_rrset,
|
|
qstate)) {
|
|
/* trust anchor revoked, restart with less anchors */
|
|
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
|
|
vq->trust_anchor_name = NULL;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
vq->key_entry = primeResponseToKE(dnskey_rrset, ta, qstate, id);
|
|
lock_basic_unlock(&ta->lock);
|
|
if(vq->key_entry) {
|
|
if(key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)
|
|
&& vq->restart_count < ve->max_restart) {
|
|
val_blacklist(&vq->chain_blacklist, qstate->region,
|
|
origin, 1);
|
|
qstate->errinf = NULL;
|
|
vq->restart_count++;
|
|
vq->key_entry = NULL;
|
|
vq->state = VAL_INIT_STATE;
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
vq->chain_blacklist = NULL;
|
|
errinf_origin(qstate, origin);
|
|
errinf_dname(qstate, "for trust anchor", ta->name);
|
|
/* store the freshly primed entry in the cache */
|
|
key_cache_insert(ve->kcache, vq->key_entry,
|
|
qstate->env->cfg->val_log_level >= 2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* If the result of the prime is a null key, skip the FINDKEY state.*/
|
|
if(!vq->key_entry || key_entry_isnull(vq->key_entry) ||
|
|
key_entry_isbad(vq->key_entry)) {
|
|
vq->state = VAL_VALIDATE_STATE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* the qstate will be reactivated after inform_super is done */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* inform validator super.
|
|
*
|
|
* @param qstate: query state that finished.
|
|
* @param id: module id.
|
|
* @param super: the qstate to inform.
|
|
*/
|
|
void
|
|
val_inform_super(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id,
|
|
struct module_qstate* super)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq = (struct val_qstate*)super->minfo[id];
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "validator: inform_super, sub is",
|
|
&qstate->qinfo);
|
|
log_query_info(VERB_ALGO, "super is", &super->qinfo);
|
|
if(!vq) {
|
|
verbose(VERB_ALGO, "super: has no validator state");
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(vq->wait_prime_ta) {
|
|
vq->wait_prime_ta = 0;
|
|
process_prime_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
|
|
qstate->return_msg, qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DS) {
|
|
int suspend;
|
|
process_ds_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
|
|
qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo,
|
|
qstate->reply_origin, &suspend);
|
|
/* If NSEC3 was needed during validation, NULL the NSEC3 cache;
|
|
* it will be re-initiated if needed later on.
|
|
* Validation (and the cache table) are happening/allocated in
|
|
* the super qstate whilst the RRs are allocated (and pointed
|
|
* to) in this sub qstate. */
|
|
if(vq->nsec3_cache_table.ct) {
|
|
vq->nsec3_cache_table.ct = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if(suspend) {
|
|
/* deep copy the return_msg to vq->sub_ds_msg; it will
|
|
* be resumed later in the super state with the caveat
|
|
* that the initial calculations will be re-caclulated
|
|
* and re-suspended there before continuing. */
|
|
vq->sub_ds_msg = dns_msg_deepcopy_region(
|
|
qstate->return_msg, super->region);
|
|
}
|
|
return;
|
|
} else if(qstate->qinfo.qtype == LDNS_RR_TYPE_DNSKEY) {
|
|
process_dnskey_response(super, vq, id, qstate->return_rcode,
|
|
qstate->return_msg, &qstate->qinfo,
|
|
qstate->reply_origin);
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
log_err("internal error in validator: no inform_supers possible");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void
|
|
val_clear(struct module_qstate* qstate, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_qstate* vq;
|
|
if(!qstate)
|
|
return;
|
|
vq = (struct val_qstate*)qstate->minfo[id];
|
|
if(vq) {
|
|
if(vq->suspend_timer) {
|
|
comm_timer_delete(vq->suspend_timer);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/* everything is allocated in the region, so assign NULL */
|
|
qstate->minfo[id] = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
size_t
|
|
val_get_mem(struct module_env* env, int id)
|
|
{
|
|
struct val_env* ve = (struct val_env*)env->modinfo[id];
|
|
if(!ve)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
return sizeof(*ve) + key_cache_get_mem(ve->kcache) +
|
|
val_neg_get_mem(ve->neg_cache) +
|
|
sizeof(size_t)*2*ve->nsec3_keyiter_count;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* The validator function block
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct module_func_block val_block = {
|
|
"validator",
|
|
&val_init, &val_deinit, &val_operate, &val_inform_super, &val_clear,
|
|
&val_get_mem
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
struct module_func_block*
|
|
val_get_funcblock(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return &val_block;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const char*
|
|
val_state_to_string(enum val_state state)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(state) {
|
|
case VAL_INIT_STATE: return "VAL_INIT_STATE";
|
|
case VAL_FINDKEY_STATE: return "VAL_FINDKEY_STATE";
|
|
case VAL_VALIDATE_STATE: return "VAL_VALIDATE_STATE";
|
|
case VAL_FINISHED_STATE: return "VAL_FINISHED_STATE";
|
|
}
|
|
return "UNKNOWN VALIDATOR STATE";
|
|
}
|
|
|