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An actual fix for the routing default crashes that

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1/ is compatible with the old route(1) in case needed.
2/ actually fixes the problem while vetting bad user input.
note: I have already fixed route(1) so the problem shouldn't occur.
if it does. use 0.0.0.0/0 instead of the word 'default' :)
This commit is contained in:
Julian Elischer 1997-07-18 11:44:24 +00:00
parent a455644f13
commit 076d0761c4
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00 
svn path=/head/; revision=27504
1 changed files with 25 additions and 15 deletions
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40
sys/net/rtsock.c
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)rtsock.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 11/2/94
* $Id: rtsock.c,v 1.29 1997/07/16 14:55:14 julian Exp $
* $Id: rtsock.c,v 1.30 1997/07/17 09:21:34 msmith Exp $
*/
@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
static struct sockaddr route_dst = { 2, PF_ROUTE, };
static struct sockaddr route_src = { 2, PF_ROUTE, };
static struct sockaddr sa_zero = { sizeof(sa_zero), AF_INET, };
static struct sockproto route_proto = { PF_ROUTE, };
struct walkarg {
@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ static struct mbuf *
rt_msg1 __P((int, struct rt_addrinfo *));
static int rt_msg2 __P((int,
struct rt_addrinfo *, caddr_t, struct walkarg *));
static void rt_xaddrs __P((caddr_t, caddr_t, struct rt_addrinfo *));
static int rt_xaddrs __P((caddr_t, caddr_t, struct rt_addrinfo *));
static int sysctl_dumpentry __P((struct radix_node *rn, void *vw));
static int sysctl_iflist __P((int af, struct walkarg *w));
static int route_output __P((struct mbuf *, struct socket *));
@ -305,7 +306,10 @@ route_output(m, so)
}
rtm->rtm_pid = curproc->p_pid;
info.rti_addrs = rtm->rtm_addrs;
rt_xaddrs((caddr_t)(rtm + 1), len + (caddr_t)rtm, &info);
if (rt_xaddrs((caddr_t)(rtm + 1), len + (caddr_t)rtm, &info)) {
dst = 0;
senderr(EINVAL);
}
if (dst == 0 || (dst->sa_family >= AF_MAX)
|| (gate != 0 && (gate->sa_family >= AF_MAX)))
senderr(EINVAL);
@ -506,11 +510,13 @@ rt_setmetrics(which, in, out)
((a) > 0 ? (1 + (((a) - 1) | (sizeof(long) - 1))) : sizeof(long))
#define ADVANCE(x, n) (x += ROUNDUP((n)->sa_len))
/*
* Extract the addresses of the passed sockaddrs.
* Do a little sanity checking so as to avoid bad memory references.
* This data is derived straight from userland.
*/
static void
static int
rt_xaddrs(cp, cplim, rtinfo)
register caddr_t cp, cplim;
register struct rt_addrinfo *rtinfo;
@ -519,30 +525,34 @@ rt_xaddrs(cp, cplim, rtinfo)
register int i;
bzero(rtinfo->rti_info, sizeof(rtinfo->rti_info));
for (i = 0; i < RTAX_MAX; i++) {
for (i = 0; (i < RTAX_MAX) && (cp < cplim); i++) {
if ((rtinfo->rti_addrs & (1 << i)) == 0)
continue;
sa = (struct sockaddr *)cp;
/*
* It won't fit. Pretend it doesn't exist.
* Would return EINVAL if not void
* It won't fit.
*/
if ( (cp + sa->sa_len) > cplim )
return;
/* accept it */
rtinfo->rti_info[i] = sa;
ADVANCE(cp, sa);
if ( (cp + sa->sa_len) > cplim ) {
return (EINVAL);
}
/*
* there are no more.. quit now
* If there are more bits, they are in error.
* I've seen this. route(1) can evidently generate these.
* This causes kernel to core dump.
* for compatibility, If we see this, point to a safe address.
*/
if (sa->sa_len == 0)
return;
if (sa->sa_len == 0) {
rtinfo->rti_info[i] = &sa_zero;
return (0); /* should be EINVAL but for compat */
}
/* accept it */
rtinfo->rti_info[i] = sa;
ADVANCE(cp, sa);
}
return (0);
}
static struct mbuf *