mirror of
https://git.hardenedbsd.org/hardenedbsd/HardenedBSD.git
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874 lines
22 KiB
C
874 lines
22 KiB
C
/*
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* Copyright (c) 1995, 1996
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* Bill Paul <wpaul@ctr.columbia.edu>. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
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* must display the following acknowledgement:
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* This product includes software developed by Bill Paul.
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* 4. Neither the name of the author nor the names of any co-contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY Bill Paul AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
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* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL Bill Paul OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
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* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
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* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
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* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
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* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
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* SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#ifndef lint
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static const char rcsid[] =
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"$FreeBSD$";
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#endif /* not lint */
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <ctype.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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#include <dirent.h>
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#include <sys/stat.h>
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#include <sys/socket.h>
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#include <netinet/in.h>
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#include <arpa/inet.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include <db.h>
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#include <pwd.h>
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <signal.h>
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#include <rpc/rpc.h>
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#include <rpcsvc/yp.h>
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#include <sys/types.h>
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#include <sys/wait.h>
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#include <sys/param.h>
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#include <sys/fcntl.h>
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struct dom_binding {};
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#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
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#include "yppasswdd_extern.h"
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#include "yppasswd.h"
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#include "yppasswd_private.h"
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char *tempname;
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void reaper(sig)
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int sig;
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{
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extern pid_t pid;
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extern int pstat;
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int st;
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int saved_errno;
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saved_errno = errno;
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if (sig > 0) {
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if (sig == SIGCHLD)
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while(wait3(&st, WNOHANG, NULL) > 0) ;
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} else {
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pid = waitpid(pid, &pstat, 0);
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}
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errno = saved_errno;
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return;
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}
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void install_reaper(on)
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int on;
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{
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if (on) {
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signal(SIGCHLD, reaper);
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} else {
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signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
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}
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return;
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}
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static struct passwd yp_password;
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static void copy_yp_pass(p, x, m)
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char *p;
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int x, m;
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{
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register char *t, *s = p;
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static char *buf;
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yp_password.pw_fields = 0;
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buf = (char *)realloc(buf, m + 10);
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bzero(buf, m + 10);
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/* Turn all colons into NULLs */
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while (strchr(s, ':')) {
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s = (strchr(s, ':') + 1);
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*(s - 1)= '\0';
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}
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t = buf;
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#define EXPAND(e) e = t; while ((*t++ = *p++));
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EXPAND(yp_password.pw_name);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_NAME;
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EXPAND(yp_password.pw_passwd);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_PASSWD;
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yp_password.pw_uid = atoi(p);
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p += (strlen(p) + 1);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_UID;
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yp_password.pw_gid = atoi(p);
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p += (strlen(p) + 1);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_GID;
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if (x) {
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EXPAND(yp_password.pw_class);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_CLASS;
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yp_password.pw_change = atol(p);
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p += (strlen(p) + 1);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_CHANGE;
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yp_password.pw_expire = atol(p);
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p += (strlen(p) + 1);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_EXPIRE;
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}
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EXPAND(yp_password.pw_gecos);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_GECOS;
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EXPAND(yp_password.pw_dir);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_DIR;
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EXPAND(yp_password.pw_shell);
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yp_password.pw_fields |= _PWF_SHELL;
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return;
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}
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static int validchars(arg)
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char *arg;
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{
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int i;
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for (i = 0; i < strlen(arg); i++) {
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if (iscntrl(arg[i])) {
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yp_error("string contains a control character");
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return(1);
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}
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if (arg[i] == ':') {
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yp_error("string contains a colon");
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return(1);
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}
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/* Be evil: truncate strings with \n in them silently. */
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if (arg[i] == '\n') {
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arg[i] = '\0';
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return(0);
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}
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}
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return(0);
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}
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static int validate_master(opw, npw)
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struct passwd *opw;
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struct x_master_passwd *npw;
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{
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if (npw->pw_name[0] == '+' || npw->pw_name[0] == '-') {
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yp_error("client tried to modify an NIS entry");
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return(1);
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}
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if (validchars(npw->pw_shell)) {
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yp_error("specified shell contains invalid characters");
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return(1);
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}
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if (validchars(npw->pw_gecos)) {
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yp_error("specified gecos field contains invalid characters");
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return(1);
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}
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if (validchars(npw->pw_passwd)) {
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yp_error("specified password contains invalid characters");
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return(1);
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}
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return(0);
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}
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static int validate(opw, npw)
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struct passwd *opw;
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struct x_passwd *npw;
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{
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if (npw->pw_name[0] == '+' || npw->pw_name[0] == '-') {
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yp_error("client tried to modify an NIS entry");
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return(1);
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}
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if (npw->pw_uid != opw->pw_uid) {
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yp_error("UID mismatch: client says user %s has UID %d",
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npw->pw_name, npw->pw_uid);
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yp_error("database says user %s has UID %d", opw->pw_name,
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opw->pw_uid);
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return(1);
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}
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if (npw->pw_gid != opw->pw_gid) {
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yp_error("GID mismatch: client says user %s has GID %d",
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npw->pw_name, npw->pw_gid);
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yp_error("database says user %s has GID %d", opw->pw_name,
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opw->pw_gid);
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return(1);
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}
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/*
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* Don't allow the user to shoot himself in the foot,
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* even on purpose.
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*/
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if (!ok_shell(npw->pw_shell)) {
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yp_error("%s is not a valid shell", npw->pw_shell);
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return(1);
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}
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if (validchars(npw->pw_shell)) {
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yp_error("specified shell contains invalid characters");
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return(1);
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}
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if (validchars(npw->pw_gecos)) {
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yp_error("specified gecos field contains invalid characters");
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return(1);
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}
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if (validchars(npw->pw_passwd)) {
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yp_error("specified password contains invalid characters");
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return(1);
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}
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return(0);
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}
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/*
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* Kludge alert:
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* In order to have one rpc.yppasswdd support multiple domains,
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* we have to cheat: we search each directory under /var/yp
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* and try to match the user in each master.passwd.byname
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* map that we find. If the user matches (username, uid and gid
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* all agree), then we use that domain. If we match the user in
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* more than one database, we must abort.
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*/
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static char *find_domain(pw)
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struct x_passwd *pw;
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{
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struct stat statbuf;
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struct dirent *dirp;
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DIR *dird;
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char yp_mapdir[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
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static char domain[YPMAXDOMAIN];
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char *tmp = NULL;
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DBT key, data;
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int hit = 0;
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yp_error("performing multidomain lookup");
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if ((dird = opendir(yp_dir)) == NULL) {
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yp_error("opendir(%s) failed: %s", yp_dir, strerror(errno));
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return(NULL);
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}
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while ((dirp = readdir(dird)) != NULL) {
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snprintf(yp_mapdir, sizeof(yp_mapdir), "%s/%s",
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yp_dir, dirp->d_name);
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if (stat(yp_mapdir, &statbuf) < 0) {
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yp_error("stat(%s) failed: %s", yp_mapdir,
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strerror(errno));
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closedir(dird);
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return(NULL);
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}
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if (S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
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tmp = (char *)dirp->d_name;
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key.data = pw->pw_name;
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key.size = strlen(pw->pw_name);
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if (yp_get_record(tmp,"master.passwd.byname",
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&key, &data, 0) != YP_TRUE) {
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continue;
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}
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*(char *)(data.data + data.size) = '\0';
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copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
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if (yp_password.pw_uid == pw->pw_uid &&
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yp_password.pw_gid == pw->pw_gid) {
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hit++;
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snprintf(domain, YPMAXDOMAIN, "%s", tmp);
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}
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}
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}
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closedir(dird);
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if (hit > 1) {
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yp_error("found same user in two different domains");
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return(NULL);
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} else
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return((char *)&domain);
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}
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static int update_inplace(pw, domain)
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struct passwd *pw;
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char *domain;
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{
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DB *dbp = NULL;
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DBT key = { NULL, 0 };
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DBT data = { NULL, 0 };
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char pwbuf[YPMAXRECORD];
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char keybuf[20];
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int i;
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char *maps[] = { "master.passwd.byname", "master.passwd.byuid",
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"passwd.byname", "passwd.byuid" };
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char *formats[] = { "%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%ld:%ld:%s:%s:%s",
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"%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%ld:%ld:%s:%s:%s",
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"%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s", "%s:%s:%d:%d:%s:%s:%s" };
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char *ptr = NULL;
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char *yp_last = "YP_LAST_MODIFIED";
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char yplastbuf[YPMAXRECORD];
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snprintf(yplastbuf, sizeof(yplastbuf), "%lu", time(NULL));
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for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
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if (i % 2) {
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snprintf(keybuf, sizeof(keybuf), "%ld", pw->pw_uid);
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key.data = (char *)&keybuf;
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key.size = strlen(keybuf);
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} else {
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key.data = pw->pw_name;
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key.size = strlen(pw->pw_name);
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}
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/*
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* XXX The passwd.byname and passwd.byuid maps come in
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* two flavors: secure and insecure. The secure version
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* has a '*' in the password field whereas the insecure one
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* has a real crypted password. The maps will be insecure
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* if they were built with 'unsecure = TRUE' enabled in
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* /var/yp/Makefile, but we'd have no way of knowing if
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* this has been done unless we were to try parsing the
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* Makefile, which is a disgusting thought. Instead, we
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* read the records from the maps, skip to the first ':'
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* in them, and then look at the character immediately
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* following it. If it's an '*' then the map is 'secure'
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* and we must not insert a real password into the pw_passwd
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* field. If it's not an '*', then we put the real crypted
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* password in.
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*/
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if (yp_get_record(domain,maps[i],&key,&data,1) != YP_TRUE) {
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yp_error("couldn't read %s/%s: %s", domain,
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maps[i], strerror(errno));
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return(1);
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}
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if ((ptr = strchr(data.data, ':')) == NULL) {
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yp_error("no colon in passwd record?!");
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return(1);
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}
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/*
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* XXX Supposing we have more than one user with the same
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* UID? (Or more than one user with the same name?) We could
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* end up modifying the wrong record if were not careful.
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*/
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if (i % 2) {
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if (strncmp(data.data, pw->pw_name,
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strlen(pw->pw_name))) {
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yp_error("warning: found entry for UID %d \
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in map %s@%s with wrong name (%.*s)", pw->pw_uid, maps[i], domain,
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ptr - (char *)data.data, data.data);
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yp_error("there may be more than one user \
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with the same UID - continuing");
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continue;
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}
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} else {
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/*
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* We're really being ultra-paranoid here.
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* This is generally a 'can't happen' condition.
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*/
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snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), ":%d:%d:", pw->pw_uid,
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pw->pw_gid);
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if (!strstr(data.data, pwbuf)) {
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yp_error("warning: found entry for user %s \
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in map %s@%s with wrong UID", pw->pw_name, maps[i], domain);
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yp_error("there may ne more than one user
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with the same name - continuing");
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continue;
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}
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}
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if (i < 2) {
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snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), formats[i],
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pw->pw_name, pw->pw_passwd, pw->pw_uid,
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pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_class, pw->pw_change,
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pw->pw_expire, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir,
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pw->pw_shell);
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} else {
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snprintf(pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), formats[i],
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pw->pw_name, *(ptr+1) == '*' ? "*" : pw->pw_passwd,
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pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gecos, pw->pw_dir,
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pw->pw_shell);
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}
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#define FLAGS O_RDWR|O_CREAT
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if ((dbp = yp_open_db_rw(domain, maps[i], FLAGS)) == NULL) {
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yp_error("couldn't open %s/%s r/w: %s",domain,
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maps[i],strerror(errno));
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return(1);
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}
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data.data = pwbuf;
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data.size = strlen(pwbuf);
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if (yp_put_record(dbp, &key, &data, 1) != YP_TRUE) {
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yp_error("failed to update record in %s/%s", domain,
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maps[i]);
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(void)(dbp->close)(dbp);
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return(1);
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}
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key.data = yp_last;
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key.size = strlen(yp_last);
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data.data = (char *)&yplastbuf;
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data.size = strlen(yplastbuf);
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if (yp_put_record(dbp, &key, &data, 1) != YP_TRUE) {
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yp_error("failed to update timestamp in %s/%s", domain,
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maps[i]);
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(void)(dbp->close)(dbp);
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return(1);
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}
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(void)(dbp->close)(dbp);
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}
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return(0);
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}
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static char *yp_mktmpnam()
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{
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static char path[MAXPATHLEN];
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char *p;
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sprintf(path,"%s",passfile);
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if ((p = strrchr(path, '/')))
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++p;
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else
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p = path;
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strcpy(p, "yppwtmp.XXXXXX");
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return(mktemp(path));
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}
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int *
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yppasswdproc_update_1_svc(yppasswd *argp, struct svc_req *rqstp)
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{
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static int result;
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struct sockaddr_in *rqhost;
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DBT key, data;
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int rval = 0;
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int pfd, tfd;
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int pid;
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int passwd_changed = 0;
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int shell_changed = 0;
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int gecos_changed = 0;
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char *oldshell = NULL;
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char *oldgecos = NULL;
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char *passfile_hold;
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char passfile_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
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char *domain = yppasswd_domain;
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static struct sockaddr_in clntaddr;
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static struct timeval t_saved, t_test;
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/*
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* Normal user updates always use the 'default' master.passwd file.
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*/
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passfile = passfile_default;
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result = 1;
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rqhost = svc_getcaller(rqstp->rq_xprt);
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gettimeofday(&t_test, NULL);
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if (!bcmp((char *)rqhost, (char *)&clntaddr,
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sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) &&
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t_test.tv_sec > t_saved.tv_sec &&
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t_test.tv_sec - t_saved.tv_sec < 300) {
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bzero((char *)&clntaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
|
|
bzero((char *)&t_saved, sizeof(struct timeval));
|
|
return(NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bcopy((char *)rqhost, (char *)&clntaddr, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
|
|
gettimeofday(&t_saved, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if (yp_access(resvport ? "master.passwd.byname" : NULL, rqstp)) {
|
|
yp_error("rejected update request from unauthorized host");
|
|
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Step one: find the user. (It's kinda pointless to
|
|
* proceed if the user doesn't exist.) We look for the
|
|
* user in the master.passwd.byname database, _NOT_ by
|
|
* using getpwent() and friends! We can't use getpwent()
|
|
* since the NIS master server is not guaranteed to be
|
|
* configured as an NIS client.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (multidomain) {
|
|
if ((domain = find_domain(&argp->newpw)) == NULL) {
|
|
yp_error("multidomain lookup failed - aborting update");
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
} else
|
|
yp_error("updating user %s in domain %s",
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name, domain);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
key.data = argp->newpw.pw_name;
|
|
key.size = strlen(argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
|
|
if ((rval=yp_get_record(domain,"master.passwd.byname",
|
|
&key, &data, 0)) != YP_TRUE) {
|
|
if (rval == YP_NOKEY) {
|
|
yp_error("user %s not found in passwd database",
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
} else {
|
|
yp_error("database access error: %s",
|
|
yperr_string(rval));
|
|
}
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Nul terminate, please. */
|
|
*(char *)(data.data + data.size) = '\0';
|
|
|
|
copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
|
|
|
|
/* Step 2: check that the supplied oldpass is valid. */
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(crypt(argp->oldpass, yp_password.pw_passwd),
|
|
yp_password.pw_passwd)) {
|
|
yp_error("rejected change attempt -- bad password");
|
|
yp_error("client address: %s username: %s",
|
|
inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr),
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Step 3: validate the arguments passed to us by the client. */
|
|
|
|
if (validate(&yp_password, &argp->newpw)) {
|
|
yp_error("rejecting change attempt: bad arguments");
|
|
yp_error("client address: %s username: %s",
|
|
inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr),
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
svcerr_decode(rqstp->rq_xprt);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Step 4: update the user's passwd structure. */
|
|
|
|
if (!no_chsh && strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_shell, yp_password.pw_shell)) {
|
|
oldshell = yp_password.pw_shell;
|
|
yp_password.pw_shell = argp->newpw.pw_shell;
|
|
shell_changed++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
if (!no_chfn && strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_gecos, yp_password.pw_gecos)) {
|
|
oldgecos = yp_password.pw_gecos;
|
|
yp_password.pw_gecos = argp->newpw.pw_gecos;
|
|
gecos_changed++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(argp->newpw.pw_passwd, yp_password.pw_passwd)) {
|
|
yp_password.pw_passwd = argp->newpw.pw_passwd;
|
|
yp_password.pw_change = 0;
|
|
passwd_changed++;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the caller specified a domain other than our 'default'
|
|
* domain, change the path to master.passwd accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(domain, yppasswd_domain)) {
|
|
snprintf(passfile_buf, sizeof(passfile_buf),
|
|
"%s/%s/master.passwd", yp_dir, domain);
|
|
passfile = (char *)&passfile_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Step 5: make a new password file with the updated info. */
|
|
|
|
if ((pfd = pw_lock()) < 0) {
|
|
return (&result);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((tfd = pw_tmp()) < 0) {
|
|
return (&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pw_copy(pfd, tfd, &yp_password)) {
|
|
yp_error("failed to created updated password file -- \
|
|
cleaning up and bailing out");
|
|
unlink(tempname);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
passfile_hold = yp_mktmpnam();
|
|
rename(passfile, passfile_hold);
|
|
if (strcmp(passfile, _PATH_MASTERPASSWD)) {
|
|
rename(tempname, passfile);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (pw_mkdb(argp->newpw.pw_name) < 0) {
|
|
yp_error("pwd_mkdb failed");
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (inplace) {
|
|
if ((rval = update_inplace(&yp_password, domain))) {
|
|
yp_error("inplace update failed -- rebuilding maps");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch((pid = fork())) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
if (inplace && !rval) {
|
|
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
|
|
yppasswd_domain, "pushpw", NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
|
|
yppasswd_domain, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
yp_error("couldn't exec map update process: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
unlink(passfile);
|
|
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
break;
|
|
case -1:
|
|
yp_error("fork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
unlink(passfile);
|
|
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
unlink(passfile_hold);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (verbose) {
|
|
yp_error("update completed for user %s (uid %d):",
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name,
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_uid);
|
|
|
|
if (passwd_changed)
|
|
yp_error("password changed");
|
|
|
|
if (gecos_changed)
|
|
yp_error("gecos changed ('%s' -> '%s')",
|
|
oldgecos, argp->newpw.pw_gecos);
|
|
|
|
if (shell_changed)
|
|
yp_error("shell changed ('%s' -> '%s')",
|
|
oldshell, argp->newpw.pw_shell);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result = 0;
|
|
return (&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
struct cmessage {
|
|
struct cmsghdr cmsg;
|
|
struct cmsgcred cmcred;
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that this function performs a little less sanity checking
|
|
* than the last one. Since only the superuser is allowed to use it,
|
|
* it is assumed that the caller knows what he's doing.
|
|
*/
|
|
int *yppasswdproc_update_master_1_svc(master_yppasswd *argp,
|
|
struct svc_req *rqstp)
|
|
{
|
|
static int result;
|
|
int pfd, tfd;
|
|
int pid;
|
|
int rval = 0;
|
|
DBT key, data;
|
|
char *passfile_hold;
|
|
char passfile_buf[MAXPATHLEN + 2];
|
|
struct sockaddr_in *rqhost;
|
|
struct cmessage *cm;
|
|
SVCXPRT *transp;
|
|
|
|
result = 1;
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* NO AF_INET CONNETCIONS ALLOWED!
|
|
*/
|
|
rqhost = svc_getcaller(rqstp->rq_xprt);
|
|
if (rqhost->sin_family != AF_UNIX) {
|
|
yp_error("Alert! %s/%d attempted to use superuser-only \
|
|
procedure!\n", inet_ntoa(rqhost->sin_addr), rqhost->sin_port);
|
|
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
transp = rqstp->rq_xprt;
|
|
|
|
if (transp->xp_verf.oa_length < sizeof(struct cmessage) ||
|
|
transp->xp_verf.oa_base == NULL ||
|
|
transp->xp_verf.oa_flavor != AUTH_UNIX) {
|
|
yp_error("caller didn't send proper credentials");
|
|
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cm = (struct cmessage *)transp->xp_verf.oa_base;
|
|
if (cm->cmsg.cmsg_type != SCM_CREDS) {
|
|
yp_error("caller didn't send proper credentials");
|
|
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (cm->cmcred.cmcred_euid) {
|
|
yp_error("caller euid is %d, expecting 0 -- rejecting request",
|
|
cm->cmcred.cmcred_euid);
|
|
svcerr_auth(rqstp->rq_xprt, AUTH_BADCRED);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
passfile = passfile_default;
|
|
|
|
key.data = argp->newpw.pw_name;
|
|
key.size = strlen(argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* The superuser may add entries to the passwd maps if
|
|
* rpc.yppasswdd is started with the -a flag. Paranoia
|
|
* prevents me from allowing additions by default.
|
|
*/
|
|
if ((rval = yp_get_record(argp->domain, "master.passwd.byname",
|
|
&key, &data, 0)) != YP_TRUE) {
|
|
if (rval == YP_NOKEY) {
|
|
yp_error("user %s not found in passwd database",
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
if (allow_additions)
|
|
yp_error("notice: adding user %s to \
|
|
master.passwd database for domain %s", argp->newpw.pw_name, argp->domain);
|
|
else
|
|
yp_error("restart rpc.yppasswdd with the -a flag to \
|
|
allow additions to be made to the password database");
|
|
} else {
|
|
yp_error("database access error: %s",
|
|
yperr_string(rval));
|
|
}
|
|
if (!allow_additions)
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
|
/* Nul terminate, please. */
|
|
*(char *)(data.data + data.size) = '\0';
|
|
|
|
copy_yp_pass(data.data, 1, data.size);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Perform a small bit of sanity checking.
|
|
*/
|
|
if (validate_master(rval == YP_TRUE ? &yp_password:NULL,&argp->newpw)){
|
|
yp_error("rejecting update attempt for %s: bad arguments",
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* If the caller specified a domain other than our 'default'
|
|
* domain, change the path to master.passwd accordingly.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(argp->domain, yppasswd_domain)) {
|
|
snprintf(passfile_buf, sizeof(passfile_buf),
|
|
"%s/%s/master.passwd", yp_dir, argp->domain);
|
|
passfile = (char *)&passfile_buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if ((pfd = pw_lock()) < 0) {
|
|
return (&result);
|
|
}
|
|
if ((tfd = pw_tmp()) < 0) {
|
|
return (&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (pw_copy(pfd, tfd, (struct passwd *)&argp->newpw)) {
|
|
yp_error("failed to created updated password file -- \
|
|
cleaning up and bailing out");
|
|
unlink(tempname);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
passfile_hold = yp_mktmpnam();
|
|
rename(passfile, passfile_hold);
|
|
if (strcmp(passfile, _PATH_MASTERPASSWD)) {
|
|
rename(tempname, passfile);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if (pw_mkdb(argp->newpw.pw_name) < 0) {
|
|
yp_error("pwd_mkdb failed");
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (inplace) {
|
|
if ((rval = update_inplace((struct passwd *)&argp->newpw,
|
|
argp->domain))) {
|
|
yp_error("inplace update failed -- rebuilding maps");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch((pid = fork())) {
|
|
case 0:
|
|
if (inplace && !rval) {
|
|
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
|
|
argp->domain, "pushpw", NULL);
|
|
} else {
|
|
execlp(MAP_UPDATE_PATH, MAP_UPDATE, passfile,
|
|
argp->domain, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
yp_error("couldn't exec map update process: %s",
|
|
strerror(errno));
|
|
unlink(passfile);
|
|
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
|
|
exit(1);
|
|
break;
|
|
case -1:
|
|
yp_error("fork() failed: %s", strerror(errno));
|
|
unlink(passfile);
|
|
rename(passfile_hold, passfile);
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
unlink(passfile_hold);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
yp_error("performed update of user %s (uid %d) domain %s",
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_name,
|
|
argp->newpw.pw_uid,
|
|
argp->domain);
|
|
|
|
result = 0;
|
|
return(&result);
|
|
}
|