HardenedBSD/sys/rpc/clnt_bck.c

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/* $NetBSD: clnt_vc.c,v 1.4 2000/07/14 08:40:42 fvdl Exp $ */
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2009, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
* - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
* and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* - Neither the name of Sun Microsystems, Inc. nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
* from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
/*
* clnt_tcp.c, Implements a TCP/IP based, client side RPC.
*
* Copyright (C) 1984, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
*
* TCP based RPC supports 'batched calls'.
* A sequence of calls may be batched-up in a send buffer. The rpc call
* return immediately to the client even though the call was not necessarily
* sent. The batching occurs if the results' xdr routine is NULL (0) AND
* the rpc timeout value is zero (see clnt.h, rpc).
*
* Clients should NOT casually batch calls that in fact return results; that is,
* the server side should be aware that a call is batched and not produce any
* return message. Batched calls that produce many result messages can
* deadlock (netlock) the client and the server....
*
* Now go hang yourself.
*/
/*
* This code handles the special case of a NFSv4.n backchannel for
* callback RPCs. It is similar to clnt_vc.c, but uses the TCP
* connection provided by the client to the server.
*/
Add TLS support to the kernel RPC. An internet draft titled "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" describes how TLS is to be used for Sun RPC, with NFS as an intended use case. This patch adds client and server support for this to the kernel RPC, using KERN_TLS and upcalls to daemons for the handshake, peer reset and other non-application data record cases. The upcalls to the daemons use three fields to uniquely identify the TCP connection. They are the time.tv_sec, time.tv_usec of the connection establshment, plus a 64bit sequence number. The time fields avoid problems with re-use of the sequence number after a daemon restart. For the server side, once a Null RPC with AUTH_TLS is received, kernel reception on the socket is blocked and an upcall to the rpctlssd(8) daemon is done to perform the TLS handshake. Upon completion, the completion status of the handshake is stored in xp_tls as flag bits and the reply to the Null RPC is sent. For the client, if CLSET_TLS has been set, a new TCP connection will send the Null RPC with AUTH_TLS to initiate the handshake. The client kernel RPC code will then block kernel I/O on the socket and do an upcall to the rpctlscd(8) daemon to perform the handshake. If the upcall is successful, ct_rcvstate will be maintained to indicate if/when an upcall is being done. If non-application data records are received, the code does an upcall to the appropriate daemon, which will do a SSL_read() of 0 length to handle the record(s). When the socket is being shut down, upcalls are done to the daemons, so that they can perform SSL_shutdown() calls to perform the "peer reset". The rpctlssd(8) and rpctlscd(8) daemons require a patched version of the openssl library and, as such, will not be committed to head at this time. Although the changes done by this patch are fairly numerous, there should be no semantics change to the kernel RPC at this time. A future commit to the NFS code will optionally enable use of TLS for NFS.
2020-08-22 05:57:55 +02:00
#include "opt_kern_tls.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
Add TLS support to the kernel RPC. An internet draft titled "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" describes how TLS is to be used for Sun RPC, with NFS as an intended use case. This patch adds client and server support for this to the kernel RPC, using KERN_TLS and upcalls to daemons for the handshake, peer reset and other non-application data record cases. The upcalls to the daemons use three fields to uniquely identify the TCP connection. They are the time.tv_sec, time.tv_usec of the connection establshment, plus a 64bit sequence number. The time fields avoid problems with re-use of the sequence number after a daemon restart. For the server side, once a Null RPC with AUTH_TLS is received, kernel reception on the socket is blocked and an upcall to the rpctlssd(8) daemon is done to perform the TLS handshake. Upon completion, the completion status of the handshake is stored in xp_tls as flag bits and the reply to the Null RPC is sent. For the client, if CLSET_TLS has been set, a new TCP connection will send the Null RPC with AUTH_TLS to initiate the handshake. The client kernel RPC code will then block kernel I/O on the socket and do an upcall to the rpctlscd(8) daemon to perform the handshake. If the upcall is successful, ct_rcvstate will be maintained to indicate if/when an upcall is being done. If non-application data records are received, the code does an upcall to the appropriate daemon, which will do a SSL_read() of 0 length to handle the record(s). When the socket is being shut down, upcalls are done to the daemons, so that they can perform SSL_shutdown() calls to perform the "peer reset". The rpctlssd(8) and rpctlscd(8) daemons require a patched version of the openssl library and, as such, will not be committed to head at this time. Although the changes done by this patch are fairly numerous, there should be no semantics change to the kernel RPC at this time. A future commit to the NFS code will optionally enable use of TLS for NFS.
2020-08-22 05:57:55 +02:00
#include <sys/ktls.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/malloc.h>
#include <sys/mbuf.h>
#include <sys/mutex.h>
#include <sys/pcpu.h>
#include <sys/proc.h>
#include <sys/protosw.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/socketvar.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/syslog.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <net/vnet.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
#include <rpc/rpc_com.h>
#include <rpc/krpc.h>
Add TLS support to the kernel RPC. An internet draft titled "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" describes how TLS is to be used for Sun RPC, with NFS as an intended use case. This patch adds client and server support for this to the kernel RPC, using KERN_TLS and upcalls to daemons for the handshake, peer reset and other non-application data record cases. The upcalls to the daemons use three fields to uniquely identify the TCP connection. They are the time.tv_sec, time.tv_usec of the connection establshment, plus a 64bit sequence number. The time fields avoid problems with re-use of the sequence number after a daemon restart. For the server side, once a Null RPC with AUTH_TLS is received, kernel reception on the socket is blocked and an upcall to the rpctlssd(8) daemon is done to perform the TLS handshake. Upon completion, the completion status of the handshake is stored in xp_tls as flag bits and the reply to the Null RPC is sent. For the client, if CLSET_TLS has been set, a new TCP connection will send the Null RPC with AUTH_TLS to initiate the handshake. The client kernel RPC code will then block kernel I/O on the socket and do an upcall to the rpctlscd(8) daemon to perform the handshake. If the upcall is successful, ct_rcvstate will be maintained to indicate if/when an upcall is being done. If non-application data records are received, the code does an upcall to the appropriate daemon, which will do a SSL_read() of 0 length to handle the record(s). When the socket is being shut down, upcalls are done to the daemons, so that they can perform SSL_shutdown() calls to perform the "peer reset". The rpctlssd(8) and rpctlscd(8) daemons require a patched version of the openssl library and, as such, will not be committed to head at this time. Although the changes done by this patch are fairly numerous, there should be no semantics change to the kernel RPC at this time. A future commit to the NFS code will optionally enable use of TLS for NFS.
2020-08-22 05:57:55 +02:00
#include <rpc/rpcsec_tls.h>
struct cmessage {
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
struct cmsgcred cmcred;
};
static void clnt_bck_geterr(CLIENT *, struct rpc_err *);
static bool_t clnt_bck_freeres(CLIENT *, xdrproc_t, void *);
static void clnt_bck_abort(CLIENT *);
static bool_t clnt_bck_control(CLIENT *, u_int, void *);
static void clnt_bck_close(CLIENT *);
static void clnt_bck_destroy(CLIENT *);
static const struct clnt_ops clnt_bck_ops = {
.cl_abort = clnt_bck_abort,
.cl_geterr = clnt_bck_geterr,
.cl_freeres = clnt_bck_freeres,
.cl_close = clnt_bck_close,
.cl_destroy = clnt_bck_destroy,
.cl_control = clnt_bck_control
};
/*
* Create a client handle for a connection.
* Default options are set, which the user can change using clnt_control()'s.
* This code handles the special case of an NFSv4.1 session backchannel
* call, which is sent on a TCP connection created against the server
* by a client.
*/
void *
clnt_bck_create(
struct socket *so, /* Server transport socket. */
const rpcprog_t prog, /* program number */
const rpcvers_t vers) /* version number */
{
CLIENT *cl; /* client handle */
struct ct_data *ct = NULL; /* client handle */
struct timeval now;
struct rpc_msg call_msg;
static uint32_t disrupt;
XDR xdrs;
if (disrupt == 0)
disrupt = (uint32_t)(long)so;
cl = (CLIENT *)mem_alloc(sizeof (*cl));
ct = (struct ct_data *)mem_alloc(sizeof (*ct));
mtx_init(&ct->ct_lock, "ct->ct_lock", NULL, MTX_DEF);
ct->ct_threads = 0;
ct->ct_closing = FALSE;
ct->ct_closed = FALSE;
ct->ct_upcallrefs = 0;
ct->ct_closeit = FALSE;
/*
* Set up private data struct
*/
ct->ct_wait.tv_sec = -1;
ct->ct_wait.tv_usec = -1;
/*
* Initialize call message
*/
getmicrotime(&now);
ct->ct_xid = ((uint32_t)++disrupt) ^ __RPC_GETXID(&now);
call_msg.rm_xid = ct->ct_xid;
call_msg.rm_direction = CALL;
call_msg.rm_call.cb_rpcvers = RPC_MSG_VERSION;
call_msg.rm_call.cb_prog = (uint32_t)prog;
call_msg.rm_call.cb_vers = (uint32_t)vers;
/*
* pre-serialize the static part of the call msg and stash it away
*/
xdrmem_create(&xdrs, ct->ct_mcallc, MCALL_MSG_SIZE,
XDR_ENCODE);
if (!xdr_callhdr(&xdrs, &call_msg))
goto err;
ct->ct_mpos = XDR_GETPOS(&xdrs);
XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
ct->ct_waitchan = "rpcbck";
ct->ct_waitflag = 0;
cl->cl_refs = 1;
cl->cl_ops = &clnt_bck_ops;
cl->cl_private = ct;
cl->cl_auth = authnone_create();
TAILQ_INIT(&ct->ct_pending);
return (cl);
err:
mtx_destroy(&ct->ct_lock);
mem_free(ct, sizeof (struct ct_data));
mem_free(cl, sizeof (CLIENT));
return (NULL);
}
enum clnt_stat
clnt_bck_call(
CLIENT *cl, /* client handle */
struct rpc_callextra *ext, /* call metadata */
rpcproc_t proc, /* procedure number */
struct mbuf *args, /* pointer to args */
struct mbuf **resultsp, /* pointer to results */
struct timeval utimeout,
SVCXPRT *xprt)
{
struct ct_data *ct = (struct ct_data *) cl->cl_private;
AUTH *auth;
struct rpc_err *errp;
enum clnt_stat stat;
XDR xdrs;
struct rpc_msg reply_msg;
bool_t ok;
int nrefreshes = 2; /* number of times to refresh cred */
struct timeval timeout;
uint32_t xid;
struct mbuf *mreq = NULL, *results;
struct ct_request *cr;
Add TLS support to the kernel RPC. An internet draft titled "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" describes how TLS is to be used for Sun RPC, with NFS as an intended use case. This patch adds client and server support for this to the kernel RPC, using KERN_TLS and upcalls to daemons for the handshake, peer reset and other non-application data record cases. The upcalls to the daemons use three fields to uniquely identify the TCP connection. They are the time.tv_sec, time.tv_usec of the connection establshment, plus a 64bit sequence number. The time fields avoid problems with re-use of the sequence number after a daemon restart. For the server side, once a Null RPC with AUTH_TLS is received, kernel reception on the socket is blocked and an upcall to the rpctlssd(8) daemon is done to perform the TLS handshake. Upon completion, the completion status of the handshake is stored in xp_tls as flag bits and the reply to the Null RPC is sent. For the client, if CLSET_TLS has been set, a new TCP connection will send the Null RPC with AUTH_TLS to initiate the handshake. The client kernel RPC code will then block kernel I/O on the socket and do an upcall to the rpctlscd(8) daemon to perform the handshake. If the upcall is successful, ct_rcvstate will be maintained to indicate if/when an upcall is being done. If non-application data records are received, the code does an upcall to the appropriate daemon, which will do a SSL_read() of 0 length to handle the record(s). When the socket is being shut down, upcalls are done to the daemons, so that they can perform SSL_shutdown() calls to perform the "peer reset". The rpctlssd(8) and rpctlscd(8) daemons require a patched version of the openssl library and, as such, will not be committed to head at this time. Although the changes done by this patch are fairly numerous, there should be no semantics change to the kernel RPC at this time. A future commit to the NFS code will optionally enable use of TLS for NFS.
2020-08-22 05:57:55 +02:00
int error, maxextsiz;
#ifdef KERN_TLS
u_int maxlen;
#endif
cr = malloc(sizeof(struct ct_request), M_RPC, M_WAITOK);
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (ct->ct_closing || ct->ct_closed) {
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
free(cr, M_RPC);
return (RPC_CANTSEND);
}
ct->ct_threads++;
if (ext) {
auth = ext->rc_auth;
errp = &ext->rc_err;
} else {
auth = cl->cl_auth;
errp = &ct->ct_error;
}
cr->cr_mrep = NULL;
cr->cr_error = 0;
if (ct->ct_wait.tv_usec == -1)
timeout = utimeout; /* use supplied timeout */
else
timeout = ct->ct_wait; /* use default timeout */
call_again:
mtx_assert(&ct->ct_lock, MA_OWNED);
ct->ct_xid++;
xid = ct->ct_xid;
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
/*
* Leave space to pre-pend the record mark.
*/
mreq = m_gethdr(M_WAITOK, MT_DATA);
mreq->m_data += sizeof(uint32_t);
KASSERT(ct->ct_mpos + sizeof(uint32_t) <= MHLEN,
("RPC header too big"));
bcopy(ct->ct_mcallc, mreq->m_data, ct->ct_mpos);
mreq->m_len = ct->ct_mpos;
/*
* The XID is the first thing in the request.
*/
*mtod(mreq, uint32_t *) = htonl(xid);
xdrmbuf_create(&xdrs, mreq, XDR_ENCODE);
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_SUCCESS;
if ((!XDR_PUTINT32(&xdrs, &proc)) ||
(!AUTH_MARSHALL(auth, xid, &xdrs,
m_copym(args, 0, M_COPYALL, M_WAITOK)))) {
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_CANTENCODEARGS;
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
goto out;
}
mreq->m_pkthdr.len = m_length(mreq, NULL);
/*
* Prepend a record marker containing the packet length.
*/
M_PREPEND(mreq, sizeof(uint32_t), M_WAITOK);
*mtod(mreq, uint32_t *) =
htonl(0x80000000 | (mreq->m_pkthdr.len - sizeof(uint32_t)));
cr->cr_xid = xid;
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
/*
* Check to see if the client end has already started to close down
* the connection. The svc code will have set ct_error.re_status
* to RPC_CANTRECV if this is the case.
* If the client starts to close down the connection after this
* point, it will be detected later when cr_error is checked,
* since the request is in the ct_pending queue.
*/
if (ct->ct_error.re_status == RPC_CANTRECV) {
if (errp != &ct->ct_error) {
errp->re_errno = ct->ct_error.re_errno;
errp->re_status = RPC_CANTRECV;
}
stat = RPC_CANTRECV;
goto out;
}
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
Add TLS support to the kernel RPC. An internet draft titled "Towards Remote Procedure Call Encryption By Default" describes how TLS is to be used for Sun RPC, with NFS as an intended use case. This patch adds client and server support for this to the kernel RPC, using KERN_TLS and upcalls to daemons for the handshake, peer reset and other non-application data record cases. The upcalls to the daemons use three fields to uniquely identify the TCP connection. They are the time.tv_sec, time.tv_usec of the connection establshment, plus a 64bit sequence number. The time fields avoid problems with re-use of the sequence number after a daemon restart. For the server side, once a Null RPC with AUTH_TLS is received, kernel reception on the socket is blocked and an upcall to the rpctlssd(8) daemon is done to perform the TLS handshake. Upon completion, the completion status of the handshake is stored in xp_tls as flag bits and the reply to the Null RPC is sent. For the client, if CLSET_TLS has been set, a new TCP connection will send the Null RPC with AUTH_TLS to initiate the handshake. The client kernel RPC code will then block kernel I/O on the socket and do an upcall to the rpctlscd(8) daemon to perform the handshake. If the upcall is successful, ct_rcvstate will be maintained to indicate if/when an upcall is being done. If non-application data records are received, the code does an upcall to the appropriate daemon, which will do a SSL_read() of 0 length to handle the record(s). When the socket is being shut down, upcalls are done to the daemons, so that they can perform SSL_shutdown() calls to perform the "peer reset". The rpctlssd(8) and rpctlscd(8) daemons require a patched version of the openssl library and, as such, will not be committed to head at this time. Although the changes done by this patch are fairly numerous, there should be no semantics change to the kernel RPC at this time. A future commit to the NFS code will optionally enable use of TLS for NFS.
2020-08-22 05:57:55 +02:00
/* For RPC-over-TLS, copy mrep to a chain of ext_pgs. */
if ((xprt->xp_tls & RPCTLS_FLAGS_HANDSHAKE) != 0) {
/*
* Copy the mbuf chain to a chain of
* ext_pgs mbuf(s) as required by KERN_TLS.
*/
maxextsiz = TLS_MAX_MSG_SIZE_V10_2;
#ifdef KERN_TLS
if (rpctls_getinfo(&maxlen, false, false))
maxextsiz = min(maxextsiz, maxlen);
#endif
mreq = _rpc_copym_into_ext_pgs(mreq, maxextsiz);
}
/*
* sosend consumes mreq.
*/
sx_xlock(&xprt->xp_lock);
error = sosend(xprt->xp_socket, NULL, NULL, mreq, NULL, 0, curthread);
if (error != 0) printf("sosend=%d\n", error);
mreq = NULL;
if (error == EMSGSIZE) {
printf("emsgsize\n");
SOCK_SENDBUF_LOCK(xprt->xp_socket);
sbwait(xprt->xp_socket, SO_SND);
SOCK_SENDBUF_UNLOCK(xprt->xp_socket);
sx_xunlock(&xprt->xp_lock);
AUTH_VALIDATE(auth, xid, NULL, NULL);
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
goto call_again;
}
sx_xunlock(&xprt->xp_lock);
reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_verf.oa_flavor = AUTH_NULL;
reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_verf.oa_base = cr->cr_verf;
reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_verf.oa_length = 0;
reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_results.where = NULL;
reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_results.proc = (xdrproc_t)xdr_void;
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (error) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
errp->re_errno = error;
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_CANTSEND;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check to see if we got an upcall while waiting for the
* lock. In both these cases, the request has been removed
* from ct->ct_pending.
*/
if (cr->cr_error) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
errp->re_errno = cr->cr_error;
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_CANTRECV;
goto out;
}
if (cr->cr_mrep) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
goto got_reply;
}
/*
* Hack to provide rpc-based message passing
*/
if (timeout.tv_sec == 0 && timeout.tv_usec == 0) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_TIMEDOUT;
goto out;
}
error = msleep(cr, &ct->ct_lock, ct->ct_waitflag, ct->ct_waitchan,
tvtohz(&timeout));
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ct->ct_pending, cr, cr_link);
if (error) {
/*
* The sleep returned an error so our request is still
* on the list. Turn the error code into an
* appropriate client status.
*/
errp->re_errno = error;
switch (error) {
case EINTR:
stat = RPC_INTR;
break;
case EWOULDBLOCK:
stat = RPC_TIMEDOUT;
break;
default:
stat = RPC_CANTRECV;
}
errp->re_status = stat;
goto out;
} else {
/*
* We were woken up by the svc thread. If the
* upcall had a receive error, report that,
* otherwise we have a reply.
*/
if (cr->cr_error) {
errp->re_errno = cr->cr_error;
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_CANTRECV;
goto out;
}
}
got_reply:
/*
* Now decode and validate the response. We need to drop the
* lock since xdr_replymsg may end up sleeping in malloc.
*/
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (ext && ext->rc_feedback)
ext->rc_feedback(FEEDBACK_OK, proc, ext->rc_feedback_arg);
xdrmbuf_create(&xdrs, cr->cr_mrep, XDR_DECODE);
ok = xdr_replymsg(&xdrs, &reply_msg);
cr->cr_mrep = NULL;
if (ok) {
if ((reply_msg.rm_reply.rp_stat == MSG_ACCEPTED) &&
(reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_stat == SUCCESS))
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_SUCCESS;
else
stat = _seterr_reply(&reply_msg, errp);
if (stat == RPC_SUCCESS) {
results = xdrmbuf_getall(&xdrs);
if (!AUTH_VALIDATE(auth, xid,
&reply_msg.acpted_rply.ar_verf, &results)) {
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_AUTHERROR;
errp->re_why = AUTH_INVALIDRESP;
} else {
KASSERT(results,
("auth validated but no result"));
*resultsp = results;
}
} /* end successful completion */
/*
* If unsuccessful AND error is an authentication error
* then refresh credentials and try again, else break
*/
else if (stat == RPC_AUTHERROR)
/* maybe our credentials need to be refreshed ... */
if (nrefreshes > 0 && AUTH_REFRESH(auth, &reply_msg)) {
nrefreshes--;
XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
goto call_again;
}
/* end of unsuccessful completion */
/* end of valid reply message */
} else
errp->re_status = stat = RPC_CANTDECODERES;
XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
out:
mtx_assert(&ct->ct_lock, MA_OWNED);
KASSERT(stat != RPC_SUCCESS || *resultsp,
("RPC_SUCCESS without reply"));
if (mreq != NULL)
m_freem(mreq);
if (cr->cr_mrep != NULL)
m_freem(cr->cr_mrep);
ct->ct_threads--;
if (ct->ct_closing)
wakeup(ct);
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (auth && stat != RPC_SUCCESS)
AUTH_VALIDATE(auth, xid, NULL, NULL);
free(cr, M_RPC);
return (stat);
}
static void
clnt_bck_geterr(CLIENT *cl, struct rpc_err *errp)
{
struct ct_data *ct = (struct ct_data *) cl->cl_private;
*errp = ct->ct_error;
}
static bool_t
clnt_bck_freeres(CLIENT *cl, xdrproc_t xdr_res, void *res_ptr)
{
XDR xdrs;
bool_t dummy;
xdrs.x_op = XDR_FREE;
dummy = (*xdr_res)(&xdrs, res_ptr);
return (dummy);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
clnt_bck_abort(CLIENT *cl)
{
}
static bool_t
clnt_bck_control(CLIENT *cl, u_int request, void *info)
{
return (TRUE);
}
static void
clnt_bck_close(CLIENT *cl)
{
struct ct_data *ct = (struct ct_data *) cl->cl_private;
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (ct->ct_closed) {
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
return;
}
if (ct->ct_closing) {
while (ct->ct_closing)
msleep(ct, &ct->ct_lock, 0, "rpcclose", 0);
KASSERT(ct->ct_closed, ("client should be closed"));
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
return;
}
ct->ct_closing = FALSE;
ct->ct_closed = TRUE;
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
wakeup(ct);
}
static void
clnt_bck_destroy(CLIENT *cl)
{
struct ct_data *ct = (struct ct_data *) cl->cl_private;
clnt_bck_close(cl);
mtx_destroy(&ct->ct_lock);
mem_free(ct, sizeof(struct ct_data));
if (cl->cl_netid && cl->cl_netid[0])
mem_free(cl->cl_netid, strlen(cl->cl_netid) +1);
if (cl->cl_tp && cl->cl_tp[0])
mem_free(cl->cl_tp, strlen(cl->cl_tp) +1);
mem_free(cl, sizeof(CLIENT));
}
/*
* This call is done by the svc code when a backchannel RPC reply is
* received.
* For the server end, where callback RPCs to the client are performed,
* xp_p2 points to the "CLIENT" and not the associated "struct ct_data"
* so that svc_vc_destroy() can CLNT_RELEASE() the reference count on it.
*/
void
clnt_bck_svccall(void *arg, struct mbuf *mrep, uint32_t xid)
{
CLIENT *cl = (CLIENT *)arg;
struct ct_data *ct;
struct ct_request *cr;
int foundreq;
ct = (struct ct_data *)cl->cl_private;
mtx_lock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (ct->ct_closing || ct->ct_closed) {
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
m_freem(mrep);
return;
}
ct->ct_upcallrefs++;
/*
* See if we can match this reply to a request.
*/
foundreq = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(cr, &ct->ct_pending, cr_link) {
if (cr->cr_xid == xid) {
/*
* This one matches. We leave the reply mbuf list in
* cr->cr_mrep. Set the XID to zero so that we will
* ignore any duplicated replies.
*/
cr->cr_xid = 0;
cr->cr_mrep = mrep;
cr->cr_error = 0;
foundreq = 1;
wakeup(cr);
break;
}
}
ct->ct_upcallrefs--;
if (ct->ct_upcallrefs < 0)
panic("rpcvc svccall refcnt");
if (ct->ct_upcallrefs == 0)
wakeup(&ct->ct_upcallrefs);
mtx_unlock(&ct->ct_lock);
if (foundreq == 0)
m_freem(mrep);
}