hardenedbsd
/
hardenedbsd
mirror of https://git.hardenedbsd.org/hardenedbsd/HardenedBSD.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
hardenedbsd/UPDATING-HardenedBSD

703 lines
21 KiB
Plaintext
Raw Permalink Blame History

[20240124] Provide mechanism to disable new USB connections
__HardenedBSD_version = 1500001
HBSD: Provide support for prohibiting new USB device connections
This commit introduces the hardening.pax.prohibit_new_usb sysctl
tunable node. This node can be set to one of three values:
0: Disabled
1: Enabled
2: Enabled without possibility to disable
When set to 2, a reboot is required to end the prohibition on new USB
connections.
This is based on a patch by Loic F <loic.f@hardenedbsd.org>.
[20230826] Catch up with FreeBSD version bump to 15
__HardenedBSD_version = 1500000
HBSD: Now that __FreeBSD_version is 1500000, let's bump up
__HardenedBSD_version to reflect major version bump to 15.
[20230621] Further restrict ptrace access to capsicumized processes
__HardenedBSD_version = 1400005
HBSD: Further restrict ptrace access targeting capsicumized processes
Prevent capsicumized processes from being ptraced. Introduce a new
4-state per-jail sysctl node, hardening.prohibit_ptrace_capsicum,
defaulted to process opt-out (2). Introduce a new hbsdcontrol knob,
prohibit_ptrace_capsicum, to toggle the feature on a per-application
basis.
The intent behind this change is to make post-exploitation tasks more
difficult. Abusing ptrace to inject code or to perform process hollowing
is commonplace.
[20230528] Introduce shared memory (SHM) hardening
__HardenedBSD_version = 1400004
SHM hardening places restrictions on what can be done with the shared
memory subsystem (see `shm_open(2)`.) This feature is launching with
one technique:
Use of `shm_open(2)/__sys_shm_open2` system calls is prohibited when:
1. The `hardening.harden_shm` sysctl tunable is enabled;
2. The process has not opted out of the feature;
3. The process has entered capability mode (aka, Capsicum mode)
[20220610] Introduce Trusted Path Execution (TPE)
__HardenedBSD_version = 1400003
TPE limits the scope of what files can be executed. By default, TPE is
left disabled, but can be enabled via the `hardening.pax.tpe.status`
sysctl tunable.
When enabled, TPE will check the to-be-executed file's parent directory
to determine whether the directory is owned by the caller and is
writable to users/groups other than the owner.
The above logic is only run when:
1. The hardening.pax.tpe.all sysctl tunable is non-zero;
2. The user's primary group is the group specified in the
hardening.pax.tpe.gid group;
3. When the hardening.pax.tpe.negate sysctl tunable is non-zero, the
user's primary group is *NOT* the group specified in the
hardening.pax.tpe.gid group.
[20220406] Introduce insecure kernel module hardening
__HardenedBSD_version = 1400002
Provide support for marking certain kernel modules with a
notion of insecure or untrustworthy. Introduce a new hardening
sysctl tunable: hardening.insecure_kmod (default to 0, meaning
loading insecure kernel modules is prohibited by default.)
[20210528] Introduce LTO libs on amd64
__HardenedBSD_version = 1400001
As an initial first step towards supporting Cross-DSO CFI,
build both static and shared libraries with LTO.
[20200221] Removal of LibreSSL and OpenNTPD
__HardenedBSD_version = 1300061
LibreSSL and OpenNTPD were removed from the HardenedBSD base
system. Users who set WITH_LIBRESSL or WITH_OPENNTPD will need
to rebuild ports.
[20191214] Jail parameter: {no}allow.extattr
__HardenedBSD_version = 1300060
Provide a new jail configuration parameter: allow.extattr (and
noallow.extattr). Default: allow.
Allow setting system-level filesystem extended attributes by
default in a jailed environment.
Change the default system behavior to be more relaxed. Prior
to this change, privileged accounts in a jail could not set
system-level filesystem extended attributes. This change now
enables that ability by default.
This is in preparation for hbsdcontrol integration with
ports/packages.
[20191019] FreeBSD ASR with HardenedBSD ASLR
__HardenedBSD_version = 1300059
FreeBSD merged in their incomplete Address Space Randomization
(ASR) patch. Undo the reversion of the ASR patch and rely on
HardenedBSD's PaX ASLR implementation for the stack and shared
page when FreeBSD's ASR is enabled.
FreeBSD's ASR is disabled by default, but can be enabled at
runtime by setting the `kern.elf64.aslr.pie_enable` and
`kern.elf64.aslr.enable` sysctl nodes to 1. If HardenedBSD's
`hardening.pax.aslr.status' sysctl node is greater than or
equal to 2, the PaX ASLR implementation will only be in effect
for the stack and the shared page.
[20181019] shift to FreeBSD 13-CURRENT
__HardenedBSD_version = 1300058
FreeBSD started 13-CURRENT, do the same here.
[20180701] OpenSSL
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200058
Switch back to OpenSSL as the default crypto library in base.
[20180123] retpoline
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200057
Integrated the retpoline patch from llvm. The object
tree should be removed fully prior to rebuilding
world/kernel.
[20180103] PAX_JAIL_SUPPORT
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200056
Added infrastructure to change hardening settings at
jail creating time. You can use the same "mibs" as
jail params, which exists under the hardening sysctl
leaf. See the example jail.conf sniplet:
exec.start = "/bin/sh /etc/rc";
exec.stop = "/bin/sh /etc/rc.shutdown";
exec.clean;
mount.devfs;
path = "/usr/jails/$name";
host.hostname = "$name";
hbsdnx {
hardening.pax.segvguard.status = 3;
hardening.pax.mprotect.status = 3;
hardening.pax.pageexec.status = 3;
hardening.pax.aslr.status = 3;
persist;
}
In the current implementation the settings are still
modifiable via sysctls inside from the jail, but this
will change in the future. The same is true for the
nested jails.
[20170914] TOCTOU fix, PAX_CONTROL_{ACL,EXTATTR}
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200055
hbsdcontrol
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
The hbsdcontrol subsystem is an extattr(9) based control pane for
HardenedBSD's security settings.
Currently only the system namespace supported. (The FreeBSD's extattr
subsystem has two namespace: system and user. The system namespace is
writeable only from non-jail root user, the user namespace is writeable
from all users.)
This means only the root can assign rules to specific file. The other
restriction is similar, only from the host is allowed to set rules to
specific file, and prohibited a such operation from jails, for jail's
root user too prohibited.
To enable the hbsdcontrol subsystem, you should add the
options PAX_CONTROL_EXTATTR
kernel knob to your kernel config.
The hbsdcontrol subsystem use the following extended attributes:
hbsd.pax.aslr
hbsd.pax.noaslr
hbsd.pax.segvguard
hbsd.pax.nosegvguard
hbsd.pax.pageexec
hbsd.pax.nopageexec
hbsd.pax.mprotect
hbsd.pax.nomprotect
hbsd.pax.shlibrandom
hbsd.pax.noshlibrandom
hbsd.pax.disallow_map32bit
hbsd.pax.nodisallow_map32bit
Valid values are only the 0 (= disabled) and 1 (= enabled).
Valid settings are the following in system FS-EA namespace (with the ASLR
example, the same is true for the other settings):
* no hbsd.pax.aslr, nor hbsd.pax.noaslr assigned to the file -> system default
* hbsd.pax.aslr = 1 and hbsd.pax.noaslr = 0 -> enabled ASLR
* hbsd.pax.aslr = 0 and hbsd.pax.noaslr = 1 -> disabled ASLR
* hbsd.pax.aslr = 0 and hbsd.pax.noaslr = 0 -> invalid, warning message + execution error
* hbsd.pax.aslr = 1 and hbsd.pax.noaslr = 1 -> invalid, warning message + execution error
Attributes in user namespace are ignored.
TOCTOU fix, PAX_ACL
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
As preparation to hbsdcontrol, and to clean up the whole control logic
there is some new kernel knob:
* PAX_CONTROL_ACL
* PAX_CONTROL_ACL_OVERRIDE_SUPPORT
* PAX_CONTROL_EXTATTR
If you want to use the external secadm utility to manage hardenedbsd's
security features, then you should add
options PAX_CONTROL_ACL
to your kernel config.
If you want to use the extattr(9) based hbsdcontrol, you should add
the
options PAX_CONTROL_EXTATTR
kernel knob.
If you want to use both hbsdcontrol and secadm, and it's nice to add
option PAX_CONTROL_ACL_OVERRIDE_SUPPORT
too. This is nice in very special case, when you set rules both
from hbsdcontrol and from secadm on the _same_ file. By default
always the hbsdcontrol wins this situation, and what was set up
by hbsdcontrol gets applied as policy. To override this behavior
you can add a special flag in you secadm conf to override this
behavior. For more details consult with secadm's source code /
readme / man page.
[20170914] Changed auxvector after e5ea82a50dd64a3e47767b132a16281242ff396d
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200054
After the following commit:
> commit e5ea82a50dd64a3e47767b132a16281242ff396d
> Author: jhb <jhb@FreeBSD.org>
> Date: Thu Sep 14 14:26:55 2017 +0000
> Add AT_HWCAP and AT_EHDRFLAGS on all platforms.
>
> A new 'u_long *sv_hwcap' field is added to 'struct sysentvec'. A
> process ABI can set this field to point to a value holding a mask of
> architecture-specific CPU feature flags. If an ABI does not wish to
> supply AT_HWCAP to processes the field can be left as NULL.
>
> The support code for AT_EHDRFLAGS was already present on all systems,
> just the #define was not present. This is a step towards unifying the
> AT_* constants across platforms.
>
> Reviewed by: kib
> MFC after: 1 month
> Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D12290
> Notes:
> svn path=/head/; revision=323579
the AT_PAXFLAGS has been changed from 24 to 26 position in
elf auxvector. This may break some functionality, especially
the SHLIBRAND feature, when you running on a newer kernel
with an older user-space.
[20170831] Changed pax_elf API
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200053
As preparation to hardenedBSD rationalize
the pax_elf(...) functions signature, to
follow the codes in kern_exec's style.
For the details, see the code.
[20170709] Enforced KPI
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200052
Enfore the KPI version at compile time. This
will implicate the recompilation of external
modules even once __HardenedBSD_version or
__FreeBSD_version gets bumped.
[20170624] Enable OpenNTPd by default
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200051
Enable WITH_OPENNTPD by default on HardenedBSD.
After this point we deliver OpenNTPd as base
ntp provider for HardenedBSD. ISC ntpd is still
available, and accessible with WITHOUT_OPENNTPD=
knob in src.conf(5).
[20170616] Changed __HardenedBSD_version scheme
__HardenedBSD_version = 1200050
The version numbers may differ in different branches (10-STABLE,
11-STABLE, 12-CURRENT) and to keep the version number in pair
with the features state, there is a need to allow to bump they
differently.
[20170616] Changed default protection settings for text section
__HardenedBSD_version = 50
Fixes the (theoretically) last outstanding memory
protection related weakness in HBSD's user-space detectable
with paxtest.
[20170302] Enable CFI by default for amd64
__HardenedBSD_version = 49
Enable WITH_CFI by default on HardenedBSD/amd64.
Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is an exploit mitigation
technique developed in the clang/llvm project. Now that
base has clang 4.0.0, which brings a linker that supports
Link-Time Optimization (LTO), lld, we can now make use of
CFI, which requires LTO.
This also enables lld by default for amd64 and arm64. Disable
CFI by setting WITHOUT_CFI in src.conf(5).
[20170112] Enable SafeStack by default for amd64
__HardenedBSD_version = 48
Enable WITH_SAFESTACK by default on HardenedBSD/amd64.
SafeStack is an exploit mitigation technique developed in the
clang/llvm project, born in the Code-Pointer Integrity
(CPI) project. Now that base has clang 3.9.1, which contains
a more mature CFI/CPI implementation, SafeStack can be enabled
by default for amd64.
Disable SafeStack for base by setting WITHOUT_SAFESTACK in
src.conf(5).
[20160820] Enable LibreSSL by default
__HardenedBSD_version = 47
Enable WITH_LIBRESSL by default on HardenedBSD.
After this we point we deliver LibreSSL as base
SSL engine for HardenedBSD. The OpenSSL is still
available, and accessible with WITHOUT_LIBRESSL=
knob in src.conf.
[20160423] RELRO + BIND_NOW
__HardenedBSD_version = 46
Enable RELRO + BIND_NOW for base.
Introduce WITHOUT_RELRO and WITHOUT_BIND_NOW.
Setting WITHOUT_RELRO also sets WITHOUT_BIND_NOW.
[20160408] PIEified base for amd64 and i386
__HardenedBSD_version = 45
Remove WANTS_PIE.
Default PIE for base for amd64 and i386 only.
When PIE is enabled, compile non-static libraries with -fPIC.
Default WITH_SHARED_TOOLCHAIN to enabled by default.
If you encounter build problems during make buildworld,
try to clean the object files directory, which is typically
/usr/obj:
cd /usr/obj; rm -rf *
And retry to build the world. This will require due to not
proper cleaning mechanizm of FreeBSD's build framework.
[201603XX] noexec and ASLR changes
__HardenedBSD_version = 44
Fixed noexec's paxflags parser to get usable system on
bronen setups too.
Changed ASLR stack randomization settings on 32 machines.
[20160316] ASLR cleanup
__HardenedBSD_version = 43
Since the hardening.pax.aslr.*_len variables are no longer
available outside of loader.conf(5), remove them from
struct hbsd_features, which gets embedded in struct
prison. This change makes the hardening.pax.aslr.*_len
variables a global setting, rather than a per-jail setting.
[20160225] RTLD noexec
__HardenedBSD_version = 42
Enforce nonexec thread stacks, driven by the RTLD.
[20160213] rewritten internals
__HardenedBSD_version = 41
Changed hardenedBSD core structures.
Dropped ptrace_hardening.
Dropped ASLR bit settings.
Fixed hbsd_update_build bug.
Added skeleton file.
Changed feature strings.
Changed noexec implicit rules.
[20160123] add pax_get_hardenedbsd_version API
__HardenedBSD_version = 40
Add pax_get_hardenedbsd_version() API to query hardening's version
from kernel codes.
Add new types, which represents the PAX_FLAGS.
[20151225] redo rework internal structures
__HardenedBSD_version = 39
Change pax_get_prison(...) to pax_get_prison_td(...) where possible.
Fix one segvguard related issue.
Changed pax_elf signature.
We reverted this code in version 37, because we observed weird
issue, but this issues was unrelated to the reworked internals.
The true root of the problem was a secadm bug and the issue fixed
with version 38.
[20151218] reworked MAP_32BIT mmap randomization
__HardenedBSD_version = 38
Previously the MAP_32BIT case mmap randomization was an ASR,
to fix this and some other issue with the MAP_32BIT related
mmap, implement a proper ASLR.
Upstream fixed stability issues with higher order PID randomization
[20151208] revert the reworked internal structures
__HardenedBSD_version = 37
revert: Change pax_get_prison(...) to pax_get_prison_td(...) where possible.
revert: Changed pax_elf signature.
[20151206] rework internal structures
__HardenedBSD_version = 36
Change pax_get_prison(...) to pax_get_prison_td(...) where possible.
Change noexec's sysctl handlers.
Fix one segvguard related issue.
Fix randompid related issue.
Changed pax_elf signature.
[20151123] changed proc structure : added p_timekeep_base
__HardenedBSD_version = 35
Follow the recent VDSO changes from kib@.
This required to introduce new field to struct proc.
[20151018] disabled lib32 build by default
__HardenedBSD_version = 34
Do not build lib32 and 32bit related stuffs on 64bit platforms
by default.
[20150924] changed stack-protector level
__HardenedBSD_version = 33
Bump the default build settings from the --stack-protector
to --stack-protector-strong.
[20150915] ASLR changes
__HardenedBSD_version = 32
Changed default VDSO randomization from 20 bits to 28 bits.
Fixed div by zero in rare cases in pax_aslr_init_vmspace.
[20150907] Reworked DISALLOWMAP32BIT and changes some internal functions
__HardenedBSD_version = 31
Rename and correctly paxify the DISALLOWMAP32BIT.
Changed pax flags setup.
[20150905] Added MAP32_PROTECT
__HardenedBSD_version = 30
Added per-process mode to disable MAP_32BIT mode mmap(2).
[20150823] Fixed pkg bootstrap
__HardenedBSD_version = 29
With FreeBSD commit 671f0b9, use of pubkey signature_type method is explicitly disallowed.
This breaks bootstrapping with pubkey signature_type.
[20150715] Fixed vdso randomization
__HardenedBSD_version = 28
Fixed and simplified vdso and stack mapping.
[20150706] Added shared-page (vdso) randomization
__HardenedBSD_version = 27
This version brings in true stack randomization.
Changed ASLR settings:
vdso random : 20 bit
[20150701] Rewriten stack randomization, and bumped ASLR settings
__HardenedBSD_version = 26
This version brings in true stack randomization.
Changed ASLR settings:
stack random : 26 -> 42 bit
exec random : 21 -> 30 bit
[20150605] ASLR "rewrite" and NOEXEC fixes after jhb's vm_mmap.c changes
__HardenedBSD_version = 25
__HardenedBSD_version = 24
Move the mmap randomization to it's own place and add more state enforcements (KASSERTs).
Added locking around pax_aslr_mmap(...).
Factore out the MAP_32BIT related code from pax_aslr_mmap(...), and move to pax_aslr_mmap_map_32bit(...)
[20150604] fix ASLR - randomize the rtld's shared object too
__HardenedBSD_version = 23
Randomize the rtld's address before load them in imgact_elf.c
[20150604] added PAX_NOTE_{,NO}SHLIBRANDOM extension
__HardenedBSD_version = 22
This feature will fix the issue mentioned on issue #137
[20150528] Changed internal structure, removed hardening.pax.segvguard.debug sysctl
__HardenedBSD_version = 21
Changed internal structure
Removed hardening.pax.segvguard.debug sysctl
[20150415] Bumped stack randomization
__HardenedBSD_version = 20
Increased stack randomization from 20 bit to 26 bit.
[20150415] Fixed stack randomization
__HardenedBSD_version = 19
[20150408] How to get HardenedBSD and HardenedBSD-ports?
Without git/svnlite:
HardenedBSD source:
# fetch https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD/archive/hardened/current/master.tar.gz -o hardenedbsd-src.tar.gz
# tar xf hardenedbsd-src.tar.gz
# mv hardenedBSD-hardened-current-master /usr/src
HardenedBSD ports:
# fetch https://github.com/HardenedBSD/freebsd-ports/archive/master.tar.gz -o hardenedbsd-ports.tar.gz
# tar xf hardenedbsd-ports.tar.gz
# mv freebsd-ports-master /usr/ports
Secadm:
# fetch https://github.com/HardenedBSD/secadm/archive/master.tar.gz -o secadm.tar.gz
# tar xf secadm.tar.gz
With git:
HardenedBSD-source:
# git clone https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD.git /usr/src
HardenedBSD ports:
# git clone https://github.com/HardenedBSD/freebsd-ports.git /usr/ports
Secadm:
# git clone https://github.com/HardenedBSD/secadm.git
With svnlite (much more slower than git version):
HardenedBSD-source:
# svnlite co https://github.com/HardenedBSD/hardenedBSD.git /usr/src
HardenedBSD ports:
# svnlite co https://github.com/HardenedBSD/freebsd-ports.git /usr/ports
Secadm:
# svnlite co https://github.com/HardenedBSD/secadm.git
[20150404] Added secadm hook to rtld
__HardenedBSD_version = 18
Added integriforce secadm hook to rtld to validate
shared object before loading them.
[20150318] Merged first part of NOEXEC project
__HardenedBSD_version = 17
This is the first part of PaX's MPROTECT restriction:
* this merge brings per process level restriction settings
* eliminated the linux's sound related mmap weakness
* improved the logging
...
If you have problem with your application, then install
secadm:
* from pkg:
pkg install secadm
* or from github:
# git clone https://github.com/hardenedbsd/secadm
# cd secadm
# make && make install
[201502011] Changed kernel knobs
Added ``options PAX`` to enable the HardenedBSD framework.
All other PAX_* knob depends on PAX knob.
[20150131] Upgrading from systems before "HBSD: Revert the chacha20 import in full."
After the "HBSD: Revert the chacha20 import in full." commit
we lost the compatibility with the previous version, this
means ABI break, and the system is unable to properly boot.
In the background is the removed VM_INHERIT_ZERO flag, which
was previously used in libc.
The solution is to install the new world, before you booting to the new kernel.
1. make buildworld kernel
2. IMPORTANT: install world before you reboot
2.1. mergemaster -p && make installworld && mergemaster
3. reboot
4. start in single user mode
5. cd /usr/src
6. make delete-old delete-old-libs
7. if you have buildworld or buildkernel error,
where the cc aborting and dumping core,
then you need to delete the content of /usr/obj directory:
7.1 cd /usr/obj
7.2 rm -rf *
And probably a full ports rebuild required too...
Reference in New Issue View Git Blame Copy Permalink