RFC4868 section 2.3 requires that the output be half... This fixes

problems that was introduced in r285336...  I have verified that
HMAC-SHA2-256 both ah only and w/ AES-CBC interoperate w/ a NetBSD
6.1.5 vm...

Reviewed by:	gnn
This commit is contained in:
John-Mark Gurney 2015-07-29 07:15:16 +00:00
parent 48c29b118e
commit a09a7146a7
Notes: svn2git 2020-12-20 02:59:44 +00:00
svn path=/head/; revision=286000
3 changed files with 38 additions and 26 deletions

View File

@ -105,6 +105,7 @@ struct xformsw {
#ifdef _KERNEL
extern void xform_register(struct xformsw*);
extern int xform_init(struct secasvar *sav, int xftype);
extern int xform_ah_authsize(struct auth_hash *esph);
struct cryptoini;

View File

@ -85,8 +85,8 @@
* Return authenticator size in bytes, based on a field in the
* algorithm descriptor.
*/
#define AUTHSIZE(sav) \
((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : (sav)->tdb_authalgxform->hashsize)
#define AUTHSIZE(sav) ((sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD) ? 16 : \
xform_ah_authsize((sav)->tdb_authalgxform))
VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_enable) = 1; /* control flow of packets with AH */
VNET_DEFINE(int, ah_cleartos) = 1; /* clear ip_tos when doing AH calc */
@ -112,6 +112,35 @@ static unsigned char ipseczeroes[256]; /* larger than an ip6 extension hdr */
static int ah_input_cb(struct cryptop*);
static int ah_output_cb(struct cryptop*);
int
xform_ah_authsize(struct auth_hash *esph)
{
int alen;
if (esph == NULL)
return 0;
switch (esph->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
alen = esph->hashsize / 2; /* RFC4868 2.3 */
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
alen = esph->hashsize;
break;
default:
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
break;
}
return alen;
}
/*
* NB: this is public for use by the PF_KEY support.
*/

View File

@ -320,7 +320,6 @@ esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav != NULL, ("null SA"));
IPSEC_ASSERT(sav->tdb_encalgxform != NULL, ("null encoding xform"));
alen = 0;
/* Valid IP Packet length ? */
if ( (skip&3) || (m->m_pkthdr.len&3) ){
DPRINTF(("%s: misaligned packet, skip %u pkt len %u",
@ -335,13 +334,13 @@ esp_input(struct mbuf *m, struct secasvar *sav, int skip, int protoff)
esph = sav->tdb_authalgxform;
espx = sav->tdb_encalgxform;
/* Determine the ESP header length */
/* Determine the ESP header and auth length */
if (sav->flags & SADB_X_EXT_OLD)
hlen = sizeof (struct esp) + sav->ivlen;
else
hlen = sizeof (struct newesp) + sav->ivlen;
/* Authenticator hash size */
alen = esph ? esph->hashsize : 0;
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
/*
* Verify payload length is multiple of encryption algorithm
@ -530,7 +529,7 @@ esp_input_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
/* If authentication was performed, check now. */
if (esph != NULL) {
alen = esph->hashsize;
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
AHSTAT_INC(ahs_hist[sav->alg_auth]);
/* Copy the authenticator from the packet */
m_copydata(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen, alen, aalg);
@ -700,10 +699,7 @@ esp_output(struct mbuf *m, struct ipsecrequest *isr, struct mbuf **mp,
/* XXX clamp padding length a la KAME??? */
padding = ((blks - ((rlen + 2) % blks)) % blks) + 2;
if (esph)
alen = esph->hashsize;
else
alen = 0;
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
ESPSTAT_INC(esps_output);
@ -983,21 +979,7 @@ esp_output_cb(struct cryptop *crp)
if (esph != NULL) {
int alen;
switch (esph->type) {
case CRYPTO_SHA2_256_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_384_HMAC:
case CRYPTO_SHA2_512_HMAC:
alen = esph->hashsize/2;
break;
case CRYPTO_AES_128_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_192_NIST_GMAC:
case CRYPTO_AES_256_NIST_GMAC:
alen = esph->hashsize;
break;
default:
alen = AH_HMAC_HASHLEN;
break;
}
alen = xform_ah_authsize(esph);
m_copyback(m, m->m_pkthdr.len - alen,
alen, ipseczeroes);
}